Re: [PATCH v3 2/2] bootconfig: Fix integer overflow in initrd size check
From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Date: 2026-09-10 02:09:02
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Medium] Mismatched boundary checks for XBC_DATA_MAX cause inconsistent fallback behavior for embedded bootconfigs. - [Low] Misleading error message when bootconfig size exceeds XBC_DATA_MAX. -- commit a24325c6fe0374f1cfc3fc8cbe63efbad0f22f32 Author: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) [off-list ref] bootconfig: Fix integer overflow in initrd size check This commit fixes an integer overflow where a crafted initrd with a huge bootconfig size can cause pointer arithmetic wrap-around. It ensures the initrd bounds are respected and verifies the size does not exceed max limits. Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260910010137.EE0431F000FF@smtp.kernel.org/ (local)
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c index a9362b2cc258a..de24c41ce815e 100644 --- a/init/main.c +++ b/init/main.c
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -294,16 +295,21 @@ static void * __init get_boot_config_from_initrd(size_t *_size) found: hdr = (u8 *)(data - 8); + if ((unsigned long)hdr < initrd_start) + return NULL; + size = get_unaligned_le32(hdr); csum = get_unaligned_le32(hdr + 4); - data = ((void *)hdr) - size; - if ((unsigned long)data < initrd_start) { - pr_err("bootconfig size %d is greater than initrd size %ld\n", + if (size > XBC_DATA_MAX ||
[Severity: Medium]
If the size is exactly equal to XBC_DATA_MAX, this check passes and the
function returns a valid data pointer. This prevents the caller from falling
back to the embedded bootconfig:
init/main.c:setup_boot_config() {
...
data = get_boot_config_from_initrd(&size);
if (!data) {
data = xbc_get_embedded_bootconfig(&size);
...
}
...
}
However, setup_boot_config() uses inclusive inequality for XBC_DATA_MAX:
init/main.c:setup_boot_config() {
...
if (size >= XBC_DATA_MAX) {
pr_err("bootconfig size %ld greater than max size %d\n", ...);
return;
}
...
}
Because the limits don't match, an exact size of XBC_DATA_MAX causes
setup_boot_config() to reject the payload and abort without attempting
the fallback. Should this check use size >= XBC_DATA_MAX to match?
+ size > ((unsigned long)hdr - initrd_start)) {
+ pr_err("bootconfig size %u is greater than initrd size %lu\n",
+ size, initrd_end - initrd_start);[Severity: Low] If this error path is taken specifically because size > XBC_DATA_MAX, the error message claims the bootconfig size is greater than the initrd size. Can this message be updated to accurately reflect which limit was exceeded?
return NULL;
}
+ data = ((void *)hdr) - size;
+
if (xbc_calc_checksum(data, size) != csum) {
pr_err("bootconfig checksum failed\n");
return NULL;-- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/178900555453.200943.4719889510443114485.stgit@devnote2?part=2