Re: [PATCH v8 19/19] ima: Enable IMA namespaces
From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Date: 2022-01-14 12:06:00
Also in:
linux-integrity, lkml
Subsystem:
extended verification module (evm), integrity measurement architecture (ima), security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Mimi Zohar, Roberto Sassu, Dmitry Kasatkin, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
On Tue, Jan 04, 2022 at 12:04:16PM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Introduce the IMA_NS in Kconfig for IMA namespace enablement. Enable the lazy initialization of an IMA namespace when a user mounts SecurityFS. Now a user_namespace will get a pointer to an ima_namespace and therefore add an implementation of get_current_ns() that returns this pointer. get_current_ns() may now return a NULL pointer for as long as the IMA namespace hasn't been created, yet. Therefore, return early from those functions that may now get a NULL pointer from this call. The NULL pointer can typically be treated similar to not having an IMA policy set and simply return early from a function. Implement ima_ns_from_file() for SecurityFS-related files where we can now get the IMA namespace via the user namespace pointer associated with the superblock of the SecurityFS filesystem instance. Since the functions using ima_ns_from_file() will only be called after an ima_namesapce has been allocated they will never get a NULL pointer for the ima_namespace. Switch access to userns->ima_ns to use acquire/release semantics to ensure that a newly created ima_namespace structure is fully visible upon access. Replace usage of current_user_ns() with ima_ns_from_user_ns() that implements a method to derive the user_namespace from the given ima_namespace. It leads to the same result. Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> --- include/linux/ima.h | 9 ++++++- init/Kconfig | 13 ++++++++++ kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++------- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++------ security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 3 ++- security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 13 +++++----- 8 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index 5354e83d1694..7b9713b290ae 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> struct linux_binprm;@@ -71,7 +72,13 @@ static inline const char * const *arch_get_ima_policy(void) static inline struct user_namespace *ima_ns_to_user_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) { - return current_user_ns(); + struct user_namespace *user_ns; + + user_ns = current_user_ns(); +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS + WARN_ON(user_ns->ima_ns != ns); +#endif + return user_ns; } #elsediff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 4b7bac10c72d..e27155e0ddba 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig@@ -1247,6 +1247,19 @@ config NET_NS Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances of the network stack. +config IMA_NS + bool "IMA namespace" + depends on USER_NS + depends on IMA + default n + help + Allow the creation of an IMA namespace for each user namespace. + Namespaced IMA enables having IMA features work separately + in each IMA namespace. + Currently, only the audit status flags are stored in the namespace, + which allows the same file to be audited each time it is accessed + in a new namespace. + endif # NAMESPACES config CHECKPOINT_RESTOREdiff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 6b2e3ca7ee99..653f8fa83b69 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/bsearch.h> #include <linux/sort.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);@@ -196,6 +197,7 @@ static void free_user_ns(struct work_struct *work) kfree(ns->projid_map.forward); kfree(ns->projid_map.reverse); } + free_ima_ns(ns); retire_userns_sysctls(ns); key_free_user_ns(ns); ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 344c8c4bd030..d993655ec796 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h@@ -509,21 +509,20 @@ struct user_namespace *ima_user_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) return file_inode(filp)->i_sb->s_user_ns; } +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS + static inline struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_from_user_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) { - if (user_ns == &init_user_ns) - return &init_ima_ns; - return NULL; + /* Pairs with smp_store_releases() in create_ima_ns(). */ + return smp_load_acquire(&user_ns->ima_ns); } static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) { - return &init_ima_ns; + return ima_ns_from_user_ns(current_user_ns()); } -#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS - struct ima_namespace *create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns); struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns,@@ -532,6 +531,11 @@ struct ns_status *ima_get_ns_status(struct ima_namespace *ns, void ima_free_ns_status_tree(struct ima_namespace *ns); +static inline struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) +{ + return ima_user_ns_from_file(filp)->ima_ns; +} + #define IMA_NS_STATUS_ACTIONS IMA_AUDIT #define IMA_NS_STATUS_FLAGS IMA_AUDITED@@ -542,6 +546,20 @@ unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, #else +static inline struct ima_namespace +*ima_ns_from_user_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) +{ + if (user_ns == &init_user_ns) + return &init_ima_ns; + return NULL; +} + + +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) +{ + return &init_ima_ns; +} + static inline struct ima_namespace * create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) {@@ -572,6 +590,11 @@ static inline unsigned long set_iint_flags(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, return flags; } +static inline struct ima_namespace *ima_ns_from_file(const struct file *filp) +{ + return &init_ima_ns; +} + #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ #endif /* __LINUX_IMA_H */diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 468508f6a7e8..ee3af81d1c3e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp); return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ns->ima_htable.violations);@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp); return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ns->ima_htable.len); }@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = { /* returns pointer to hlist_node */ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file); loff_t l = *pos; struct ima_queue_entry *qe;@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos) static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(m->file); struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v; /* lock protects when reading beyond last element@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ static ssize_t ima_read_policy(struct ima_namespace *ns, char *path) static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(file); char *data; ssize_t result;@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_user_ns_from_file(filp); - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(filp); if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) */ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = &init_ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = ima_ns_from_file(file); const char *cause = ns->valid_policy ? "completed" : "failed"; if ((file->f_flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDONLY)@@ -459,12 +459,29 @@ int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root) struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements = NULL; struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL; struct dentry *violations = NULL; + bool created_ns = false; + + /* + * While multiple superblocks can exist they are keyed by userns in + * s_fs_info for securityfs. The first time a userns mounts a + * securityfs instance we lazily allocate the ima_namespace for the + * userns since that's the only way a userns can meaningfully use ima. + * The vfs ensures we're the only one to call fill_super() and hence + * ima_fs_ns_init(), so we don't need any memory barriers here, i.e. + * user_ns->ima_ns can't change while we're in here. + */ + if (!ns) { + ns = create_ima_ns(user_ns); + if (IS_ERR(ns)) + return PTR_ERR(ns); + created_ns = true; + }
Since create_ima_ns() initializes user_ns->ima_ns via smp_store_release() the patch currently implies that concurrent access to user_ns->ima_ns are safe once create_ima_ns() returns. Specifically, it entails that no caller will access entries in the ima namespace that will only be filled in past this point. Afaict, this only relates to the ns->policy_dentry which can't be accessed until securityfs is finished. Nonetheless, I would recommend that you change create_ima_ns() to not initialize user_ns->ima_ns and instead defer this until everything in the namespace is setup. So maybe move the smp_store_release() to the end of ima_fs_ns_init(). If ns->policy_dentry wouldn't be stashed in ima_ns it wouldn't matter but since it is I would not publish ima_ns before this is set. Sm like (uncompiled, untested):
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index ee3af81d1c3e..64ca47671d31 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c@@ -531,6 +531,8 @@ int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root) goto out; } + if (!user_ns->ima_ns) + smp_store_release(&user_ns->ima_ns, ns); return 0; out: securityfs_remove(ns->policy_dentry);
As a side-effect this will let you get rid of the bool created_ns and thereby simplify the codeflow. (Note, that obviously means that the changes I mentioned earlier in https://lore.kernel.org/containers/20220114114321.7prnt72ukvch4wxa@wittgenstein (local) can't be made.)