@@ -235,9 +235,9 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_fix_setgroups, struct cred *new, const struct cred * old)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setpgid, struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getpgid, struct task_struct *p)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getsid, struct task_struct *p)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getsecid_subj, u32 *secid)
-LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getsecid_obj,
-	 struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, current_getlsmprop_subj, struct lsm_prop *prop)
+LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, task_getlsmprop_obj,
+	 struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setnice, struct task_struct *p, int nice)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_setioprio, struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, task_getioprio, struct task_struct *p)

@@ -507,8 +507,8 @@ int security_task_fix_setgroups(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
 int security_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid);
 int security_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p);
 int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p);
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid);
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid);
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop);
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop);
 int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice);
 int security_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio);
 int security_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p);

@@ -1305,14 +1305,15 @@ static inline int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
-static inline void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static inline void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+						struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
 }
 
 static inline int security_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)

@@ -2179,16 +2179,16 @@ void audit_log_key(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *key)
 
 int audit_log_task_context(struct audit_buffer *ab)
 {
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	char *ctx = NULL;
 	unsigned len;
 	int error;
-	u32 sid;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
-	if (!sid)
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	if (!lsmprop_is_set(&prop))
 		return 0;
 
-	error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
+	error = security_lsmprop_to_secctx(&prop, &ctx, &len);
 	if (error) {
 		if (error != -EINVAL)
 			goto error_path;

@@ -2405,8 +2405,7 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
 			audit_sig_uid = auid;
 		else
 			audit_sig_uid = uid;
-		/* scaffolding */
-		security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_sig_lsm.scaffold.secid);
+		security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&audit_sig_lsm);
 	}
 
 	return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);

@@ -1371,8 +1371,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
 			case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
 				if (f->lsm_rule) {
 					/* scaffolding */
-					security_current_getsecid_subj(
-							&prop.scaffold.secid);
+					security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 					result = security_audit_rule_match(
 						   &prop, f->type, f->op,
 						   f->lsm_rule);

@@ -470,7 +470,6 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 {
 	const struct cred *cred;
 	int i, need_sid = 1;
-	u32 sid;
 	struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 	unsigned int sessionid;
 

@@ -675,15 +674,14 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
 					 * fork()/copy_process() in which case
 					 * the new @tsk creds are still a dup
 					 * of @current's creds so we can still
-					 * use security_current_getsecid_subj()
+					 * use
+					 * security_current_getlsmprop_subj()
 					 * here even though it always refs
 					 * @current's creds
 					 */
-					security_current_getsecid_subj(&sid);
+					security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 					need_sid = 0;
 				}
-				/* scaffolding */
-				prop.scaffold.secid = sid;
 				result = security_audit_rule_match(&prop,
 								   f->type,
 								   f->op,

@@ -2730,12 +2728,15 @@ int __audit_sockaddr(int len, void *a)
 void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
 {
 	struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	context->target_pid = task_tgid_nr(t);
 	context->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	context->target_uid = task_uid(t);
 	context->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &context->target_sid);
+	security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	context->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid;
 	memcpy(context->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 }
 

@@ -2751,6 +2752,7 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 	struct audit_aux_data_pids *axp;
 	struct audit_context *ctx = audit_context();
 	kuid_t t_uid = task_uid(t);
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	if (!audit_signals || audit_dummy_context())
 		return 0;

@@ -2762,7 +2764,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 		ctx->target_auid = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 		ctx->target_uid = t_uid;
 		ctx->target_sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-		security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+		security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+		/* scaffolding */
+		ctx->target_sid = prop.scaffold.secid;
 		memcpy(ctx->target_comm, t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 		return 0;
 	}

@@ -2783,7 +2787,9 @@ int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
 	axp->target_auid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_loginuid(t);
 	axp->target_uid[axp->pid_count] = t_uid;
 	axp->target_sessionid[axp->pid_count] = audit_get_sessionid(t);
-	security_task_getsecid_obj(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+	security_task_getlsmprop_obj(t, &prop);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count] = prop.scaffold.secid;
 	memcpy(axp->target_comm[axp->pid_count], t->comm, TASK_COMM_LEN);
 	axp->pid_count++;
 

@@ -1534,11 +1534,14 @@ int __init netlbl_unlabel_defconf(void)
 	int ret_val;
 	struct netlbl_dom_map *entry;
 	struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	/* Only the kernel is allowed to call this function and the only time
 	 * it is called is at bootup before the audit subsystem is reporting
 	 * messages so don't worry to much about these values. */
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info.secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	audit_info.secid = prop.scaffold.secid;
 	audit_info.loginuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID;
 	audit_info.sessionid = 0;
 

@@ -32,7 +32,11 @@
  */
 static inline void netlbl_netlink_auditinfo(struct netlbl_audit *audit_info)
 {
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&audit_info->secid);
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
+
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	audit_info->secid = prop.scaffold.secid;
 	audit_info->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
 	audit_info->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
 }

@@ -982,17 +982,24 @@ static void apparmor_bprm_committed_creds(const struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 	return;
 }
 
-static void apparmor_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = __begin_current_label_crit_section();
-	*secid = label->secid;
+
+	prop->apparmor.label = label;
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid;
 	__end_current_label_crit_section(label);
 }
 
-static void apparmor_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+					  struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct aa_label *label = aa_get_task_label(p);
-	*secid = label->secid;
+
+	prop->apparmor.label = label;
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop->scaffold.secid = label->secid;
 	aa_put_label(label);
 }
 

@@ -1503,8 +1510,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_free, apparmor_task_free),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_alloc, apparmor_task_alloc),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, apparmor_current_getsecid_subj),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, apparmor_task_getsecid_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj,
+		      apparmor_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, apparmor_task_getlsmprop_obj),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(userns_create, apparmor_userns_create),

@@ -369,7 +369,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {}
 
 /* LIM API function definitions */
 int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		   const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
 		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);

@@ -400,8 +400,8 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
 int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		     const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-		     int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos);
 void ima_init_policy(void);

@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: pointer to the inode associated with the object being validated
  * @cred: pointer to credentials structure to validate
- * @secid: secid of the task being validated
+ * @prop: properties of the task being validated
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXEC,
  *        MAY_APPEND)
  * @func: caller identifier

@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
  *
  */
 int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		   const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, int mask,
+		   const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop, int mask,
 		   enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr,
 		   struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		   const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)

@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ int ima_get_action(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 
 	flags &= ima_policy_flag;
 
-	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, secid, func, mask,
+	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, cred, prop, func, mask,
 				flags, pcr, template_desc, func_data,
 				allowed_algos);
 }

@@ -73,13 +73,13 @@ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void)
 int ima_must_appraise(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 		      int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	if (!ima_appraise)
 		return 0;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), secid,
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return ima_match_policy(idmap, inode, current_cred(), &prop,
 				func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, NULL,
 				NULL, NULL, NULL);
 }

@@ -206,8 +206,8 @@ static void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
 }
 
 static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
-			       u32 secid, char *buf, loff_t size, int mask,
-			       enum ima_hooks func)
+			       struct lsm_prop *prop, char *buf, loff_t size,
+			       int mask, enum ima_hooks func)
 {
 	struct inode *real_inode, *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;

@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 	 * bitmask based on the appraise/audit/measurement policy.
 	 * Included is the appraise submask.
 	 */
-	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, secid,
+	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(file), inode, cred, prop,
 				mask, func, &pcr, &template_desc, NULL,
 				&allowed_algos);
 	violation_check = ((func == FILE_CHECK || func == MMAP_CHECK ||

@@ -443,23 +443,23 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred,
 static int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
 			 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	int ret;
 
 	if (!file)
 		return 0;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 
 	if (reqprot & PROT_EXEC) {
-		ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+		ret = process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
 					  0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT);
 		if (ret)
 			return ret;
 	}
 
 	if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
-		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
+		return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL,
 					   0, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK);
 
 	return 0;

@@ -488,9 +488,9 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	char *pathbuf = NULL;
 	const char *pathname = NULL;
 	struct inode *inode;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 	int result = 0;
 	int action;
-	u32 secid;
 	int pcr;
 
 	/* Is mprotect making an mmap'ed file executable? */

@@ -498,13 +498,13 @@ static int ima_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
 	    !(prot & PROT_EXEC) || (vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC))
 		return 0;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 	inode = file_inode(vma->vm_file);
 	action = ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
-				current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
+				current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC, MMAP_CHECK,
 				&pcr, &template, NULL, NULL);
 	action |= ima_get_action(file_mnt_idmap(vma->vm_file), inode,
-				 current_cred(), secid, MAY_EXEC,
+				 current_cred(), &prop, MAY_EXEC,
 				 MMAP_CHECK_REQPROT, &pcr, &template, NULL,
 				 NULL);
 

@@ -542,15 +542,18 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
 	int ret;
 	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop = { };
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
-				  MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	ret = process_measurement(bprm->file, current_cred(),
+				  &prop, NULL, 0, MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
 	security_cred_getsecid(bprm->cred, &secid);
-	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, secid, NULL, 0,
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop.scaffold.secid = secid;
+	return process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->cred, &prop, NULL, 0,
 				   MAY_EXEC, CREDS_CHECK);
 }
 

@@ -566,10 +569,10 @@ static int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  */
 static int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 {
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL, 0,
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
 				   mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC |
 					   MAY_APPEND), FILE_CHECK);
 }

@@ -768,7 +771,7 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 			 bool contents)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	/*
 	 * Do devices using pre-allocated memory run the risk of the

@@ -788,9 +791,9 @@ static int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id,
 
 	/* Read entire file for all partial reads. */
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, NULL,
-				   0, MAY_READ, func);
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, NULL, 0,
+				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 
 const int read_idmap[READING_MAX_ID] = {

@@ -818,7 +821,7 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 			      enum kernel_read_file_id read_id)
 {
 	enum ima_hooks func;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	/* permit signed certs */
 	if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE)

@@ -831,8 +834,8 @@ static int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size,
 	}
 
 	func = read_idmap[read_id] ?: FILE_CHECK;
-	security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
-	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), secid, buf, size,
+	security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
+	return process_measurement(file, current_cred(), &prop, buf, size,
 				   MAY_READ, func);
 }
 

@@ -967,7 +970,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo];
 	int violation = 0;
 	int action = 0;
-	u32 secid;
+	struct lsm_prop prop;
 
 	if (digest && digest_len < digest_hash_len)
 		return -EINVAL;

@@ -990,9 +993,9 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	 * buffer measurements.
 	 */
 	if (func) {
-		security_current_getsecid_subj(&secid);
+		security_current_getlsmprop_subj(&prop);
 		action = ima_get_action(idmap, inode, current_cred(),
-					secid, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
+					&prop, 0, func, &pcr, &template,
 					func_data, NULL);
 		if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE) && !digest)
 			return -ENOENT;

@@ -557,7 +557,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
  * @idmap: idmap of the mount the inode was found from
  * @inode: a pointer to an inode
  * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation
- * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
  * @func: LIM hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @func_data: func specific data, may be NULL

@@ -567,7 +567,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 			    struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 			    struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred,
-			    u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
+			    struct lsm_prop *prop, enum ima_hooks func, int mask,
 			    const char *func_data)
 {
 	int i;

@@ -658,8 +658,6 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule,
 		case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
 		case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
-			/* scaffolding */
-			prop.scaffold.secid = secid;
 			rc = ima_filter_rule_match(&prop, lsm_rule->lsm[i].type,
 						   Audit_equal,
 						   lsm_rule->lsm[i].rule);

@@ -723,7 +721,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
  * @cred: pointer to a credentials structure for which the policy decision is
  *        being made
- * @secid: LSM secid of the task to be validated
+ * @prop: LSM properties of the task to be validated
  * @func: IMA hook identifier
  * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
  * @flags: IMA actions to consider (e.g. IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE)

@@ -740,8 +738,8 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func)
  * than writes so ima_match_policy() is classical RCU candidate.
  */
 int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
-		     const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, enum ima_hooks func,
-		     int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
+		     const struct cred *cred, struct lsm_prop *prop,
+		     enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr,
 		     struct ima_template_desc **template_desc,
 		     const char *func_data, unsigned int *allowed_algos)
 {

@@ -759,7 +757,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *inode,
 		if (!(entry->action & actmask))
 			continue;
 
-		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, secid,
+		if (!ima_match_rules(entry, idmap, inode, cred, prop,
 				     func, mask, func_data))
 			continue;
 

@@ -3492,33 +3492,33 @@ int security_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 /**
- * security_current_getsecid_subj() - Get the current task's subjective secid
- * @secid: secid value
+ * security_current_getlsmprop_subj() - Current task's subjective LSM data
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
  *
  * Retrieve the subjective security identifier of the current task and return
- * it in @secid.  In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * it in @prop.
  */
-void security_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+void security_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(current_getsecid_subj, secid);
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(current_getlsmprop_subj, prop);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getsecid_subj);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_current_getlsmprop_subj);
 
 /**
- * security_task_getsecid_obj() - Get a task's objective secid
+ * security_task_getlsmprop_obj() - Get a task's objective LSM data
  * @p: target task
- * @secid: secid value
+ * @prop: lsm specific information
  *
  * Retrieve the objective security identifier of the task_struct in @p and
- * return it in @secid. In case of failure, @secid will be set to zero.
+ * return it in @prop.
  */
-void security_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+void security_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p, struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = 0;
-	call_void_hook(task_getsecid_obj, p, secid);
+	lsmprop_init(prop);
+	call_void_hook(task_getlsmprop_obj, p, prop);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getsecid_obj);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_task_getlsmprop_obj);
 
 /**
  * security_task_setnice() - Check if setting a task's nice value is allowed

@@ -4169,14 +4169,19 @@ static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 			    PROCESS__GETSESSION, NULL);
 }
 
-static void selinux_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = current_sid();
+	prop->selinux.secid = current_sid();
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid;
 }
 
-static void selinux_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+					struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
-	*secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+	prop->selinux.secid = task_sid_obj(p);
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop->scaffold.secid = prop->selinux.secid;
 }
 
 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)

@@ -7203,8 +7208,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, selinux_task_setpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, selinux_task_getpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, selinux_task_getsid),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, selinux_current_getsecid_subj),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, selinux_task_getsecid_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, selinux_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, selinux_task_getlsmprop_obj),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, selinux_task_setnice),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, selinux_task_setioprio),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, selinux_task_getioprio),

@@ -2239,30 +2239,35 @@ static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_current_getsecid_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
- * @secid: where to put the result
+ * smack_current_getlsmprop_subj - get the subjective secid of the current task
+ * @prop: where to put the result
  *
  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's subjective smack label.
  */
-static void smack_current_getsecid_subj(u32 *secid)
+static void smack_current_getlsmprop_subj(struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
 
-	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	prop->smack.skp = skp;
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /**
- * smack_task_getsecid_obj - get the objective secid of the task
+ * smack_task_getlsmprop_obj - get the objective data of the task
  * @p: the task
- * @secid: where to put the result
+ * @prop: where to put the result
  *
  * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the task's objective smack label.
  */
-static void smack_task_getsecid_obj(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+static void smack_task_getlsmprop_obj(struct task_struct *p,
+				      struct lsm_prop *prop)
 {
 	struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct_obj(p);
 
-	*secid = skp->smk_secid;
+	prop->smack.skp = skp;
+	/* scaffolding */
+	prop->scaffold.secid = skp->smk_secid;
 }
 
 /**

@@ -5130,8 +5135,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getsecid_subj, smack_current_getsecid_subj),
-	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid_obj, smack_task_getsecid_obj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(current_getlsmprop_subj, smack_current_getlsmprop_subj),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getlsmprop_obj, smack_task_getlsmprop_obj),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),