Re: [PATCH v6 00/20] dma-mapping: Use DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED through direct, pool and swiotlb paths
From: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@kernel.org>
Date: 2026-06-18 08:37:42
Also in:
linux-arm-kernel, linux-coco, linux-iommu, linux-s390, lkml
Alexey Kardashevskiy [off-list ref] writes:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
On 10/6/26 00:47, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:quoted
On Tue, Jun 09, 2026 at 02:43:08PM +0100, Catalin Marinas wrote:quoted
On Thu, Jun 04, 2026 at 02:09:39PM +0530, Aneesh Kumar K.V (Arm) wrote:quoted
This series propagates DMA_ATTR_CC_SHARED through the dma-direct, dma-pool, and swiotlb paths so that encrypted and decrypted DMA buffers are handled consistently. Today, the direct DMA path mostly relies on force_dma_unencrypted() for shared/decrypted buffer handling. This series consolidates the force_dma_unencrypted() checks in the top-level functions and ensures that the remaining DMA interfaces use DMA attributes to make the correct decisions.Please check Sashiko's reports, it has some good points: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260604083959.1265923-1-aneesh.kumar@kernel.org I think the main one is the swiotlb_tbl_map_single() changes which break AMD SME host support. There cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT) is true but force_dma_unencrypted() is false. Normally you'd not end up on this path but you can have swiotlb=force.IMHO that's an AMD issue, not with the design of this series.. The series is right, a device that is !force_dma_decrypted() must be considerd to be a trusted device and we must never place any DMA mappings for a trusted device into shared memory.swiotlb=force forces swiotlb, not decryption.quoted
That AMD has done somethine insane: bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) { /* * For SEV, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses. */ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) return true; /* * For SME, all DMA must be to unencrypted addresses if the * device does not support DMA to addresses that include the * encryption mask. */ if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) { u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, dev->bus_dma_limit); if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) return true; }So when I try "mem_encrypt=on iommu=pt swiotlb=force" with this patchset, it fails to boot. But it boots with a hack like this: ===@@ -39,7 +41,7 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) return true; } - return false; + return swiotlb_force_bounce; }=== Or we say "mem_encrypt=on iommu=pt swiotlb=force" combo is just weird and we won't be supporting which bit in this? Thanks,
Something like? modified arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev) u64 dma_enc_mask = DMA_BIT_MASK(__ffs64(sme_me_mask)); u64 dma_dev_mask = min_not_zero(dev->coherent_dma_mask, dev->bus_dma_limit); + /* + * With memory encryption enabled, SWIOTLB is marked decrypted. + * If SWIOTLB bouncing is forced, treat the device as requiring + * decrypted DMA. + */ + if (is_swiotlb_force_bounce(dev)) + return true; if (dma_dev_mask <= dma_enc_mask) return true; -aneesh