Re: [PATCH 1/2] fs: Provide function that allocates a secure anonymous inode
From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Date: 2025-06-19 05:37:21
Also in:
kvm, linux-fsdevel, linux-mm, lkml, selinux
On Mon, Jun 16, 2025 at 06:30:09PM +0530, Shivank Garg wrote:
On 6/6/2025 8:39 PM, Ira Weiny wrote:quoted
Paul Moore wrote:quoted
On Thu, Jun 5, 2025 at 1:50 AM Mike Rapoport [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
secretmem always had S_PRIVATE set because alloc_anon_inode() clears it anyway and this patch does not change it.Yes, my apologies, I didn't look closely enough at the code.quoted
I'm just thinking that it makes sense to actually allow LSM/SELinux controls that S_PRIVATE bypasses for both secretmem and guest_memfd.It's been a while since we added the anon_inode hooks so I'd have to go dig through the old thread to understand the logic behind marking secretmem S_PRIVATE, especially when the anon_inode_make_secure_inode() function cleared it. It's entirely possible it may have just been an oversight.
anon_inode_make_secure_inode() was introduced when more than 10 versions of secretmem already were posted so it didn't jump at me to replace alloc_anon_inode() with anon_inode_make_secure_inode().
quoted
I'm jumping in where I don't know what I'm talking about... But my reading of the S_PRIVATE flag is that the memory can't be mapped by user space. So for guest_memfd() we need !S_PRIVATE because it is intended to be mapped by user space. So we want the secure checks. I think secretmem is the same.
Agree.
quoted
Do I have that right?Hi Mike, Paul, If I understand correctly, we need to clear the S_PRIVATE flag for all secure inodes. The S_PRIVATE flag was previously set for secretmem (via alloc_anon_inode()), which caused security checks to be bypassed - this was unintentional since the original anon_inode_make_secure_inode() was already clearing it. Both secretmem and guest_memfd create file descriptors (memfd_create/kvm_create_guest_memfd) so they should be subject to LSM/SELinux security policies rather than bypassing them with S_PRIVATE? static struct inode *anon_inode_make_secure_inode(struct super_block *s, const char *name, const struct inode *context_inode) { ... /* Clear S_PRIVATE for all inodes*/ inode->i_flags &= ~S_PRIVATE; ... } Please let me know if this conclusion makes sense?
Yes, makes sense to me.
Thanks, Shivank
-- Sincerely yours, Mike.