Re: [PATCH RFC 1/4] ipe: add the .ipe policy keyring
flat view
From: Fan Wu <wufan@kernel.org>
Date: 2026-10-19 23:15:58
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bpf, keyrings, linux-doc, linux-kselftest, lkml
On 10/19/2026 2:40 PM, Manuel Huber via B4 Relay wrote:
From: Manuel Huber <redacted> Add a dedicated .ipe keyring for IPE policy signature verification, modeled after the .dm-verity and .bpf keyring implementations. With this, userspace can provision its own keys into the keyring, then restrict it and activate it for IPE policy signature verification. This enables scenarios in which a trusted userspace component generates an IPE policy, and creates an ephemeral policy-signing key pair, provisions its public certificate, and restricts the IPE keyring during the early lifetime of a system. The trusted component can then sign the IPE policy, destroy the private key, and load and activate the policy. During that phase, the system is considered in a trusted state whereas the system transitions into a possibly untrusted state afterwards, running arbitrary user-provided applications. In such a scenario, the trusted userspace component could reside on a dm-verity protected rootfs disk, and applications would reside on additional dm-verity protected disks. The latter disks would be dynamically attached and their dm-verity root hashes and/or signatures not known a priori to launching the system.
You might need to explain why the existing keyrings, i.e. builtin/secondary/platform cannot be used in your scenario. Like the firmware is not trusted?
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A concrete usage scenario could be Kata Containers, which enables running Kubernetes pods in ephemeral, headless utility VMs, possibly without systemd. The rootfs disk is static and known beforehand, but containerd's image layers might be acquired and transported into the VM using the erofs snapshotter and dynamic block device attachment using dm-verity. Signed-off-by: Manuel Huber <redacted> --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++ security/ipe/Makefile | 1 + security/ipe/ipe.c | 2 + security/ipe/keyring.c | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ security/ipe/keyring.h | 16 +++++ security/ipe/policy.c | 10 ++++ 6 files changed, 117 insertions(+)diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index e75344f4e0cd..fd508dd779ed 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt@@ -2733,6 +2733,15 @@ Kernel parameters Determine whether IPE starts in permissive (0) or enforce (1) mode. The default is enforce. + ipe.keyring_unsealed= + [IPE] + Format: <bool> + When set to 1, leave the IPE policy keyring + unsealed after initialization so userspace can provision + keys. Once the keyring is nonempty and restricted, it is + searched during policy-signature verification. The default + is 0, which creates the keyring restricted and empty. +
I would prefer a Kconfig CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE_KEYRING default to N instead, like the fsverity keyring. In the kconfig you can also describe in which cases should this option be turned on.
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ipe.success_audit= [IPE] Format: <bool>diff --git a/security/ipe/Makefile b/security/ipe/Makefile index 2ffabfa63fe9..109e736696a5 100644 --- a/security/ipe/Makefile +++ b/security/ipe/Makefile@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_IPE) += \ hooks.o \ fs.o \ ipe.o \ + keyring.o \
with Kconfig this can be obj-$(CONFIG_IPE_KEYRING) += keyring.o
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policy.o \ policy_fs.o \ policy_parser.o \diff --git a/security/ipe/ipe.c b/security/ipe/ipe.c index 495bb765de1b..f5232f850dc2 100644 --- a/security/ipe/ipe.c +++ b/security/ipe/ipe.c@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "eval.h" #include "hooks.h" +#include "keyring.h" extern const char *const ipe_boot_policy; bool ipe_enabled;@@ -97,4 +98,5 @@ DEFINE_LSM(ipe) = { .init = ipe_init, .blobs = &ipe_blobs, .initcall_fs = ipe_init_securityfs, + .initcall_late = ipe_keyring_init, };diff --git a/security/ipe/keyring.c b/security/ipe/keyring.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..ea8d164b62a6 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/keyring.c@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved. + */ + +#include <linux/cred.h> +#include <linux/err.h> +#include <linux/key.h> +#include <linux/moduleparam.h> + +#include "ipe.h" +#include "keyring.h" + +static struct key *ipe_keyring __ro_after_init;
You can remove static here then the other ipe code can directly use the variable instead of a function call.
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+ +static bool ipe_keyring_unsealed __ro_after_init; + +/* Set the right module name for built-in parameters. */ +#ifdef KBUILD_MODNAME +#undef KBUILD_MODNAME +#define KBUILD_MODNAME "ipe" +#endif + +module_param_named(keyring_unsealed, ipe_keyring_unsealed, bool, 0444); +MODULE_PARM_DESC(keyring_unsealed, "Leave the IPE keyring unsealed"); +
...
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+ +/** + * ipe_keyring_init() - Allocate and configure the IPE keyring. + * + * Return: Always %0. A failure leaves IPE without its dedicated keyring. + */ +int __init ipe_keyring_init(void) +{ + struct key *keyring; + int rc; + + keyring = keyring_alloc(".ipe", GLOBAL_ROOT_UID, GLOBAL_ROOT_GID, + current_cred(), + KEY_POS_SEARCH | + KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_WRITE | + KEY_USR_SEARCH | KEY_USR_SETATTR, + KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); + if (IS_ERR(keyring)) { + pr_err("failed to allocate keyring: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(keyring)); + return 0;
You might need to panic here like the fsverity kerying.
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+ } + + if (!ipe_keyring_unsealed) { + rc = keyring_restrict(make_key_ref(keyring, true), NULL, NULL); + if (rc) { + pr_err("failed to restrict keyring: %d\n", rc); + key_revoke(keyring); + key_put(keyring); + return 0; + } + }
This looks kind of awkward, like if unseal is not set, it can create an empty keyring then immediately seal it. I would switch to the fsverity's approach to let userspace seal it.
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+ + ipe_keyring = keyring; + + return 0; +}diff --git a/security/ipe/keyring.h b/security/ipe/keyring.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3d450a465511 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/ipe/keyring.h@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2026 NVIDIA CORPORATION & AFFILIATES. All rights reserved. + */ + +#ifndef _IPE_KEYRING_H +#define _IPE_KEYRING_H + +#include <linux/init.h> + +struct key; + +int __init ipe_keyring_init(void); +struct key *ipe_keyring_lookup(void); + +#endif /* _IPE_KEYRING_H */diff --git a/security/ipe/policy.c b/security/ipe/policy.c index e542329726bc..abc1ff9ac230 100644 --- a/security/ipe/policy.c +++ b/security/ipe/policy.c@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #include "ipe.h" #include "eval.h" #include "fs.h" +#include "keyring.h" #include "policy.h" #include "policy_parser.h" #include "audit.h"@@ -160,6 +161,7 @@ struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, const char *pkcs7, size_t pkcs7len) { struct ipe_policy *new = NULL; + struct key *keyring; int rc = 0; new = kzalloc_obj(*new);@@ -189,6 +191,14 @@ struct ipe_policy *ipe_new_policy(const char *text, size_t textlen, VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, set_pkcs7_data, new); #endif + if (rc == -ENOKEY || rc == -EKEYREJECTED) { + keyring = ipe_keyring_lookup(); + if (keyring) + rc = verify_pkcs7_signature(NULL, 0, new->pkcs7, + pkcs7len, keyring, + VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE, + set_pkcs7_data, new); + }
With Kconfig this part can be just like the above cases. Fan
if (rc)
goto err;
} else {