[PATCH 10/14] parisc/ptrace: run seccomp after ptrace
flat view
STALE3768d
From: Kees Cook <hidden>
Date: 2016-06-09 21:05:59
Also in:
linux-arch, linux-arm-kernel, linux-mips, linux-s390, linux-um, lkml
Subsystem:
parisc architecture, ptrace support, the rest · Maintainers:
"James E.J. Bottomley", Helge Deller, Oleg Nesterov, Linus Torvalds
Close the hole where ptrace can change a syscall out from under seccomp. Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <redacted> Cc: "James E.J. Bottomley" <redacted> Cc: Helge Deller <deller@gmx.de> Cc: linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org --- arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
index 8edc47c0b98e..e02d7b4d2b69 100644
--- a/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/parisc/kernel/ptrace.c@@ -311,10 +311,6 @@ long compat_arch_ptrace(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request, long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) { - /* Do the secure computing check first. */ - if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) - return -1; - if (test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACE) && tracehook_report_syscall_entry(regs)) { /*
@@ -325,6 +321,11 @@ long do_syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs) regs->gr[20] = -1UL; goto out; } + + /* Do the secure computing check after ptrace. */ + if (secure_computing(NULL) == -1) + return -1; + #ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT))) trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->gr[20]);
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2.7.4