Re: [RFC PATCH] powerpc/fsl: Add barrier_nospec implementation for NXP PowerPC Book E
From: Diana Madalina Craciun <hidden>
Date: 2018-05-29 15:22:11
Hi Scott,=0A= =0A= Thanks for the review.=0A= =0A= On 05/22/2018 11:31 PM, Scott Wood wrote:=0A=
On Tue, 2018-05-22 at 10:10 +0300, Diana Craciun wrote:=0A=quoted
Implement the barrier_nospec as a isync;sync instruction sequence.=0A= The implementation uses the infrastructure built for BOOK3S 64=0A= with the difference that for NXP platforms there is no firmware involved=
=0A=
quoted
and the need for a speculation barrier is read from the device tree.=0A= I have used the same name for the property:=0A= fsl,needs-spec-barrier-for-bounds-check=0A=Using the device tree this way means that anyone without an updated devic=
e=0A=
tree won't get the protection. I also don't see any device tree updates =
--=0A=
which chips are affected?=0A=
=0A= I was planning to have the device tree changes in a different patch-set.=0A= The affected cores are e500, e500mc, e5500, e6500.=0A= =0A=
Wouldn't it be more robust to just have the kernel=0A= check the CPU type, especially given that it already does so for a lot of=
=0A=
other purposes?=0A=
=0A= Yes, I think that it might be a better solution not to use the device=0A= tree at all.=0A= =0A=
=0A=quoted
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64=0A= void setup_barrier_nospec(void)=0A= {=0A= bool enable;=0A=@@ -44,6 +46,12 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void)=0A= =0A= enable_barrier_nospec(enable);=0A= }=0A= +#elif CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E=0A= +void setup_barrier_nospec(void)=0A= +{=0A= + enable_barrier_nospec(true);=0A= +}=0A= +#endif=0A=The call site is in FSL_BOOK3E-specific code so why not call=0A= enable_barrier_nospec() directly from there?=0A=
=0A= OK=0A= =0A=
=0A=quoted
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64=0A= ssize_t cpu_show_meltdown(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute=
=0A=
quoted
*attr, char *buf)=0A= {=0A= bool thread_priv;=0A=@@ -155,3 +164,4 @@ ssize_t cpu_show_spectre_v2(struct device *dev, stru=
ct=0A=
quoted
device_attribute *attr, c=0A= =0A= return s.len;=0A= }=0A= +#endif=0A=No equivalent of this for FSL?=0A=
=0A= There will be an equivalent for this for FSL as well. I was planning to=0A= send a different patch for this.=0A= =0A=
=0A=quoted
+#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_FSL_BOOK3E=0A= +void do_barrier_nospec_fixups_range(bool enable, void *fixup_start, voi=
d=0A=
quoted
*fixup_end)=0A= +{=0A= + unsigned int instr[2], *dest;=0A= + long *start, *end;=0A= + int i;=0A= +=0A= + start =3D fixup_start;=0A= + end =3D fixup_end;=0A= +=0A= + instr[0] =3D PPC_INST_NOP; /* nop */=0A= + instr[1] =3D PPC_INST_NOP; /* nop */=0A= +=0A= + if (enable) {=0A= + pr_info("barrier_nospec: using isync; sync as a speculation=0A= barrier\n");=0A= + instr[0] =3D PPC_INST_ISYNC;=0A= + instr[1] =3D PPC_INST_SYNC;=0A= + }=0A= +=0A= + for (i =3D 0; start < end; start++, i++) {=0A= + dest =3D (void *)start + *start;=0A= + pr_devel("patching dest %lx\n", (unsigned long)dest);=0A= +=0A= + patch_instruction(dest, instr[0]);=0A= + patch_instruction(dest + 1, instr[1]);=0A= +=0A= + }=0A= +=0A= + pr_debug("barrier-nospec: patched %d locations\n", i);=0A=Why patch nops in if not enabled? Aren't those locations already nops? =
For=0A=
that matter, how can this function even be called on FSL_BOOK3E with enab=
le !=3D=0A=
true?=0A=
=0A= There is some code in arch/powerpc/kernel/security.c which allows=0A= control of barrier_nospec via debugfs.=0A= =0A=
=0A=quoted
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/corenet_generic.c=0A=b/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/corenet_generic.c=0A= index ac191a7..11bce3d 100644=0A=--- a/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/corenet_generic.c=0A= +++ b/arch/powerpc/platforms/85xx/corenet_generic.c=0A=@@ -59,6 +59,21 @@ void __init corenet_gen_pic_init(void)=0A= }=0A= }=0A= =0A= +static void setup_spec_barrier(void)=0A= +{=0A= + struct device_node *np =3D of_find_node_by_name(NULL, "cpus");=0A= +=0A= + if (np) {=0A= + struct property *prop;=0A= +=0A= + prop =3D of_find_property(np,=0A= + "fsl,needs-spec-barrier-for-bounds-check", NULL);=0A= + if (prop)=0A= + setup_barrier_nospec();=0A= + of_node_put(np);=0A= + }=0A= +}=0A=Why is this in board code?=0A=
=0A= I will move it away from the board code.=0A= =0A=
=0A= Should there be a way for the user to choose not to enable this (editing =
the=0A=
device tree doesn't count), for a use case that is not sufficiently secur=
ity=0A=
sensitive to justify the performance loss? What is the performance impac=
t of=0A=
this patch?=0A=
=0A= My reason was that on the other architectures Spectre variant 1=0A= mitigations are not disabled either. But I think that it might be a good=0A= idea to add a bootarg parameter to disable the barrier.=0A= =0A= Regards,=0A= =0A= Diana=0A= =0A=