Re: [PATCH v2] powerpc/xmon: add read-only mode
flat view
From: Oliver <oohall@gmail.com>
Date: 2019-04-10 06:55:13
On Wed, Apr 10, 2019 at 12:35 PM Christopher M Riedl [off-list ref] wrote:
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On April 8, 2019 at 1:34 AM Oliver [off-list ref] wrote: On Mon, Apr 8, 2019 at 1:06 PM Christopher M. Riedl [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
Operations which write to memory and special purpose registers should be restricted on systems with integrity guarantees (such as Secure Boot) and, optionally, to avoid self-destructive behaviors. Add a config option, XMON_RW, to control default xmon behavior along with kernel cmdline options xmon=ro and xmon=rw for explicit control. Use XMON_RW instead of XMON in the condition to set PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT to allow xmon in read-only mode alongside write-protected kernel text. XMON_RW defaults to !STRICT_KERNEL_RWX. The following xmon operations are affected: memops: disable memmove disable memset disable memzcan memex: no-op'd mwrite super_regs: no-op'd write_spr bpt_cmds: disable proc_call: disable Signed-off-by: Christopher M. Riedl <redacted> --- v1->v2: Use bool type for xmon_is_ro flag Replace XMON_RO with XMON_RW config option Make XMON_RW dependent on STRICT_KERNEL_RWXDo you mean make it dependent on XMON?Yeah that's really not clear at all -- XMON_RW is set based on the value of STRICT_KERNEL_RWX.quoted
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Use XMON_RW to control PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT Add printf in xmon read-only mode when dropping/skipping writes Disable memzcan (zero-fill memop) in xmon read-only mode arch/powerpc/Kconfig.debug | 10 +++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h | 5 ++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h | 5 ++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h | 5 ++- arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)diff --git a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig.debug b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig.debug index 4e00cb0a5464..0c7f21476018 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/Kconfig.debug +++ b/arch/powerpc/Kconfig.debug@@ -117,6 +117,16 @@ config XMON_DISASSEMBLY to say Y here, unless you're building for a memory-constrained system.quoted
+config XMON_RW + bool "Allow xmon read and write operations" + depends on XMON + default !STRICT_KERNEL_RWX + help + Allow xmon to read and write to memory and special-purpose registers. + Conversely, prevent xmon write access when set to N. Read and write + access can also be explicitly controlled with 'xmon=rw' or 'xmon=ro' + (read-only) cmdline options. Default is !STRICT_KERNEL_RWX.Maybe I am a dumb, but I found this *extremely* confusing. Conventionally Kconfig options will control what code is and is not included in the kernel (see XMON_DISASSEMBLY) rather than changing the default behaviour of code. It's not wrong to do so and I'm going to assume that you were following the pattern of XMON_DEFAULT, but I think you need to be a little more clear about what option actually does. Renaming it to XMON_DEFAULT_RO_MODE and re-wording the description to indicate it's a only a mode change would help a lot. Sorry if this comes across as pointless bikeshedding since it's the opposite of what Christophe said in the last patch, but this was a bit of a head scratcher.If anyone is dumb here it's me for making this confusing :) I chatted with Michael Ellerman about this, so let me try to explain this more clearly. There are two things I am trying to address with XMON_RW: 1) provide a default access mode for xmon based on system "security" 2) replace XMON in the decision to write-protect kernel text at compile-time I think a single Kconfig for both of those things is sensible as ultimately the point is to allow xmon to operate in read-only mode on "secure" systems -- without violating any integrity/security guarantees (such as write-protected kernel text). Christophe suggested looking at STRICT_KERNEL_RWX and I think that option makes the most sense to base XMON_RW on since the description for STRICT_KERNEL_RWX states:quoted
If this is set, kernel text and rodata memory will be made read-only, and non-text memory will be made non-executable. This provides protection against certain security exploits (e.g. executing the heap or modifying text) These features are considered standard security practice these days. You should say Y here in almost all cases.Considering this, does XMON_DEFAULT_RO_MODE really make things more clear?
Not really.
With that said, I will remove the 'xmon=rw' cmdline option as it really doesn't work since kernel text is write-protected at compile time.
I think you're overestimating the importance of being able to write to the kernel text. The only features that require a writeable text are using the mem commands to modify the kernel text (a bad idea) and software breakpoints. Funnily enough, enabling STRICT_RWX make software breakpoints work again since it enables a smarter implementation of patch_instruction() that uses a temporary RW mapping to do the patch. Considering that kprobes and dynamic ftrace are also implemented with patch_instruction() too we could just default to the newer implementation and force PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT to be PAGE_KERNEL_ROX all the time.
'xmon=ro' remains for those who would optionally like to prevent shooting themselves in the foot/feet while using xmon. Hopefully this makes a bit more sense now?quoted
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config DEBUGGER bool depends on KGDB || XMONdiff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h index aa8406b8f7ba..615144ad667d 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/32/pgtable.h@@ -86,8 +86,9 @@ static inline bool pte_user(pte_t pte) * set breakpoints anywhere, so don't write protect the kernel text * on platforms where such control is possible. */ -#if defined(CONFIG_KGDB) || defined(CONFIG_XMON) || defined(CONFIG_BDI_SWITCH) ||\ - defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE) +#if defined(CONFIG_KGDB) || defined(CONFIG_XMON_RW) || \ + defined(CONFIG_BDI_SWITCH) || defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) || \ + defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE) #define PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT PAGE_KERNEL_X #else #define PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT PAGE_KERNEL_ROXdiff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h index 581f91be9dd4..bc4655122f6b 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/pgtable.h@@ -168,8 +168,9 @@ * set breakpoints anywhere, so don't write protect the kernel text * on platforms where such control is possible. */ -#if defined(CONFIG_KGDB) || defined(CONFIG_XMON) || defined(CONFIG_BDI_SWITCH) || \ - defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE) +#if defined(CONFIG_KGDB) || defined(CONFIG_XMON_RW) || \ + defined(CONFIG_BDI_SWITCH) || defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) || \ + defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE) #define PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT PAGE_KERNEL_X #else #define PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT PAGE_KERNEL_ROXdiff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h index 1ca1c1864b32..c052931bd243 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/nohash/pgtable.h@@ -22,8 +22,9 @@ * set breakpoints anywhere, so don't write protect the kernel text * on platforms where such control is possible. */ -#if defined(CONFIG_KGDB) || defined(CONFIG_XMON) || defined(CONFIG_BDI_SWITCH) ||\ - defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) || defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE) +#if defined(CONFIG_KGDB) || defined(CONFIG_XMON_RW) || \ + defined(CONFIG_BDI_SWITCH) || defined(CONFIG_KPROBES) || \ + defined(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE) #define PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT PAGE_KERNEL_X #else #define PAGE_KERNEL_TEXT PAGE_KERNEL_ROXdiff --git a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c index a0f44f992360..224ca0b3506b 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/xmon/xmon.c@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static int set_indicator_token = RTAS_UNKNOWN_SERVICE; #endif static unsigned long in_xmon __read_mostly = 0; static int xmon_on = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XMON_DEFAULT); +static bool xmon_is_ro = !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XMON_RW); static unsigned long adrs; static int size = 1;@@ -202,6 +203,8 @@ static void dump_tlb_book3e(void); #define GETWORD(v) (((v)[0] << 24) + ((v)[1] << 16) + ((v)[2] << 8) + (v)[3]) #endif +static const char *xmon_is_ro_warn = "xmon read-only mode: skipping write\n"; + static char *help_string = "\ Commands:\n\ b show breakpoints\n\@@ -989,6 +992,10 @@ cmds(struct pt_regs *excp) memlocate(); break; case 'z': + if (xmon_is_ro) { + printf(xmon_is_ro_warn); + break; + } memzcan(); break; case 'i':@@ -1042,6 +1049,10 @@ cmds(struct pt_regs *excp) set_lpp_cmd(); break; case 'b': + if (xmon_is_ro) { + printf(xmon_is_ro_warn); + break; + } bpt_cmds(); break; case 'C':@@ -1055,6 +1066,10 @@ cmds(struct pt_regs *excp) bootcmds(); break; case 'p': + if (xmon_is_ro) { + printf(xmon_is_ro_warn); + break; + } proccall(); break; case 'P':@@ -1777,6 +1792,11 @@ read_spr(int n, unsigned long *vp) static void write_spr(int n, unsigned long val) { + if (xmon_is_ro) { + printf(xmon_is_ro_warn); + return; + } + if (setjmp(bus_error_jmp) == 0) { catch_spr_faults = 1; sync();@@ -2016,6 +2036,12 @@ mwrite(unsigned long adrs, void *buf, int size) char *p, *q; n = 0; + + if (xmon_is_ro) { + printf(xmon_is_ro_warn); + return n; + } + if (setjmp(bus_error_jmp) == 0) { catch_memory_errors = 1; sync();@@ -2884,9 +2910,17 @@ memops(int cmd) scanhex((void *)&mcount); switch( cmd ){ case 'm': + if (xmon_is_ro) { + printf(xmon_is_ro_warn); + break; + } memmove((void *)mdest, (void *)msrc, mcount); break; case 's': + if (xmon_is_ro) { + printf(xmon_is_ro_warn); + break; + } memset((void *)mdest, mval, mcount); break; case 'd':@@ -3796,6 +3830,14 @@ static int __init early_parse_xmon(char *p) } else if (strncmp(p, "on", 2) == 0) { xmon_init(1); xmon_on = 1; + } else if (strncmp(p, "rw", 2) == 0) { + xmon_init(1); + xmon_on = 1; + xmon_is_ro = false; + } else if (strncmp(p, "ro", 2) == 0) { + xmon_init(1); + xmon_on = 1; + xmon_is_ro = true; } else if (strncmp(p, "off", 3) == 0) xmon_on = 0; else --2.21.0