On Fri, May 2, 2025, at 15:30, James Bottomley wrote:

On Fri, 2025-05-02 at 08:53 +0200, Thomas Weißschuh wrote:

quoted

Specifically the output of any party can recreate bit-by-bit
identical copies of all specified artifacta previous build (the
public key, module signatures) is not available during the rebuild or
verification.

You just strip the signatures before verifying reproducibility.

If the goal is: "verify the Linux Kernel is reproducible", that could work.
It gets increasingly cumbersome when you're trying to check the reproducibility
of some larger artifact that embeds the Linux kernel (and lots of other stuff),
like an ISO or disk image, though: you'd have to unpack/mount it, check all its
contents individually (perhaps recursively), and strip signatures in 'just the
right places'.

Writing such tooling is a chore, but of course feasible: diffoscope already
comes a long way (though checking large images may take some resources). The
problem is trusting such tooling: instead of 'simply' checking the images are
identical, suddenly I now have to convince myself there's no shenanigans
possible in the disk image interpretation and other check tooling, which gets
nontrivial fast.

All current secure
build processes (hermetic builds, SLSA and the like) are requiring
output provenance (i.e. signed artifacts).  If you try to stand like
Canute against this tide saying "no signed builds", you're simply
opposing progress for the sake of it

I don't think anyone is saying 'no signed builds', but we'd enjoy being able to
keep the signatures as detached metadata instead of having to embed them into
the 'actual' artifacts.


Kind regards,

Arnout