Re: [PATCH RESEND bpf-next 3/4] security: Replace indirect LSM hook calls with static calls
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Date: 2023-02-06 16:29:27
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bpf
On 2/6/2023 5:04 AM, KP Singh wrote:
On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 5:36 AM Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On Fri, Jan 20, 2023 at 01:08:17AM +0100, KP Singh wrote:quoted
The indirect calls are not really needed as one knows the addresses of[...]quoted
quoted
+/* + * Define static calls and static keys for each LSM hook. + */ + +#define DEFINE_LSM_STATIC_CALL(NUM, NAME, RET, ...) \ + DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(LSM_STATIC_CALL(NAME, NUM), \ + *((RET(*)(__VA_ARGS__))NULL)); \ + DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(SECURITY_HOOK_ENABLED_KEY(NAME, NUM));Hm, another place where we would benefit from having separated logic for "is it built?" and "is it enabled by default?" and we could use DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_MAYBE(). But, since we don't, I think we need to use DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE() here or else won't all the calls be out-of-line? (i.e. the default compiled state will be NOPs?) If we're trying to optimize for having LSMs, I think we should default to inline calls. (The machine code in the commit log seems to indicate that they are out of line -- it uses jumps.)I should have added it in the commit description, actually we are optimizing for "hot paths are less likely to have LSM hooks enabled" (eg. socket_sendmsg).
How did you come to that conclusion? Where is there a correlation between "hot path" and "less likely to be enabled"?
But I do see that there are LSMs that have these enabled. Maybe we can put this behind a config option, possibly depending on CONFIG_EXPERT?
Help me, as the maintainer of one of those LSMs, understand why that would be a good idea.