Re: [PATCH v1 3/4] KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: migrate remaining normal-GFNs to secure-GFNs in H_SVM_INIT_DONE
From: Bharata B Rao <hidden>
Date: 2020-06-04 02:33:49
On Wed, Jun 03, 2020 at 04:10:25PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:
On Tue, Jun 02, 2020 at 03:36:39PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:quoted
On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 12:05:35PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:quoted
On Mon, Jun 01, 2020 at 05:25:18PM +0530, Bharata B Rao wrote:quoted
On Sat, May 30, 2020 at 07:27:50PM -0700, Ram Pai wrote:quoted
H_SVM_INIT_DONE incorrectly assumes that the Ultravisor has explicitly called H_SVM_PAGE_IN for all secure pages.I don't think that is quite true. HV doesn't assume anything about secure pages by itself.Yes. Currently, it does not assume anything about secure pages. But I am proposing that it should consider all pages (except the shared pages) as secure pages, when H_SVM_INIT_DONE is called.Ok, then may be also add the proposed changes to H_SVM_INIT_DONE documentation.ok.quoted
quoted
In other words, HV should treat all pages; except shared pages, as secure pages once H_SVM_INIT_DONE is called. And this includes pages added subsequently through memory hotplug.So after H_SVM_INIT_DONE, if HV touches a secure page for any reason and gets encrypted contents via page-out, HV drops the device pfn at that time. So what state we would be in that case? We have completed H_SVM_INIT_DONE, but still have a normal (but encrypted) page in HV?Good point. The corresponding GFN will continue to be a secure GFN. Just that its backing PFN is not a device-PFN, but a memory-PFN. Also that backing memory-PFN contains encrypted content. I will clarify this in the patch; about secure-GFN state.
I feel all this is complicating the states in HV and is avoidable if UV just issued page-in calls during memslot registration uvcall. Regards, Bharata.