Re: [PATCH 51/61] security: update audit format strings for u64 i_ino
From: Ryan Lee <hidden>
Date: 2026-02-27 16:47:26
Also in:
amd-gfx, autofs, ceph-devel, dri-devel, linux-cifs, linux-ext4, linux-f2fs-devel, linux-fscrypt, linux-fsdevel, linux-hams, linux-integrity, linux-media, linux-mm, linux-nfs, linux-perf-users, linux-security-module, linux-unionfs, linux-xfs, lkml, netdev, netfs, ntfs3, nvdimm, ocfs2-devel, selinux, v9fs
On Thu, Feb 26, 2026 at 9:13 AM Jeff Layton [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Update %lu/%ld to %llu/%lld in security audit logging functions that print inode->i_ino, since i_ino is now u64. Files updated: apparmor/apparmorfs.c, integrity/integrity_audit.c, ipe/audit.c, lsm_audit.c. Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org> --- security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c | 4 ++-- security/integrity/integrity_audit.c | 2 +- security/ipe/audit.c | 2 +- security/lsm_audit.c | 10 +++++----- security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++-- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 12 ++++++------ 6 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 2f84bd23edb69e7e69cb097e554091df0132816d..7b645f40e71c956f216fa6a7d69c3ecd4e2a5ff4 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static int aafs_count; static int aafs_show_path(struct seq_file *seq, struct dentry *dentry) { - seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME, d_inode(dentry)->i_ino); + seq_printf(seq, "%s:[%llu]", AAFS_NAME, d_inode(dentry)->i_ino); return 0; }@@ -2644,7 +2644,7 @@ static int policy_readlink(struct dentry *dentry, char __user *buffer, char name[32];
I have confirmed that the buffer is still big enough for a 64-bit inode number.
int res;
- res = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:[%lu]", AAFS_NAME,
+ res = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%s:[%llu]", AAFS_NAME,
d_inode(dentry)->i_ino);
if (res > 0 && res < sizeof(name))
res = readlink_copy(buffer, buflen, name, strlen(name));For the AppArmor portion: Reviewed-By: Ryan Lee <redacted>
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c index 0ec5e4c22cb2a1066c2b897776ead6d3db72635c..d8d9e5ff1cd22b091f462d1e83d28d2d6bd983e9 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c +++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode, if (inode) { audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); - audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); + audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino); } audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d errno=%d", !result, errno); audit_log_end(ab);diff --git a/security/ipe/audit.c b/security/ipe/audit.c index 3f0deeb54912730d9acf5e021a4a0cb29a34e982..93fb59fbddd60b56c0b22be2a38b809ef9e18b76 100644 --- a/security/ipe/audit.c +++ b/security/ipe/audit.c@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void ipe_audit_match(const struct ipe_eval_ctx *const ctx, if (inode) { audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); - audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); + audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino); } else { audit_log_format(ab, " dev=? ino=?"); }diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c index 7d623b00495c14b079e10e963c21a9f949c11f07..737f5a263a8f79416133315edf363ece3d79c722 100644 --- a/security/lsm_audit.c +++ b/security/lsm_audit.c@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ void audit_log_lsm_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, if (inode) { audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); - audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); + audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino); } break; }@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ void audit_log_lsm_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, if (inode) { audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); - audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); + audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino); } break; }@@ -228,7 +228,7 @@ void audit_log_lsm_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, if (inode) { audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); - audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); + audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino); } audit_log_format(ab, " ioctlcmd=0x%hx", a->u.op->cmd);@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@ void audit_log_lsm_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, if (inode) { audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); - audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); + audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino); } break; }@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ void audit_log_lsm_data(struct audit_buffer *ab, } audit_log_format(ab, " dev="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, inode->i_sb->s_id); - audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%lu", inode->i_ino); + audit_log_format(ab, " ino=%llu", inode->i_ino); rcu_read_unlock(); break; }diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index d8224ea113d1ac273aac1fb52324f00b3301ae75..150ea86ebc1f7c7f8391af4109a3da82b12d00d2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c@@ -1400,7 +1400,7 @@ static int inode_doinit_use_xattr(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *dentry, if (rc < 0) { kfree(context); if (rc != -ENODATA) { - pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", + pr_warn("SELinux: %s: getxattr returned %d for dev=%s ino=%lld\n", __func__, -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino); return rc; }@@ -3477,7 +3477,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, &newsid); if (rc) { pr_err("SELinux: unable to map context to SID" - "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n", + "for (%s, %llu), rc=%d\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc); return; }diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 98af9d7b943469d0ddd344fc78c0b87ca40c16c4..7e2f54c17a5d5c70740bbfa92ba4d4f1aca2cf22 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc) char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE) - pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", + pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %lld) %s\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm); if (rc <= 0)@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc) smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); - pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %lld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm); return 0;@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc) char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE) - pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", + pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %lld) %s\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm); if (rc <= 0)@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc) rc = 0; smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); - pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %lld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file, current->comm);@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1]; if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE) - pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", + pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %lld) %s\n", inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm); if (rc <= 0)@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file, rc = 0; smk_bu_mode(mode, acc); - pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], + pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %lld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc], sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file, current->comm); --2.53.0