Re: [PATCH V2] powerpc/syscall: Fix seccomp errno handling with GENERIC_ENTRY
From: Shrikanth Hegde <hidden>
Date: 2026-06-30 20:11:41
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Hi Mukesh. On 6/29/26 11:59 PM, Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya (IBM) wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
After enabling GENERIC_ENTRY on PowerPC, seccomp filters using SCMP_ACT_ERRNO without an explicit errnoRet value return ENOSYS (Function not implemented) instead of the expected EPERM (Operation not permitted). The issue occurs in system_call_exception() when syscall_enter_from_user_mode() returns -1 to indicate the syscall should be skipped (e.g., blocked by seccomp). The current code treats this -1 as a syscall number and compares it against NR_syscalls. Since -1 is greater than NR_syscalls, the code incorrectly returns -ENOSYS, overwriting the errno that seccomp already set via syscall_set_return_value(). The generic entry code in syscall_trace_enter() calls __secure_computing(), which sets the appropriate errno in regs->gpr[3] and returns -1 to signal that the syscall should be skipped. However, the PowerPC syscall handler was not checking for this -1 return value before validating the syscall number. Fix this by explicitly checking if syscall_enter_from_user_mode() returns -1 and returning the value already set in regs->gpr[3] (the errno from seccomp) before performing the syscall number validation. Also Move the syscall_enter_from_user_mode() call and the seccomp/ptrace skip check to after the NR_syscalls bounds check. When syscall -1 was passed, the r0 == -1L check would trigger before the NR_syscalls check, causing syscall_get_error() to return 0 instead of -ENOSYS. This resulted in a silent success (ret=0, errno=0) instead of the expected ENOSYS error. By moving syscall_enter_from_user_mode() after the bounds check, an initial syscall number of -1 is correctly rejected with -ENOSYS first. The seccomp/ptrace skip path still works correctly for valid syscall numbers that get overridden to -1 by seccomp or ptrace. This aligns PowerPC's behavior with other architectures using GENERIC_ENTRY and restores correct seccomp errno handling. Fixes: bee25f97ad24 ("powerpc: Enable GENERIC_ENTRY feature") Reported-by: Michal Suchánek <redacted> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/ajpp-_XnbF3UTM_E@kunlun.suse.cz/ (local) Signed-off-by: Mukesh Kumar Chaurasiya (IBM) <redacted> --- v1 -> v2: - Fix issues in the previous fix (Michal) v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260624171520.772408-1-mkchauras@gmail.com (local) arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c | 7 ++++++- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c index a9da2af6efa8..36d73933a311 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long r0) syscall_fn f; add_random_kstack_offset(); - r0 = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, r0); if (unlikely(r0 >= NR_syscalls)) { if (unlikely(trap_is_unsupported_scv(regs))) {@@ -31,6 +30,12 @@ notrace long system_call_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long r0) return -ENOSYS; } + r0 = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, r0); +
I see many arch first do syscall_enter_from_user_mode and then check for return value.
take x86 for example,
__visible noinstr bool do_syscall_64(struct pt_regs *regs, int nr)
{
nr = syscall_enter_from_user_mode(regs, nr);
if (!do_syscall_x64(regs, nr) && !do_syscall_x32(regs, nr) && nr != -1) {
/* Invalid system call, but still a system call. */
regs->ax = __x64_sys_ni_syscall(regs);
}
}
So seccomp fails silently there if initial nr was -1?
+ /* Seccomp or ptrace may have set return value, skip syscall */ + if (unlikely(r0 == -1L)) + return syscall_get_error(current, regs); + /* May be faster to do array_index_nospec? */ barrier_nospec();
Code per se, looks okay to me.