Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] Race condition in `__eh_frame_remove_section()` leads to double-free, memory leak, and SRCU list corruption.
- [Critical] Unwinder error path triggers hard deadlock and NMI-safety violations by calling `eh_frame_remove_section()`.
- [Medium] Strict size matching in prctl handlers rejects UAPI structure extensions, breaking forward compatibility.
- [Medium] Silent data truncation of 64-bit `eh_frame_hdr_start` in `eh_frame_unregister()` on 32-bit platforms.
--
--- Patch [25]: [RFC PATCH v1 25/25] unwind_user/eh_frame: Add prctl() interface for (un)registering .eh_frame_hdr sections ---
commit 04469d758625968e94108e567fd1bac500c0f41d
Author: Jens Remus [off-list ref]
unwind_user/eh_frame: Add prctl() interface for (un)registering .eh_frame_hdr sections
This patch adds two new prctl options to allow dynamic linkers to register
and unregister .eh_frame_hdr sections with the kernel. It introduces the
eh_frame_setup structure to pass section bounds from userspace and adds the
corresponding handlers.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260528151023.00f5ec4e@gandalf.local.home/ (local)
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/kernel/unwind/eh_frame.c b/kernel/unwind/eh_frame.c
index 49e8a3e8d794a..12279f02381d0 100644
--- a/kernel/unwind/eh_frame.c
+++ b/kernel/unwind/eh_frame.c
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
@@ -1723,3 +1724,48 @@ void eh_frame_free_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
mtree_destroy(&mm->eh_frame_mt);
}
+
+int eh_frame_register(struct eh_frame_setup __user *user_data, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ struct eh_frame_setup data;
+ unsigned long eh_frame_hdr_end, text_end;
+
+ if (!user_data && !size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(data))
+ return -EINVAL;
[Severity: Medium]
Could this strict size check prevent future UAPI extensions from being handled
properly by older kernels?
If a newer userspace binary passes a legitimately extended eh_frame_setup
struct to an older kernel, it looks like it will be rejected with -EINVAL.
Would it be better to use copy_struct_from_user() here to safely handle
zero-padded extensions?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&data, user_data, sizeof(data)))
+ return -EFAULT;
[ ... ]
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+int eh_frame_unregister(struct eh_frame_setup __user *user_data, __kernel_size_t size)
+{
+ struct eh_frame_setup data;
+
+ if (!user_data && !size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (size != sizeof(data))
+ return -EINVAL;
[Severity: Medium]
As with eh_frame_register(), does this strict size comparison break forward
compatibility for future struct extensions?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&data, user_data, sizeof(data)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /* Unregister only uses eh_frame_hdr_start */
+ if (data.eh_frame_hdr_size || data.text_start || data.text_size)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return eh_frame_remove_section(data.eh_frame_hdr_start);
[Severity: Medium]
Does this code silently truncate the 64-bit parameter on 32-bit platforms,
potentially causing the wrong section to be unregistered?
The data.eh_frame_hdr_start parameter is a __u64, but it is passed directly
into eh_frame_remove_section() which takes an unsigned long. If userspace
provides an out-of-bounds 64-bit value on a 32-bit system, it appears it
would be implicitly truncated to a valid 32-bit address rather than being
rejected.
Looking at the underlying implementation of eh_frame_remove_section() that is
exposed by this new prctl, is there a race condition in
__eh_frame_remove_section() that could lead to a double-free?
kernel/unwind/eh_frame.c:__eh_frame_remove_section() {
...
if (!mtree_erase(&mm->eh_frame_mt, sec->text_start)) {
dbg_sec("mtree_erase failed: text=%lx\n", sec->text_start);
return -EINVAL;
}
call_srcu(&eh_frame_srcu, &sec->rcu, eh_frame_free_srcu);
...
}
[Severity: Critical]
If a thread unregisters the section and a third thread immediately registers
a new section at the exact same address, would mtree_erase() erase and return
the new section instead?
Because the code evaluates the return value simply as non-NULL, it seems it
would proceed to call call_srcu() on the old section again, potentially
causing a double-free and SRCU list corruption.
Also, regarding the interaction with the unwinder fast path in eh_frame_find():
kernel/unwind/eh_frame.c:eh_frame_find() {
...
if (ret && (ret != -ENOENT && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)) {
dbg_sec("removing bad .eh_frame[_hdr] section\n");
if (eh_frame_remove_section(sec->eh_frame_hdr_start))
...
}
[Severity: Critical]
Can this sequence cause a hard deadlock or NMI-safety violation?
Stack unwinding is frequently invoked from NMI or IRQ contexts. If
eh_frame_find() encounters a parsing error, it unconditionally calls
eh_frame_remove_section(). This attempts to acquire the mtree_lock spinlock
and invokes call_srcu(), both of which are forbidden in NMI/IRQ contexts.
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260818144954.2320378-1-jremus@linux.ibm.com?part=25