[PATCH 1/3] integrity: Make arch_ima_get_secureboot integrity-wide
From: Coiby Xu <hidden>
Date: 2026-01-15 00:43:44
Also in:
keyrings, linux-arm-kernel, linux-efi, linux-integrity, linux-s390, linux-security-module, lkml
Subsystem:
arm64 port (aarch64 architecture), extensible firmware interface (efi), extended verification module (evm), integrity measurement architecture (ima), linux for powerpc (32-bit and 64-bit), s390 architecture, security subsystem, the rest, x86 architecture (32-bit and 64-bit) · Maintainers:
Catalin Marinas, Will Deacon, Ard Biesheuvel, Mimi Zohar, Roberto Sassu, Dmitry Kasatkin, Madhavan Srinivasan, Heiko Carstens, Vasily Gorbik, Alexander Gordeev, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds, Thomas Gleixner, Ingo Molnar, Borislav Petkov, Dave Hansen
EVM and other LSMs need the ability to query the secure boot status of the system, without directly calling the IMA arch_ima_get_secureboot function. Refactor the secure boot status check into a general, integrity-wide function named arch_integrity_get_secureboot. Define a new Kconfig option CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT, which is automatically configured by the supported architectures. The existing IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT Kconfig loads the architecture specific IMA policy based on the refactored secure boot status code. Reported-and-suggested-by: Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] Suggested-by: Roberto Sassu <redacted> Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <redacted> --- arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/powerpc/Kconfig | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c | 5 -- arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c | 13 +++++ arch/s390/Kconfig | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c | 6 -- arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c | 9 +++ arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h | 4 +- arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 2 +- include/linux/ima.h | 7 +-- include/linux/integrity.h | 8 +++ security/integrity/Kconfig | 6 ++ security/integrity/Makefile | 3 + security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 +- security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c | 47 +--------------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 4 +- security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c | 2 +- 21 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c create mode 100644 arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig
index 93173f0a09c7..4c265b7386bb 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig@@ -2427,6 +2427,7 @@ config EFI select EFI_STUB select EFI_GENERIC_STUB imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT + imply INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT default y help This option provides support for runtime services provided
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
index 9537a61ebae0..878f752c35fb 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ config PPC_SECURE_BOOT depends on PPC_POWERNV || PPC_PSERIES depends on IMA_ARCH_POLICY imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT + imply INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT select PSERIES_PLPKS if PPC_PSERIES help Systems with firmware secure boot enabled need to define security
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
index 2f0a2e69c607..3bb1fb9a1e0e 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/Makefile@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ ifneq ($(CONFIG_PPC_POWERNV)$(CONFIG_PPC_SVM),) obj-y += ucall.o endif -obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o secvar-ops.o +obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECURE_BOOT) += secure_boot.o ima_arch.o integrity_sb_arch.o secvar-ops.o obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_SECVAR_SYSFS) += secvar-sysfs.o # Disable GCOV, KCOV & sanitizers in odd or sensitive code
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
index b7029beed847..0d8892a03526 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ima_arch.c@@ -7,11 +7,6 @@ #include <linux/ima.h> #include <asm/secure_boot.h> -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) -{ - return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(); -} - /* * The "secure_rules" are enabled only on "secureboot" enabled systems. * These rules verify the file signatures against known good values.
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..29f9494391a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2019 IBM Corporation + * Author: Nayna Jain + */ + +#include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <asm/secure_boot.h> + +bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return is_ppc_secureboot_enabled(); +}
diff --git a/arch/s390/Kconfig b/arch/s390/Kconfig
index 0e5fad5f06ca..db0383b19493 100644
--- a/arch/s390/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/s390/Kconfig@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ config S390 # Note: keep this list sorted alphabetically # imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT + imply INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT select ALTERNATE_USER_ADDRESS_SPACE select ARCH_32BIT_USTAT_F_TINODE select ARCH_CORRECT_STACKTRACE_ON_KRETPROBE
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile b/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile
index 42c83d60d6fa..ee976a27e677 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/Makefile@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += machine_kexec_file.o kexec_image.o obj-$(CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE) += kexec_elf.o obj-$(CONFIG_CERT_STORE) += cert_store.o obj-$(CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT) += ima_arch.o +obj-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT) += integrity_sb_arch.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += perf_event.o obj-$(CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS) += perf_cpum_cf.o perf_cpum_sf.o
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
index f3c3e6e1c5d3..6ccbe34ce408 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/ima_arch.c@@ -1,12 +1,6 @@ // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/ima.h> -#include <asm/boot_data.h> - -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) -{ - return ipl_secure_flag; -} const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) {
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c b/arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..208a28cb9961
--- /dev/null
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/integrity_sb_arch.c@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +#include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <asm/boot_data.h> + +bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return ipl_secure_flag; +}
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 80527299f859..5051cc80309a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig@@ -330,6 +330,7 @@ config X86 select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B if X86_64 || X86_ALIGNMENT_16 select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_4B imply IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT if EFI + imply INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT if EFI select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_NO_PATCHABLE select ARCH_SUPPORTS_PT_RECLAIM if X86_64 select ARCH_SUPPORTS_SCHED_SMT if SMP
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
index f227a70ac91f..d409f11da331 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/efi.h@@ -401,9 +401,9 @@ extern int __init efi_memmap_split_count(efi_memory_desc_t *md, extern void __init efi_memmap_insert(struct efi_memory_map *old_memmap, void *buf, struct efi_mem_range *mem); -extern enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode(void); +enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_integrity_efi_boot_mode(void); -#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode() +#define arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode __x86_integrity_efi_boot_mode() #ifdef CONFIG_EFI_RUNTIME_MAP int efi_get_runtime_map_size(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 463b784499a8..94704858f17a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c@@ -921,7 +921,7 @@ umode_t efi_attr_is_visible(struct kobject *kobj, struct attribute *attr, int n) return attr->mode; } -enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_ima_efi_boot_mode(void) +enum efi_secureboot_mode __x86_integrity_efi_boot_mode(void) { return boot_params.secure_boot; }
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index 8e29cb4e6a01..fc0ce1e27a2f 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> +#include <linux/integrity.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> struct linux_binprm;
@@ -72,14 +73,8 @@ int __init ima_get_kexec_buffer(void **addr, size_t *size); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_SECURE_AND_OR_TRUSTED_BOOT -extern bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void); extern const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void); #else -static inline bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) -{ - return false; -} - static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) { return NULL;
diff --git a/include/linux/integrity.h b/include/linux/integrity.h
index f5842372359b..39e8961b58dd 100644
--- a/include/linux/integrity.h
+++ b/include/linux/integrity.h@@ -61,5 +61,13 @@ integrity_inode_attrs_changed(const struct integrity_inode_attributes *attrs, !inode_eq_iversion(inode, attrs->version)); } +#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT +bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void); +#else +static inline bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void) +{ + return false; +} +#endif #endif /* _LINUX_INTEGRITY_H */
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 916d4f2bfc44..1c3e54df3b73 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig@@ -97,6 +97,12 @@ config INTEGRITY_CA_MACHINE_KEYRING_MAX will not be loaded. The remaining MOK keys are loaded into the .platform keyring. +config INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT + bool + help + This option is selected by architectures to provide secure boot + related helper functions. + config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING depends on EFI
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 92b63039c654..08622460e6fd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile@@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_IPL_KEYS) += platform_certs/load_ipl_s390.o integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_PPC_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \ platform_certs/load_powerpc.o \ platform_certs/keyring_handler.o +ifeq ($(CONFIG_EFI),y) +integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SECURE_BOOT) += efi_secureboot.o +endif # The relative order of the 'ima' and 'evm' LSMs depends on the order below. obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima/ obj-$(CONFIG_EVM) += evm/
diff --git a/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..93d5086217d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/efi_secureboot.c@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-1.0+ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation + */ +#include <linux/efi.h> +#include <linux/integrity.h> +#include <asm/efi.h> + +#ifndef arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode +#define arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset +#endif + +static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void) +{ + enum efi_secureboot_mode mode; + + if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) { + pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n"); + return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; + } + + mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable); + if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled) + pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode disabled\n"); + else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) + pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode unknown\n"); + else + pr_info("integrity: secureboot mode enabled\n"); + return mode; +} + +/* + * Query secure boot status + * + * Note don't call this function too early e.g. in __setup hook otherwise the + * kernel may hang when calling efi_get_secureboot_mode. + * + */ +bool arch_integrity_get_secureboot(void) +{ + static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode; + static bool initialized; + + if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { + sb_mode = arch_integrity_efi_boot_mode; + + if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) + sb_mode = get_sb_mode(); + initialized = true; + } + + if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled) + return true; + else + return false; +}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 5149ff4fd50d..f45106cad443 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ core_param(ima_appraise, ima_appraise_cmdline_default, charp, 0); void __init ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void) { const char *str = ima_appraise_cmdline_default; - bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot(); + bool sb_state = arch_integrity_get_secureboot(); int appraisal_state = ima_appraise; if (!str)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
index 138029bfcce1..d6545ae446c7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_efi.c@@ -2,52 +2,8 @@ /* * Copyright (C) 2018 IBM Corporation */ -#include <linux/efi.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/ima.h> -#include <asm/efi.h> - -#ifndef arch_ima_efi_boot_mode -#define arch_ima_efi_boot_mode efi_secureboot_mode_unset -#endif - -static enum efi_secureboot_mode get_sb_mode(void) -{ - enum efi_secureboot_mode mode; - - if (!efi_rt_services_supported(EFI_RT_SUPPORTED_GET_VARIABLE)) { - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown, no efi\n"); - return efi_secureboot_mode_unknown; - } - - mode = efi_get_secureboot_mode(efi.get_variable); - if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_disabled) - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode disabled\n"); - else if (mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unknown) - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode unknown\n"); - else - pr_info("ima: secureboot mode enabled\n"); - return mode; -} - -bool arch_ima_get_secureboot(void) -{ - static enum efi_secureboot_mode sb_mode; - static bool initialized; - - if (!initialized && efi_enabled(EFI_BOOT)) { - sb_mode = arch_ima_efi_boot_mode; - - if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_unset) - sb_mode = get_sb_mode(); - initialized = true; - } - - if (sb_mode == efi_secureboot_mode_enabled) - return true; - else - return false; -} /* secureboot arch rules */ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = {
@@ -67,7 +23,8 @@ static const char * const sb_arch_rules[] = { const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) { - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_ARCH_POLICY) && + arch_integrity_get_secureboot()) { if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MODULE_SIG)) set_module_sig_enforced(); if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG))
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 5770cf691912..3f267557dfbe 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c@@ -949,8 +949,8 @@ static int ima_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) switch (id) { case LOADING_KEXEC_IMAGE: - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) - && arch_ima_get_secureboot()) { + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KEXEC_SIG) && + arch_integrity_get_secureboot()) { pr_err("impossible to appraise a kernel image without a file descriptor; try using kexec_file_load syscall.\n"); return -EACCES; }
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index d1fdd113450a..3042a0c536d6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ static int __init load_uefi_certs(void) } /* the MOK/MOKx can not be trusted when secure boot is disabled */ - if (!arch_ima_get_secureboot()) + if (!arch_integrity_get_secureboot()) return 0; mokx = get_cert_list(L"MokListXRT", &mok_var, &mokxsize, &status);
--
2.52.0