Re: [PATCH v2] fs,security: Fix file_set_fowner LSM hook inconsistencies
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: 2024-08-12 22:27:09
Also in:
linux-fsdevel, lkml, selinux
On Mon, Aug 12, 2024 at 1:44 PM Mickaël Salaün [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
The fcntl's F_SETOWN command sets the process that handle SIGIO/SIGURG for the related file descriptor. Before this change, the file_set_fowner LSM hook was used to store this information. However, there are three issues with this approach: - Because security_file_set_fowner() only get one argument, all hook implementations ignore the VFS logic which may not actually change the process that handles SIGIO (e.g. TUN, TTY, dnotify). - Because security_file_set_fowner() is called before f_modown() without lock (e.g. f_owner.lock), concurrent F_SETOWN commands could result to a race condition and inconsistent LSM states (e.g. SELinux's fown_sid) compared to struct fown_struct's UID/EUID. - Because the current hook implementations does not use explicit atomic operations, they may create inconsistencies. It would help to completely remove this constraint, as well as the requirements of the RCU read-side critical section for the hook. Fix these issues by replacing f_owner.uid and f_owner.euid with a new f_owner.cred [1]. This also saves memory by removing dedicated LSM blobs, and simplifies code by removing file_set_fowner hook implementations for SELinux and Smack. This changes enables to remove the smack_file_alloc_security implementation, Smack's file blob, and SELinux's file_security_struct->fown_sid field. As for the UID/EUID, f_owner.cred is not always updated. Move the file_set_fowner hook to align with the VFS semantic. This hook does not have user anymore [2]. Before this change, f_owner's UID/EUID were initialized to zero (i.e. GLOBAL_ROOT_UID), but to simplify code, f_owner's cred is now initialized with the file descriptor creator's credentials (i.e. file->f_cred), which is more consistent and simplifies LSMs logic. The sigio_perm()'s semantic does not need any change because SIGIO/SIGURG are only sent when a process is explicitly set with __f_setown(). Rename f_modown() to __f_setown() to simplify code. Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> Cc: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com> Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com> Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240809-explosionsartig-ablesen-b039dbc6ce82@brauner (local) [1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAHC9VhQY+H7n2zCn8ST0Vu672UA=_eiUikRDW2sUDSN3c=gVQw@mail.gmail.com (local) [2] Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> --- Changes since v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240812144936.1616628-1-mic@digikod.net (local) - Add back the file_set_fowner hook (but without user) as requested by Paul, but move it for consistency. --- fs/fcntl.c | 42 +++++++++++++++---------------- fs/file_table.c | 3 +++ include/linux/fs.h | 2 +- security/security.c | 5 +++- security/selinux/hooks.c | 22 +++------------- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 1 - security/smack/smack.h | 6 ----- security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 39 +--------------------------- 8 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 87 deletions(-)diff --git a/fs/fcntl.c b/fs/fcntl.c index 300e5d9ad913..4217b66a4e99 100644 --- a/fs/fcntl.c +++ b/fs/fcntl.c@@ -87,8 +87,8 @@ static int setfl(int fd, struct file * filp, unsigned int arg) return error; } -static void f_modown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type, - int force) +void __f_setown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type, + int force) { write_lock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock); if (force || !filp->f_owner.pid) {@@ -97,20 +97,15 @@ static void f_modown(struct file *filp, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type, filp->f_owner.pid_type = type; if (pid) { - const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); - filp->f_owner.uid = cred->uid; - filp->f_owner.euid = cred->euid; + security_file_set_fowner(filp); + put_cred(rcu_replace_pointer( + filp->f_owner.cred, + get_cred_rcu(current_cred()), + lockdep_is_held(&filp->f_owner.lock))); } } write_unlock_irq(&filp->f_owner.lock); }
Looking at this quickly, why can't we accomplish pretty much the same thing by moving the security_file_set_fowner() into f_modown (as you've done above) and leveraging the existing file->f_security field as Smack and SELinux do today? I'm seeing a lot of churn to get a cred pointer into fown_struct which doesn't seem to offer that much additional value. From what I can see this seems really focused on adding a cred reference when it isn't clear an additional one is needed. If a new cred reference *is* needed, please provide an explanation as to why; reading the commit description this isn't clear. Of course, if I'm mistaken, feel free to correct me, although I'm sure all the people on the Internet don't need to be told that ;) -- paul-moore.com