On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 10:01:56PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:

Michael S. Tsirkin [off-list ref] writes:

quoted

On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 06:42:00PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:

quoted

Michael S. Tsirkin [off-list ref] writes:

quoted

On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 09:05:04PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:

quoted

Michael S. Tsirkin [off-list ref] writes:

quoted

On Wed, Mar 20, 2019 at 01:13:41PM -0300, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote:

quoted

quoted

From what I understand of the ACCESS_PLATFORM definition, the host will

only ever try to access memory addresses that are supplied to it by the
guest, so all of the secure guest memory that the host cares about is
accessible:

    If this feature bit is set to 0, then the device has same access to
    memory addresses supplied to it as the driver has. In particular,
    the device will always use physical addresses matching addresses
    used by the driver (typically meaning physical addresses used by the
    CPU) and not translated further, and can access any address supplied
    to it by the driver. When clear, this overrides any
    platform-specific description of whether device access is limited or
    translated in any way, e.g. whether an IOMMU may be present.

All of the above is true for POWER guests, whether they are secure
guests or not.

Or are you saying that a virtio device may want to access memory
addresses that weren't supplied to it by the driver?

Your logic would apply to IOMMUs as well.  For your mode, there are
specific encrypted memory regions that driver has access to but device
does not. that seems to violate the constraint.

Right, if there's a pre-configured 1:1 mapping in the IOMMU such that
the device can ignore the IOMMU for all practical purposes I would
indeed say that the logic would apply to IOMMUs as well. :-)

I guess I'm still struggling with the purpose of signalling to the
driver that the host may not have access to memory addresses that it
will never try to access.

For example, one of the benefits is to signal to host that driver does
not expect ability to access all memory. If it does, host can
fail initialization gracefully.

But why would the ability to access all memory be necessary or even
useful? When would the host access memory that the driver didn't tell it
to access?

When I say all memory I mean even memory not allowed by the IOMMU.

Yes, but why? How is that memory relevant?

It's relevant when driver is not trusted to only supply correct
addresses. The feature was originally designed to support userspace
drivers within guests.

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

But the name "sev_active" makes me scared because at least AMD guys who
were doing the sensible thing and setting ACCESS_PLATFORM

My understanding is, AMD guest-platform knows in advance that their
guest will run in secure mode and hence sets the flag at the time of VM
instantiation. Unfortunately we dont have that luxury on our platforms.

Well you do have that luxury. It looks like that there are existing
guests that already acknowledge ACCESS_PLATFORM and you are not happy
with how that path is slow. So you are trying to optimize for
them by clearing ACCESS_PLATFORM and then you have lost ability
to invoke DMA API.

For example if there was another flag just like ACCESS_PLATFORM
just not yet used by anyone, you would be all fine using that right?

Yes, a new flag sounds like a great idea. What about the definition
below?

VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_IOMMU This feature has the same meaning as
    VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM both when set and when not set, with the
    exception that the IOMMU is explicitly defined to be off or bypassed
    when accessing memory addresses supplied to the device by the
    driver. This flag should be set by the guest if offered, but to
    allow for backward-compatibility device implementations allow for it
    to be left unset by the guest. It is an error to set both this flag
    and VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.

It looks kind of narrow but it's an option.

Great!

quoted

I wonder how we'll define what's an iommu though.

Hm, it didn't occur to me it could be an issue. I'll try.

I rephrased it in terms of address translation. What do you think of
this version? The flag name is slightly different too:


VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM_NO_TRANSLATION This feature has the same
    meaning as VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM both when set and when not set,
    with the exception that address translation is guaranteed to be
    unnecessary when accessing memory addresses supplied to the device
    by the driver. Which is to say, the device will always use physical
    addresses matching addresses used by the driver (typically meaning
    physical addresses used by the CPU) and not translated further. This
    flag should be set by the guest if offered, but to allow for
    backward-compatibility device implementations allow for it to be
    left unset by the guest. It is an error to set both this flag and
    VIRTIO_F_ACCESS_PLATFORM.

Thanks, I'll think about this approach. Will respond next week.

Thanks!

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

quoted

Another idea is maybe something like virtio-iommu?

You mean, have legacy guests use virtio-iommu to request an IOMMU
bypass? If so, it's an interesting idea for new guests but it doesn't
help with guests that are out today in the field, which don't have A
virtio-iommu driver.

I presume legacy guests don't use encrypted memory so why do we
worry about them at all?

They don't use encrypted memory, but a host machine will run a mix of
secure and legacy guests. And since the hypervisor doesn't know whether
a guest will be secure or not at the time it is launched, legacy guests
will have to be launched with the same configuration as secure guests.

OK and so I think the issue is that hosts generally fail if they set
ACCESS_PLATFORM and guests do not negotiate it.
So you can not just set ACCESS_PLATFORM for everyone.
Is that the issue here?

Yes, that is one half of the issue. The other is that even if hosts
didn't fail, existing legacy guests wouldn't "take the initiative" of
not negotiating ACCESS_PLATFORM to get the improved performance. They'd
have to be modified to do that.

So there's a non-encrypted guest, hypervisor wants to set
ACCESS_PLATFORM to allow encrypted guests but that will slow down legacy
guests since their vIOMMU emulation is very slow.

So enabling support for encryption slows down non-encrypted guests. Not
great but not the end of the world, considering even older guests that
don't support ACCESS_PLATFORM are completely broken and you do not seem
to be too worried by that.

For future non-encrypted guests, bypassing the emulated IOMMU for when
that emulated IOMMU is very slow might be solvable in some other way,
e.g. with virtio-iommu. Which reminds me, could you look at
virtio-iommu as a solution for some of the issues?
Review of that patchset from that POV would be appreciated.

--
Thiago Jung Bauermann
IBM Linux Technology Center