Re: [PATCH v2 0/4] Introduce security_create_user_ns()
From: Christian Göttsche <hidden>
Date: 2022-07-08 12:10:23
Also in:
bpf, linux-kselftest, lkml, netdev, selinux
,On Fri, 8 Jul 2022 at 00:32, Frederick Lawler [off-list ref] wrote:
While creating a LSM BPF MAC policy to block user namespace creation, we
used the LSM cred_prepare hook because that is the closest hook to prevent
a call to create_user_ns().
The calls look something like this:
cred = prepare_creds()
security_prepare_creds()
call_int_hook(cred_prepare, ...
if (cred)
create_user_ns(cred)
We noticed that error codes were not propagated from this hook and
introduced a patch [1] to propagate those errors.
The discussion notes that security_prepare_creds()
is not appropriate for MAC policies, and instead the hook is
meant for LSM authors to prepare credentials for mutation. [2]
Ultimately, we concluded that a better course of action is to introduce
a new security hook for LSM authors. [3]
This patch set first introduces a new security_create_user_ns() function
and create_user_ns LSM hook, then marks the hook as sleepable in BPF.
Some thoughts:
I.
Why not make the hook more generic, e.g. support all other existing
and potential future namespaces?
Also I think the naming scheme is <object>_<verb>.
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_create, const struct cred *cred,
unsigned int flags)
where flags is a bitmap of CLONE flags from include/uapi/linux/sched.h
(like CLONE_NEWUSER).
II.
While adding policing for namespaces maybe also add a new hook for setns(2)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, namespace_join, const struct cred *subj, const
struct cred *obj, unsigned int flags)
III.
Maybe even attach a security context to namespaces so they can be
further governed?
SELinux example:
type domainA_userns_t;
type_transition domainA_t domainA_t : namespace domainA_userns_t "user";
allow domainA_t domainA_userns_t:namespace create;
# domainB calling setns(2) with domainA as target
allow domainB_t domainA_userns_t:namespace join;
Links: 1. https://lore.kernel.org/all/20220608150942.776446-1-fred@cloudflare.com/ (local) 2. https://lore.kernel.org/all/87y1xzyhub.fsf@email.froward.int.ebiederm.org/ (local) 3. https://lore.kernel.org/all/9fe9cd9f-1ded-a179-8ded-5fde8960a586@cloudflare.com/ (local) Changes since v1: - Add selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm create_user_ns hook patch - Add selinux: Implement create_user_ns hook patch - Change function signature of security_create_user_ns() to only take struct cred - Move security_create_user_ns() call after id mapping check in create_user_ns() - Update documentation to reflect changes Frederick Lawler (4): security, lsm: Introduce security_create_user_ns() bpf-lsm: Make bpf_lsm_create_user_ns() sleepable selftests/bpf: Add tests verifying bpf lsm create_user_ns hook selinux: Implement create_user_ns hook include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 1 + include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 4 + include/linux/security.h | 6 ++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 1 + kernel/user_namespace.c | 5 ++ security/security.c | 5 ++ security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++ security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 + .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c | 39 ++++++++ 10 files changed, 160 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/deny_namespace.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/test_deny_namespace.c -- 2.30.2