On Tue, Nov 10, 2026 at 03:42:04PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
Commit db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
records in parent_could_setfcap whether the creator of a user namespace
had CAP_SETFCAP, because a creator writing its own uid_map only has
capabilities in the new namespace. The snapshot uses cap_raised(), so a
task whose LSM policy denies CAP_SETFCAP can still map uid 0 in a
namespace it creates.
Use security_capable() against the parent namespace instead: the
creator's credentials still belong to it at this point, so commoncap
returns the same result, and only LSM denials are added.
Do not audit this check: creating a user namespace does not use
CAP_SETFCAP, and most namespaces never map uid 0. The uid_map write
that later fails has no LSM audit record.
Checking CAP_SETFCAP when the map is written would not work: the
writer's credentials then belong to the new namespace, where commoncap
grants the creator all capabilities.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: <redacted>
Fixes: db2e718a4798 ("capabilities: require CAP_SETFCAP to map uid 0")
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
This seems fine but is another instance where what we really really
really want is for the LSM to be informed where exactly
security_capable() is called from. IOW, it would be nice if the LSM
would know that it is called from the user namespace creation path.
Can be a follow-up but would be nice.