Re: [REPORT] landlock: SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass via F_SETOWN to invoker pgid -> SIGIO/SIGKILL to non-sandboxed targets
From: <hidden>
Date: 2026-05-29 04:43:23
Also in:
stable
Subsystem:
landlock security module, security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Mickaël Salaün, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
Thanks Justin -- much appreciated for reproducing on mic/next and for the
Tested-by.
v2 below addresses your review:
- the commit message is trimmed to just the bug and the fix;
- the reproducer and the A/B verification are moved below the --- so
they become git notes, not part of the commit;
- added your Tested-by.
The fix hunk is unchanged. I agree the concise statement of the defect is
"we fail to check the subject on fan-out signal types (PIDTYPE_PGID and
PIDTYPE_SID, i.e. type > PIDTYPE_TGID)". The patch keeps the explicit
PIDTYPE_PGID / PIDTYPE_SID test for readability and to stay robust if the
enum is ever reordered -- happy to switch to "> PIDTYPE_TGID" if you
prefer. I'll follow up separately on the erratum entry and a regression
test, as you suggested.
Independent security researcher. HEXLAB SAS (registration pending) --
Cali, Colombia.
Thanks,
Bryam Vargas
----- v2 patch (inline, plain text) -----
From 75f801309cd64f74d04ef86236bd973314dd7d94 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Bryam Vargas <redacted>
Date: Thu, 28 May 2026 23:33:13 -0500
Subject: [PATCH v2] landlock: fix LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL bypass via F_SETOWN to
invoker's pgid
A Landlock-restricted process can bypass LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL on the
SIGIO delivery path and deliver arbitrary signals (including SIGKILL via
F_SETSIG) to non-Landlocked targets that share its pgid, by exploiting a
producer-side cache-vs-live evaluation gap.
The SIGIO path in hook_file_send_sigiotask() consults a cached subject
stored in landlock_file(file)->fown_subject at fcntl(F_SETOWN) time
(via hook_file_set_fowner()), instead of evaluating the live Landlock
domain of the invoking task at signal-send time. The capture is gated
by control_current_fowner(), which returns false (skipping capture)
when pid_task(fown->pid, fown->pid_type) is in current's thread group.
This is correct for PIDTYPE_TGID / PIDTYPE_PID, where the target is a
single task sharing current's cred. It is unsafe for PIDTYPE_PGID and
PIDTYPE_SID: when current is at the head of its pgid hlist -- the
default placement after fork(), hlist_add_head_rcu() in kernel/fork.c --
pid_task(pgid, PIDTYPE_PGID) resolves to current itself,
same_thread_group(current, current) is true, the capture is skipped, and
fown_subject.domain stays NULL. hook_file_send_sigiotask() then
short-circuits at "if (!subject->domain) return 0;", letting the kernel
fan the signal out to every member of the group, including tasks outside
current's Landlock domain that SCOPE_SIGNAL is supposed to protect.
The direct kill() path (hook_task_kill) is unaffected: it evaluates
current's live domain on every call. Only the cached SIGIO path is
broken.
Tighten control_current_fowner() to apply the thread-group exemption
only when the target identifies a single task whose Landlock cred is
necessarily shared with current (PIDTYPE_TGID, PIDTYPE_PID). For
PIDTYPE_PGID and PIDTYPE_SID, always capture the current Landlock
subject so the consumer's scope check runs against every member of the
group at delivery time.
Reported-by: Bryam Vargas <redacted>
Tested-by: Justin Suess <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <redacted>
---
v2: per review, the commit message is trimmed to the bug + the fix; the
reproducer and the A/B verification are moved below the --- so they
stay out of the commit. Added Tested-by. The hunk is unchanged from
v1 (v1 sent to security@kernel.org 2026-05-28, embargoed -- not yet
in a public archive).
Reproducer (ordinary unprivileged user; sandbox active in the child):
int pfd[2]; pipe(pfd);
landlock_create_ruleset(&{.scoped = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL},
sizeof(attr), 0);
prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0);
landlock_restrict_self(rfd, 0);
fcntl(pfd[0], F_SETSIG, SIGKILL);
fcntl(pfd[0], F_SETOWN, -getpgrp()); /* PIDTYPE_PGID */
fcntl(pfd[0], F_SETFL, O_ASYNC);
write(pfd[1], "X", 1); /* trigger SIGIO */
/* every pgid member receives SIGKILL, including the non-sandboxed
* parent / supervisor / sibling workers */
A/B-verified on a 6.12.90 lab kernel (same .config, only this hunk
differs): pre-fix the sandboxed child's SIGKILL reaches the
non-sandboxed parent (SCOPE_SIGNAL bypassed); post-fix it is blocked.
hook_task_kill's direct-kill enforcement and the intra-thread-group
F_SETOWN cases continue to work post-patch.
security/landlock/fs.c | 12 ++++++++++++
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index c1ecfe239032..edaa52572cbd 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c@@ -1909,6 +1909,18 @@ static bool control_current_fowner(struct fown_struct *const fown) if (!p) return true; + /* + * For PIDTYPE_PGID and PIDTYPE_SID, signal delivery fans out to + * every member of the group at SIGIO time. Even when pid_task() + * resolves to current itself (e.g., current is the pgid hlist + * head post-fork), non-current members of the group are still + * valid targets that must be checked by hook_file_send_sigiotask(). + * Always capture the current subject for those types so the + * consumer scope check runs against the live fown_subject. + */ + if (fown->pid_type == PIDTYPE_PGID || fown->pid_type == PIDTYPE_SID) + return true; + return !same_thread_group(p, current); } --
2.43.0