Re: [PATCH] ima: don't clear IMA_DIGSIG flag when setting non-IMA xattr
From: Coiby Xu <hidden>
Date: 2025-09-08 11:15:19
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linux-integrity, lkml
On Thu, Sep 04, 2025 at 10:41:42PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
On Tue, 2025-09-02 at 12:25 +0800, Coiby Xu wrote:quoted
Currently when both IMA and EVM are in fix mode, the IMA signature will be reset to IMA hash if a program first stores IMA signature in security.ima and then sets security.selinux for a file. For example, on Fedora, after booting the kernel with "ima_appraise=fix evm=fix ima_policy=appraise_tcb" and installing rpm-plugin-ima, reinstalling a package will not make good reference IMA signature generated. Instead IMA hash is generated, # getfattr -m - -d -e hex /usr/bin/bash # file: usr/bin/bash security.ima=0x0404... This happens because when setting selinux.selinux, the IMA_DIGSIG flag that had been set early was cleared. As a result, IMA hash is generated when the file is closed. Here's a minimal C reproducer, #include <stdio.h> #include <sys/xattr.h> #include <fcntl.h> #include <unistd.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdlib.h> int main() { const char* file_path = "/usr/sbin/test_binary"; const char* hex_string = "030204d33204490066306402304"; int length = strlen(hex_string); char* ima_attr_value; int fd; fd = open(file_path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, 0644); if (fd == -1) { perror("Error opening file"); return 1; } ima_attr_value = (char*)malloc(length / 2 ); for (int i = 0, j = 0; i < length; i += 2, j++) { sscanf(hex_string + i, "%2hhx", &ima_attr_value[j]); } if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.ima", ima_attr_value, length/2, 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } const char* selinux_value= "system_u:object_r:bin_t:s0"; if (fsetxattr(fd, "security.selinux", selinux_value, strlen(selinux_value), 0) == -1) { perror("Error setting extended attribute"); close(fd); return 1; } close(fd); return 0; } Signed-off-by: Coiby Xu <redacted>Thanks, Coiby. Agreed, the ability to clear the IMA_DIGSIG flag should be limited to security.ima xattr and probably security.evm xattr. Writing other security xattrs should not affect the IMA_DIGSIG flag.
Thanks for confirming it!
Even without an IMA appraise policy, the security xattrs are written out to the filesystem, but the IMA_DIGSIG flag is not cached.
It seems I miss some context for the above sentence. If no IMA policy is configured, no ima_iint_cache will be created. If you mean non-appraisal policy, will not caching IMA_DIGSIG flag cause any problem?
Please document the tristate values: 0: clear IMA_DIGSIG 1: set IMA_DIGSIG -1: don't change IMA_DIGSIG
Addressed in v2. Thanks for the suggestion!
quoted
--- security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index f435eff4667f..fc82161f8b30 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c@@ -708,7 +708,7 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); if (digsig) set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags);This matches both -1 and 1. Test "digsig == 1" here.quoted
- else + else if (digsig != -1)and test "digsig == 0" here.quoted
clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); }@@ -794,6 +794,8 @@ static int ima_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); } else if (!strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) && xattr_value_len > 0) { digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG); + } else if (result != 1) {The "if (result != 1)" test is redundant.
I've fixed them in v2. Thanks for reviewing the patch and correcting my careless mistakes! I'll check if my mind is in a clear thinking state next time.
thanks, Mimiquoted
+ digsig = -1; } if (result == 1 || evm_revalidate_status(xattr_name)) { ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
-- Best regards, Coiby