On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 08:17:42AM +0000, Christophe Leroy wrote:
+Nathan as this is RTAS related.
Le 21/08/2018 à 20:42, Breno Leitao a écrit :
quoted
The rtas syscall reads a value from a user-provided structure and uses it
to index an array, being a possible area for a potential spectre v1 attack.
This is the code that exposes this problem.
args.rets = &args.args[nargs];
The nargs is an user provided value, and the below code is an example where
the 'nargs' value would be set to XX.
struct rtas_args ra;
ra.nargs = htobe32(XX);
syscall(__NR_rtas, &ra);
This patch has been hanging around in patchwork since 2018 and doesn't
apply anymore. Is it still relevant ? If so, can you rebase et resubmit ?
This seems to be important, since nargs is a user-provided value. I can
submit it if the maintainers are willing to accept. I do not want to
spend my time if no one is willing to review it.
Thanks for revamping this one.