Re: [PATCH v5 01/10] capabilities: introduce CAP_PERFMON to kernel and user space
From: Alexey Budankov <hidden>
Date: 2020-02-07 13:39:23
Also in:
intel-gfx, linux-arm-kernel, linux-perf-users, linux-security-module, lkml, selinux
On 07.02.2020 14:38, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
Alexey Budankov [off-list ref] writes:quoted
On 22.01.2020 17:25, Alexey Budankov wrote:quoted
On 22.01.2020 17:07, Stephen Smalley wrote:quoted
quoted
It keeps the implementation simple and readable. The implementation is more performant in the sense of calling the API - one capable() call for CAP_PERFMON privileged process. Yes, it bloats audit log for CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged and unprivileged processes, but this bloating also advertises and leverages using more secure CAP_PERFMON based approach to use perf_event_open system call.I can live with that. We just need to document that when you see both a CAP_PERFMON and a CAP_SYS_ADMIN audit message for a process, try only allowing CAP_PERFMON first and see if that resolves the issue. We have a similar issue with CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH versus CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE.perf security [1] document can be updated, at least, to align and document this audit logging specifics.And I plan to update the document right after this patch set is accepted. Feel free to let me know of the places in the kernel docs that also require update w.r.t CAP_PERFMON extension.The documentation update wants be part of the patch set and not planned to be done _after_ the patch set is merged.
Well, accepted. It is going to make patches #11 and beyond. Thanks, Alexey
Thanks,
tglx