On Thu, Aug 27 2026 at 15:46, H. Peter Anvin wrote:
Can anyone *please* find out what the actual security requirements are for the
syscall randomization offset?
The original checkin, 39218ff4c625 ("stack: Optionally randomize kernel stack
offset each syscall") indicates that it is fundamental that the stack offset
is applied *after* pt_regs pushing, but that isn't documented anywhere in the
kernel sources as far as I can tell.
However, I have also come to understand that there are further, undocumented
constraints; at least at one point I was told that "the offset should not be
stored in memory while running in the kernel", which seems more than a bit odd.
This thread has the initial discussions about it with more explanations:
https://lore.kernel.org/kernel-hardening/2236FBA76BA1254E88B949DDB74E612BA4BC57C1@IRSMSX102.ger.corp.intel.com/
Thanks,
tglx