On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 11:34 AM Serge E. Hallyn [off-list ref] wrote:

On Thu, Nov 28, 2024 at 07:37:33AM -0800, Jordan Rome wrote:

quoted

In cases where we want a stable way to observe/trace
cap_capable (e.g. protection from inlining and API updates)
add a tracepoint that passes:
- The credentials used
- The user namespace of the resource being accessed
- The user namespace in which the credential provides the
capability to access the targeted resource
- The capability to check for
- Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
- The return value of the check

Signed-off-by: Jordan Rome <redacted>
---
 MAINTAINERS                       |  1 +
 include/trace/events/capability.h | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/commoncap.c              | 57 +++++++++++++++++++----------
 3 files changed, 100 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/trace/events/capability.h

diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index f870842fad9c..b90df58f6030 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS

@@ -5103,6 +5103,7 @@ M:      Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
 L:   linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
 S:   Supported
 F:   include/linux/capability.h
+F:   include/trace/events/capability.h
 F:   include/uapi/linux/capability.h
 F:   kernel/capability.c
 F:   security/commoncap.c

diff --git a/include/trace/events/capability.h b/include/trace/events/capability.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..65311c2652f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/trace/events/capability.h

@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+#undef TRACE_SYSTEM
+#define TRACE_SYSTEM capability
+
+#if !defined(_TRACE_CAPABILITY_H) || defined(TRACE_HEADER_MULTI_READ)
+#define _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H
+
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
+
+/**
+ * cap_capable - called after it's determined if a task has a particular
+ * effective capability
+ *
+ * @cred: The credentials used
+ * @target_ns: The user namespace of the resource being accessed
+ * @capable_ns: The user namespace in which the credential provides the
+ *              capability to access the targeted resource.
+ *              This will be NULL if ret is not 0.
+ * @cap: The capability to check for
+ * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
+ * @ret: The return value of the check: 0 if it does, -ve if it does not
+ *
+ * Allows to trace calls to cap_capable in commoncap.c
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(cap_capable,
+
+     TP_PROTO(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+             const struct user_namespace *capable_ns, int cap, unsigned int opts, int ret),

Hi,

you're still sending opts in here.  Will that really be helpful for
your use case, given that cap_capable() ignores it as Linus pointed
out?

Ah, my bad. I'll remove.

quoted

+
+     TP_ARGS(cred, target_ns, capable_ns, cap, opts, ret),
+
+     TP_STRUCT__entry(
+             __field(const struct cred *, cred)
+             __field(struct user_namespace *, target_ns)
+             __field(const struct user_namespace *, capable_ns)
+             __field(int, cap)
+             __field(unsigned int, opts)
+             __field(int, ret)
+     ),
+
+     TP_fast_assign(
+             __entry->cred       = cred;
+             __entry->target_ns    = target_ns;
+             __entry->capable_ns = ret == 0 ? capable_ns : NULL;
+             __entry->cap        = cap;
+             __entry->opts       = opts;
+             __entry->ret        = ret;
+     ),
+
+     TP_printk("cred %p, target_ns %p, capable_ns %p, cap %d, opts %u, ret %d",
+             __entry->cred, __entry->target_ns, __entry->capable_ns, __entry->cap,
+             __entry->opts, __entry->ret)
+);
+
+#endif /* _TRACE_CAPABILITY_H */
+
+/* This part must be outside protection */
+#include <trace/define_trace.h>

diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index cefad323a0b1..9fa9aba3961d 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c

@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
 #include <linux/mnt_idmapping.h>
 #include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>

+#define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
+#include <trace/events/capability.h>
+
 /*
  * If a non-root user executes a setuid-root binary in
  * !secure(SECURE_NOROOT) mode, then we raise capabilities.

@@ -50,24 +53,17 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname)
 }

 /**
- * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
- * @cred: The credentials to use
- * @targ_ns:  The user namespace in which we need the capability
- * @cap: The capability to check for
- * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
+ * cap_capable_helper - Determine whether a task has a particular effective
+ * capability.
  *
- * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
- * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
- *
- * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
- * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
- * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
- * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
+ * See cap_capable for more details.
  */
-int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
-             int cap, unsigned int opts)
+static inline int cap_capable_helper(const struct cred *cred,
+                                  struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+                                  const struct user_namespace *cred_ns,
+                                  int cap)
 {
-     struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns;
+     struct user_namespace *ns = target_ns;

      /* See if cred has the capability in the target user namespace
       * by examining the target user namespace and all of the target

@@ -75,21 +71,21 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
       */
      for (;;) {
              /* Do we have the necessary capabilities? */
-             if (ns == cred->user_ns)
+             if (likely(ns == cred_ns))
                      return cap_raised(cred->cap_effective, cap) ? 0 : -EPERM;

              /*
               * If we're already at a lower level than we're looking for,
               * we're done searching.
               */
-             if (ns->level <= cred->user_ns->level)
+             if (ns->level <= cred_ns->level)
                      return -EPERM;

              /*
               * The owner of the user namespace in the parent of the
               * user namespace has all caps.
               */
-             if ((ns->parent == cred->user_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
+             if ((ns->parent == cred_ns) && uid_eq(ns->owner, cred->euid))
                      return 0;

              /*

@@ -102,6 +98,31 @@ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns,
      /* We never get here */
 }

+/**
+ * cap_capable - Determine whether a task has a particular effective capability
+ * @cred: The credentials to use
+ * @target_ns:  The user namespace of the resource being accessed
+ * @cap: The capability to check for
+ * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h
+ *
+ * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst
+ * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not.
+ *
+ * NOTE WELL: cap_has_capability() cannot be used like the kernel's capable()
+ * and has_capability() functions.  That is, it has the reverse semantics:
+ * cap_has_capability() returns 0 when a task has a capability, but the
+ * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case.
+ */
+int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *target_ns,
+             int cap, unsigned int opts)
+{
+     const struct user_namespace *cred_ns = cred->user_ns;
+     int ret = cap_capable_helper(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap);
+
+     trace_cap_capable(cred, target_ns, cred_ns, cap, opts, ret);
+     return ret;
+}
+
 /**
  * cap_settime - Determine whether the current process may set the system clock
  * @ts: The time to set
--

2.43.5