[PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

Subsystems: documentation, keys-encrypted, keys-trusted, keys/keyrings, security subsystem, the rest

STALE1665d REVIEWED: 5 (5M)

1 review trailer (1 from subsystem maintainers).

16 messages, 5 authors, 2022-01-20 · open the first message on its own page

[PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Yael Tiomkin <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-29 21:54:12

The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.

Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
---

Notes:
    v -> v2: fixed compilation error.
    
    v2 -> v3: modified documentation.
    
    v3 -> v4: modified commit message.

 .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       | 25 ++++++--
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c      | 62 +++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 80d5a5af62a1..f614dad7de12 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -107,12 +107,13 @@ Encrypted Keys
 --------------
 
 Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
-for encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel-generated random
-numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified ‘master’ key. The
-‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main disadvantage
-of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, they are only
-as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key should therefore
-be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in boot.
+for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated
+random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted
+using a specified ‘master’ key. The ‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or
+user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not
+rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting
+them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as
+possible, preferably early in boot.
 
 
 Usage
@@ -199,6 +200,8 @@ Usage::
 
     keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
         ring
+    keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen
+        decrypted-data" ring
     keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
     keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"
 
@@ -303,6 +306,16 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::
     82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
     24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
 
+Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::
+
+    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u
+    794890253
+
+    $ keyctl print 794890253
+    default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d
+    bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247
+    17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
+
 Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
 are anticipated.  In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined
 in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem.  More details
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 87432b35d771..baf6fba5e05e 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
  *
  * datablob format:
  * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <decrypted data>
  * load [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
  *     <encrypted iv + data>
  * update <new-master-key name>
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
  */
 static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
 			  char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
-			  char **hex_encoded_iv)
+			  char **hex_encoded_iv, char **decrypted_data)
 {
 	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 	int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -231,6 +232,8 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
 				"when called from .update method\n", keyword);
 			break;
 		}
+		*decrypted_data = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+
 		ret = 0;
 		break;
 	case Opt_load:
@@ -595,7 +598,8 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
 							 const char *format,
 							 const char *master_desc,
-							 const char *datalen)
+							 const char *datalen,
+							 const char *decrypted_data)
 {
 	struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
 	unsigned short datablob_len;
@@ -604,6 +608,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
 	unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
 	unsigned int format_len;
 	long dlen;
+	int i;
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
@@ -613,6 +618,20 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
 	format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
 	decrypted_datalen = dlen;
 	payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+
+	if (decrypted_data) {
+		if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
+			pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < strlen(decrypted_data); i++) {
+			if (!isalnum(decrypted_data[i])) {
+				pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided must be alphanumeric\n");
+				return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (format) {
 		if (!strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs)) {
 			if (dlen != ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
@@ -740,13 +759,14 @@ static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 /*
  * encrypted_init - initialize an encrypted key
  *
- * For a new key, use a random number for both the iv and data
- * itself.  For an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
+ * For a new key, use either a random number or user-provided decrypted data in
+ * case it is provided. A random number is used for the iv in both cases. For
+ * an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
  */
 static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 			  const char *key_desc, const char *format,
 			  const char *master_desc, const char *datalen,
-			  const char *hex_encoded_iv)
+			  const char *hex_encoded_iv, const char *decrypted_data)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
 
@@ -760,21 +780,26 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 	}
 
 	__ekey_init(epayload, format, master_desc, datalen);
-	if (!hex_encoded_iv) {
-		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
-
-		get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data,
-				 epayload->decrypted_datalen);
-	} else
+	if (hex_encoded_iv) {
 		ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv);
+	} else if (decrypted_data) {
+		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+		memcpy(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
+				epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+	} else {
+		get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+		get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+	}
 	return ret;
 }
 
 /*
  * encrypted_instantiate - instantiate an encrypted key
  *
- * Decrypt an existing encrypted datablob or create a new encrypted key
- * based on a kernel random number.
+ * Instantiates the key:
+ * - by decrypting an existing encrypted datablob, or
+ * - by creating a new encrypted key based on a kernel random number, or
+ * - using provided decrypted data.
  *
  * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
  */
@@ -787,6 +812,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	char *master_desc = NULL;
 	char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
 	char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
+	char *decrypted_data = NULL;
 	size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
 	int ret;
 
@@ -799,18 +825,18 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
 	datablob[datalen] = 0;
 	memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
 	ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
-			     &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv);
+			     &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv, &decrypted_data);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
 	epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, format, master_desc,
-				       decrypted_datalen);
+				       decrypted_datalen, decrypted_data);
 	if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
 		goto out;
 	}
 	ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
-			     decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
+			     decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv, decrypted_data);
 	if (ret < 0) {
 		kfree_sensitive(epayload);
 		goto out;
@@ -860,7 +886,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 
 	buf[datalen] = 0;
 	memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen);
-	ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
+	ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL, NULL);
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -869,7 +895,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
 		goto out;
 
 	new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, epayload->format,
-					   new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
+					   new_master_desc, epayload->datalen, NULL);
 	if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
 		ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
 		goto out;
-- 
2.34.1.448.ga2b2bfdf31-goog

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Sumit Garg <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-30 10:07:38

+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted hunk
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
---

Notes:
    v -> v2: fixed compilation error.

    v2 -> v3: modified documentation.

    v3 -> v4: modified commit message.

 .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       | 25 ++++++--
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c      | 62 +++++++++++++------
 2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 80d5a5af62a1..f614dad7de12 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -107,12 +107,13 @@ Encrypted Keys
 --------------

 Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
-for encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel-generated random
-numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified ‘master’ key. The
-‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main disadvantage
-of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, they are only
-as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key should therefore
-be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in boot.
+for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated
+random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted
+using a specified ‘master’ key. The ‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or
+user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not
+rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting
+them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as
+possible, preferably early in boot.


 Usage
@@ -199,6 +200,8 @@ Usage::

     keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
         ring
+    keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen
+        decrypted-data" ring
     keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
     keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"
@@ -303,6 +306,16 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::
     82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
     24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc

+Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::
+
+    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u
+    794890253
+
+    $ keyctl print 794890253
+    default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d
+    bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247
+    17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
+
 Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
 are anticipated.  In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined
 in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem.  More details
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 87432b35d771..baf6fba5e05e 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
  *
  * datablob format:
  * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <decrypted data>
  * load [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
  *     <encrypted iv + data>
  * update <new-master-key name>
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
  */
 static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
                          char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
-                         char **hex_encoded_iv)
+                         char **hex_encoded_iv, char **decrypted_data)
 {
        substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
        int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -231,6 +232,8 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
                                "when called from .update method\n", keyword);
                        break;
                }
+               *decrypted_data = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+
                ret = 0;
                break;
        case Opt_load:
@@ -595,7 +598,8 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
                                                         const char *format,
                                                         const char *master_desc,
-                                                        const char *datalen)
+                                                        const char *datalen,
+                                                        const char *decrypted_data)
 {
        struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
        unsigned short datablob_len;
@@ -604,6 +608,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
        unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
        unsigned int format_len;
        long dlen;
+       int i;
        int ret;

        ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
@@ -613,6 +618,20 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
        format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
        decrypted_datalen = dlen;
        payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+
+       if (decrypted_data) {
+               if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
+                       pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
+                       return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+               }
+               for (i = 0; i < strlen(decrypted_data); i++) {
+                       if (!isalnum(decrypted_data[i])) {
+                               pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided must be alphanumeric\n");
+                               return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+                       }
+               }
+       }
+
        if (format) {
                if (!strcmp(format, key_format_ecryptfs)) {
                        if (dlen != ECRYPTFS_MAX_KEY_BYTES) {
@@ -740,13 +759,14 @@ static void __ekey_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
 /*
  * encrypted_init - initialize an encrypted key
  *
- * For a new key, use a random number for both the iv and data
- * itself.  For an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
+ * For a new key, use either a random number or user-provided decrypted data in
+ * case it is provided. A random number is used for the iv in both cases. For
+ * an old key, decrypt the hex encoded data.
  */
 static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
                          const char *key_desc, const char *format,
                          const char *master_desc, const char *datalen,
-                         const char *hex_encoded_iv)
+                         const char *hex_encoded_iv, const char *decrypted_data)
 {
        int ret = 0;
@@ -760,21 +780,26 @@ static int encrypted_init(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
        }

        __ekey_init(epayload, format, master_desc, datalen);
-       if (!hex_encoded_iv) {
-               get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
-
-               get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data,
-                                epayload->decrypted_datalen);
-       } else
+       if (hex_encoded_iv) {
                ret = encrypted_key_decrypt(epayload, format, hex_encoded_iv);
+       } else if (decrypted_data) {
+               get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+               memcpy(epayload->decrypted_data, decrypted_data,
+                               epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+       } else {
+               get_random_bytes(epayload->iv, ivsize);
+               get_random_bytes(epayload->decrypted_data, epayload->decrypted_datalen);
+       }
        return ret;
 }

 /*
  * encrypted_instantiate - instantiate an encrypted key
  *
- * Decrypt an existing encrypted datablob or create a new encrypted key
- * based on a kernel random number.
+ * Instantiates the key:
+ * - by decrypting an existing encrypted datablob, or
+ * - by creating a new encrypted key based on a kernel random number, or
+ * - using provided decrypted data.
  *
  * On success, return 0. Otherwise return errno.
  */
@@ -787,6 +812,7 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
        char *master_desc = NULL;
        char *decrypted_datalen = NULL;
        char *hex_encoded_iv = NULL;
+       char *decrypted_data = NULL;
        size_t datalen = prep->datalen;
        int ret;
@@ -799,18 +825,18 @@ static int encrypted_instantiate(struct key *key,
        datablob[datalen] = 0;
        memcpy(datablob, prep->data, datalen);
        ret = datablob_parse(datablob, &format, &master_desc,
-                            &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv);
+                            &decrypted_datalen, &hex_encoded_iv, &decrypted_data);
        if (ret < 0)
                goto out;

        epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, format, master_desc,
-                                      decrypted_datalen);
+                                      decrypted_datalen, decrypted_data);
        if (IS_ERR(epayload)) {
                ret = PTR_ERR(epayload);
                goto out;
        }
        ret = encrypted_init(epayload, key->description, format, master_desc,
-                            decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv);
+                            decrypted_datalen, hex_encoded_iv, decrypted_data);
        if (ret < 0) {
                kfree_sensitive(epayload);
                goto out;
@@ -860,7 +886,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)

        buf[datalen] = 0;
        memcpy(buf, prep->data, datalen);
-       ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL);
+       ret = datablob_parse(buf, &format, &new_master_desc, NULL, NULL, NULL);
        if (ret < 0)
                goto out;
@@ -869,7 +895,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep)
                goto out;

        new_epayload = encrypted_key_alloc(key, epayload->format,
-                                          new_master_desc, epayload->datalen);
+                                          new_master_desc, epayload->datalen, NULL);
        if (IS_ERR(new_epayload)) {
                ret = PTR_ERR(new_epayload);
                goto out;
--
2.34.1.448.ga2b2bfdf31-goog

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Date: 2021-12-30 13:30:06

Hi Sumit,

On Thu, 2021-12-30 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
There is a difference between trusted and encrypted keys.  So in
addition to pointing to the rather long discussion thread, please
summarize the conclusion and, assuming you agree, include why in once
case it was acceptable and in the other it wasn't to provide userspace
key data.

thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Sumit Garg <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-03 06:51:22

Hi Mimi,

Apologies for the delayed reply as I was on leave for a long new year weekend.

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 18:59, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:
Hi Sumit,

On Thu, 2021-12-30 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
quoted
+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
There is a difference between trusted and encrypted keys.
Yeah I understand the implementation differences.
 So in
addition to pointing to the rather long discussion thread, please
summarize the conclusion and, assuming you agree, include why in once
case it was acceptable and in the other it wasn't to provide userspace
key data.
My major concern with importing user-space key data in *plain* format
is that if import is *not* done in a safe (manufacturing or
production) environment then the plain key data is susceptible to
user-space compromises when the device is in the field.

And it sounds like we are diverting from basic definition [1] of encrypted keys:

"Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the
existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable
length symmetric keys, and in both cases all keys are created in the
kernel, and **user space sees, stores, and loads** only encrypted
blobs."

Also, as Jarrko mentioned earlier the use-case is still not clear to
me as well. Isn't user logon keys an alternative option for
non-readable user-space keys?

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.13/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.html

-Sumit
thanks,

Mimi

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2022-01-05 20:12:36

On Wed, 2021-12-29 at 16:53 -0500, Yael Tiomkin wrote:
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
The 2nd to last sentence is essentially a tautology but fails to
be even that, as you can already "perform key encryption" from user
space, just not with arbitrary key material.

It does not elighten any applications of this feature.

/Jarkko

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Yael Tiomkin <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-05 20:18:44

Hi Sumit,

On Mon, Jan 3, 2022 at 1:51 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
Hi Mimi,

Apologies for the delayed reply as I was on leave for a long new year weekend.

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 18:59, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Thu, 2021-12-30 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
quoted
+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
There is a difference between trusted and encrypted keys.
Yeah I understand the implementation differences.
quoted
 So in
addition to pointing to the rather long discussion thread, please
summarize the conclusion and, assuming you agree, include why in once
case it was acceptable and in the other it wasn't to provide userspace
key data.
My major concern with importing user-space key data in *plain* format
is that if import is *not* done in a safe (manufacturing or
production) environment then the plain key data is susceptible to
user-space compromises when the device is in the field.
I agree this can happen. Key distribution in any scenario needs to be
secure and this could also potentially be an issue if the key is first
encrypted and then imported. We can make sure the documentation
highlights the safety requirement.
And it sounds like we are diverting from basic definition [1] of encrypted keys:

"Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the
existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable
length symmetric keys, and in both cases all keys are created in the
kernel, and **user space sees, stores, and loads** only encrypted
blobs."

Also, as Jarrko mentioned earlier the use-case is still not clear to
me as well. Isn't user logon keys an alternative option for
non-readable user-space keys?
The goal in this change is to allow key encryption from userspace,
using user-provided decrypted data. This cannot be achieved in logon
keys, which as you mentioned, are simply non-readable user type keys.

[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.13/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.html

-Sumit
quoted
thanks,

Mimi
Yael

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Yael Tiomkin <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-06 18:30:43

On Wed, Jan 5, 2022 at 3:12 PM Jarkko Sakkinen [off-list ref] wrote:
On Wed, 2021-12-29 at 16:53 -0500, Yael Tiomkin wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
The 2nd to last sentence is essentially a tautology but fails to
be even that, as you can already "perform key encryption" from user
space, just not with arbitrary key material.

It does not elighten any applications of this feature.

/Jarkko
Sure. Please look at the modification below.

The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to inject (and encrypt) user-provided
decrypted data. The decrypted key material will be inaccessible from
userspace. This feature also acts as a building block for a userspace
envelope encryption capability.

Yael

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Sumit Garg <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-07 05:15:16

Hi Yael,

On Thu, 6 Jan 2022 at 01:48, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
Hi Sumit,

On Mon, Jan 3, 2022 at 1:51 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Mimi,

Apologies for the delayed reply as I was on leave for a long new year weekend.

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 18:59, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Thu, 2021-12-30 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
quoted
+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
There is a difference between trusted and encrypted keys.
Yeah I understand the implementation differences.
quoted
 So in
addition to pointing to the rather long discussion thread, please
summarize the conclusion and, assuming you agree, include why in once
case it was acceptable and in the other it wasn't to provide userspace
key data.
My major concern with importing user-space key data in *plain* format
is that if import is *not* done in a safe (manufacturing or
production) environment then the plain key data is susceptible to
user-space compromises when the device is in the field.
I agree this can happen. Key distribution in any scenario needs to be
secure and this could also potentially be an issue if the key is first
encrypted and then imported.
Currently its not the case with encrypted keys. These are random keys
generated within the kernel and encrypted with master key within the
kernel and then exposed to user-space as encrypted blob only.
We can make sure the documentation
highlights the safety requirement.
IMO, you should enable this feature as a compile time option. The help
text for that config option should highlight the use-case along with a
safety warning.

-Sumit
quoted
And it sounds like we are diverting from basic definition [1] of encrypted keys:

"Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the
existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable
length symmetric keys, and in both cases all keys are created in the
kernel, and **user space sees, stores, and loads** only encrypted
blobs."

Also, as Jarrko mentioned earlier the use-case is still not clear to
me as well. Isn't user logon keys an alternative option for
non-readable user-space keys?
The goal in this change is to allow key encryption from userspace,
using user-provided decrypted data. This cannot be achieved in logon
keys, which as you mentioned, are simply non-readable user type keys.

quoted
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.13/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.html

-Sumit
quoted
thanks,

Mimi
Yael

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Yael Tiomkin <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-07 12:53:55

Hi Sumit,

On Fri, Jan 7, 2022 at 12:15 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
Hi Yael,

On Thu, 6 Jan 2022 at 01:48, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Mon, Jan 3, 2022 at 1:51 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Mimi,

Apologies for the delayed reply as I was on leave for a long new year weekend.

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 18:59, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Thu, 2021-12-30 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
quoted
+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
There is a difference between trusted and encrypted keys.
Yeah I understand the implementation differences.
quoted
 So in
addition to pointing to the rather long discussion thread, please
summarize the conclusion and, assuming you agree, include why in once
case it was acceptable and in the other it wasn't to provide userspace
key data.
My major concern with importing user-space key data in *plain* format
is that if import is *not* done in a safe (manufacturing or
production) environment then the plain key data is susceptible to
user-space compromises when the device is in the field.
I agree this can happen. Key distribution in any scenario needs to be
secure and this could also potentially be an issue if the key is first
encrypted and then imported.
Currently its not the case with encrypted keys. These are random keys
generated within the kernel and encrypted with master key within the
kernel and then exposed to user-space as encrypted blob only.

There are two different ways to create encrypted keys. One is to have
them generated within the kernel using random numbers, and the other
is by importing them in their encrypted form from user-space.
I was referring to the latter in my previous statement.
quoted
We can make sure the documentation
highlights the safety requirement.
IMO, you should enable this feature as a compile time option. The help
text for that config option should highlight the use-case along with a
safety warning.

-Sumit
quoted
quoted
And it sounds like we are diverting from basic definition [1] of encrypted keys:

"Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the
existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable
length symmetric keys, and in both cases all keys are created in the
kernel, and **user space sees, stores, and loads** only encrypted
blobs."

Also, as Jarrko mentioned earlier the use-case is still not clear to
me as well. Isn't user logon keys an alternative option for
non-readable user-space keys?
The goal in this change is to allow key encryption from userspace,
using user-provided decrypted data. This cannot be achieved in logon
keys, which as you mentioned, are simply non-readable user type keys.

quoted
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.13/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.html

-Sumit
quoted
thanks,

Mimi
Yael

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Sumit Garg <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-07 13:32:53

On Fri, 7 Jan 2022 at 18:23, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
Hi Sumit,

On Fri, Jan 7, 2022 at 12:15 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Yael,

On Thu, 6 Jan 2022 at 01:48, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Mon, Jan 3, 2022 at 1:51 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Mimi,

Apologies for the delayed reply as I was on leave for a long new year weekend.

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 18:59, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Thu, 2021-12-30 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
quoted
+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
There is a difference between trusted and encrypted keys.
Yeah I understand the implementation differences.
quoted
 So in
addition to pointing to the rather long discussion thread, please
summarize the conclusion and, assuming you agree, include why in once
case it was acceptable and in the other it wasn't to provide userspace
key data.
My major concern with importing user-space key data in *plain* format
is that if import is *not* done in a safe (manufacturing or
production) environment then the plain key data is susceptible to
user-space compromises when the device is in the field.
I agree this can happen. Key distribution in any scenario needs to be
secure and this could also potentially be an issue if the key is first
encrypted and then imported.
Currently its not the case with encrypted keys. These are random keys
generated within the kernel and encrypted with master key within the
kernel and then exposed to user-space as encrypted blob only.

There are two different ways to create encrypted keys. One is to have
them generated within the kernel using random numbers, and the other
is by importing them in their encrypted form from user-space.
I was referring to the latter in my previous statement.
So, from a key distribution security point of view, encrypted key
user-space import is **not equal to** plain key user-space import.
That's why we need to have a separate compile time option as every
device may come with its own threat model and may choose to enable or
disable this user-space plain key import feature.

-Sumit
quoted
quoted
We can make sure the documentation
highlights the safety requirement.
IMO, you should enable this feature as a compile time option. The help
text for that config option should highlight the use-case along with a
safety warning.

-Sumit
quoted
quoted
And it sounds like we are diverting from basic definition [1] of encrypted keys:

"Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the
existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable
length symmetric keys, and in both cases all keys are created in the
kernel, and **user space sees, stores, and loads** only encrypted
blobs."

Also, as Jarrko mentioned earlier the use-case is still not clear to
me as well. Isn't user logon keys an alternative option for
non-readable user-space keys?
The goal in this change is to allow key encryption from userspace,
using user-provided decrypted data. This cannot be achieved in logon
keys, which as you mentioned, are simply non-readable user type keys.

quoted
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.13/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.html

-Sumit
quoted
thanks,

Mimi
Yael

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Date: 2022-01-08 21:58:54

On Wed, Dec 29, 2021 at 04:53:30PM -0500, Yael Tiomkin wrote:
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.

Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
What is the use case for this?

BR, Jarkko

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Nayna <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-10 16:04:26

On 12/29/21 16:53, Yael Tiomkin wrote:
quoted hunk
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.

Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
---

Notes:
     v -> v2: fixed compilation error.
     
     v2 -> v3: modified documentation.
     
     v3 -> v4: modified commit message.

  .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       | 25 ++++++--
  security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c      | 62 +++++++++++++------
  2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 80d5a5af62a1..f614dad7de12 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -107,12 +107,13 @@ Encrypted Keys
  --------------
  
  Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
-for encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel-generated random
-numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified ‘master’ key. The
-‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main disadvantage
-of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, they are only
-as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key should therefore
-be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in boot.
+for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated
+random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted
+using a specified ‘master’ key. The ‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or
+user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not
+rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting
+them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as
+possible, preferably early in boot.
  
  
  Usage
@@ -199,6 +200,8 @@ Usage::
  
      keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
          ring
+    keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen
+        decrypted-data" ring
      keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
      keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"
  
@@ -303,6 +306,16 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::
      82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
      24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
  
+Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::
+
+    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u
+    794890253
+
+    $ keyctl print 794890253
+    default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d
+    bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247
+    17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
+
  Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
  are anticipated.  In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined
  in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem.  More details
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 87432b35d771..baf6fba5e05e 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
   *
   * datablob format:
   * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <decrypted data>
   * load [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
   *     <encrypted iv + data>
   * update <new-master-key name>
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
   */
  static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
  			  char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
-			  char **hex_encoded_iv)
+			  char **hex_encoded_iv, char **decrypted_data)
  {
  	substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
  	int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -231,6 +232,8 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
  				"when called from .update method\n", keyword);
  			break;
  		}
+		*decrypted_data = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+
  		ret = 0;
  		break;
  	case Opt_load:
@@ -595,7 +598,8 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
  static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
  							 const char *format,
  							 const char *master_desc,
-							 const char *datalen)
+							 const char *datalen,
+							 const char *decrypted_data)
  {
  	struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
  	unsigned short datablob_len;
@@ -604,6 +608,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
  	unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
  	unsigned int format_len;
  	long dlen;
+	int i;
  	int ret;
  
  	ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
@@ -613,6 +618,20 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
  	format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
  	decrypted_datalen = dlen;
  	payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+
+	if (decrypted_data) {
+		if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
+			pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
+			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+		}
+		for (i = 0; i < strlen(decrypted_data); i++) {
+			if (!isalnum(decrypted_data[i])) {
User-provided decrypted data may have special characters, commonly used 
in passwords or key phrases, apart from alphanumeric.  Replace isalnum 
with !iscntrl() to validate against control characters but allow special 
characters.

Thanks & Regards,

      - Nayna

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Yael Tiomkin <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-13 19:02:00

On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 11:04 AM Nayna [off-list ref] wrote:

On 12/29/21 16:53, Yael Tiomkin wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.

Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
---

Notes:
     v -> v2: fixed compilation error.

     v2 -> v3: modified documentation.

     v3 -> v4: modified commit message.

  .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       | 25 ++++++--
  security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c      | 62 +++++++++++++------
  2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 80d5a5af62a1..f614dad7de12 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -107,12 +107,13 @@ Encrypted Keys
  --------------

  Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
-for encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel-generated random
-numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified ‘master’ key. The
-‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main disadvantage
-of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, they are only
-as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key should therefore
-be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in boot.
+for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated
+random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted
+using a specified ‘master’ key. The ‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or
+user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not
+rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting
+them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as
+possible, preferably early in boot.


  Usage
@@ -199,6 +200,8 @@ Usage::

      keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
          ring
+    keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen
+        decrypted-data" ring
      keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
      keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"
@@ -303,6 +306,16 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::
      82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
      24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc

+Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::
+
+    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u
+    794890253
+
+    $ keyctl print 794890253
+    default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d
+    bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247
+    17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
+
  Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
  are anticipated.  In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined
  in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem.  More details
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 87432b35d771..baf6fba5e05e 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
   *
   * datablob format:
   * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <decrypted data>
   * load [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
   *     <encrypted iv + data>
   * update <new-master-key name>
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
   */
  static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
                        char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
-                       char **hex_encoded_iv)
+                       char **hex_encoded_iv, char **decrypted_data)
  {
      substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
      int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -231,6 +232,8 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
                              "when called from .update method\n", keyword);
                      break;
              }
+             *decrypted_data = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+
              ret = 0;
              break;
      case Opt_load:
@@ -595,7 +598,8 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
  static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
                                                       const char *format,
                                                       const char *master_desc,
-                                                      const char *datalen)
+                                                      const char *datalen,
+                                                      const char *decrypted_data)
  {
      struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
      unsigned short datablob_len;
@@ -604,6 +608,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
      unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
      unsigned int format_len;
      long dlen;
+     int i;
      int ret;

      ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
@@ -613,6 +618,20 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
      format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
      decrypted_datalen = dlen;
      payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+
+     if (decrypted_data) {
+             if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
+                     pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
+                     return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+             }
+             for (i = 0; i < strlen(decrypted_data); i++) {
+                     if (!isalnum(decrypted_data[i])) {
User-provided decrypted data may have special characters, commonly used
in passwords or key phrases, apart from alphanumeric.  Replace isalnum
with !iscntrl() to validate against control characters but allow special
characters.

Thanks & Regards,

      - Nayna
Hi Nayna,
I wonder if we should use isprint() instead?

Yael

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Yael Tiomkin <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-13 19:15:14

On Fri, Jan 7, 2022 at 8:32 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
On Fri, 7 Jan 2022 at 18:23, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Fri, Jan 7, 2022 at 12:15 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Yael,

On Thu, 6 Jan 2022 at 01:48, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Mon, Jan 3, 2022 at 1:51 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Mimi,

Apologies for the delayed reply as I was on leave for a long new year weekend.

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 18:59, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Thu, 2021-12-30 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
quoted
+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
There is a difference between trusted and encrypted keys.
Yeah I understand the implementation differences.
quoted
 So in
addition to pointing to the rather long discussion thread, please
summarize the conclusion and, assuming you agree, include why in once
case it was acceptable and in the other it wasn't to provide userspace
key data.
My major concern with importing user-space key data in *plain* format
is that if import is *not* done in a safe (manufacturing or
production) environment then the plain key data is susceptible to
user-space compromises when the device is in the field.
I agree this can happen. Key distribution in any scenario needs to be
secure and this could also potentially be an issue if the key is first
encrypted and then imported.
Currently its not the case with encrypted keys. These are random keys
generated within the kernel and encrypted with master key within the
kernel and then exposed to user-space as encrypted blob only.

There are two different ways to create encrypted keys. One is to have
them generated within the kernel using random numbers, and the other
is by importing them in their encrypted form from user-space.
I was referring to the latter in my previous statement.
So, from a key distribution security point of view, encrypted key
user-space import is **not equal to** plain key user-space import.
That's why we need to have a separate compile time option as every
device may come with its own threat model and may choose to enable or
disable this user-space plain key import feature.

-Sumit
quoted
quoted
quoted
We can make sure the documentation
highlights the safety requirement.
IMO, you should enable this feature as a compile time option. The help
text for that config option should highlight the use-case along with a
safety warning.

-Sumit
quoted
quoted
And it sounds like we are diverting from basic definition [1] of encrypted keys:

"Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the
existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable
length symmetric keys, and in both cases all keys are created in the
kernel, and **user space sees, stores, and loads** only encrypted
blobs."

Also, as Jarrko mentioned earlier the use-case is still not clear to
me as well. Isn't user logon keys an alternative option for
non-readable user-space keys?
The goal in this change is to allow key encryption from userspace,
using user-provided decrypted data. This cannot be achieved in logon
keys, which as you mentioned, are simply non-readable user type keys.

quoted
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.13/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.html

-Sumit
quoted
thanks,

Mimi
Yael
Hi Sumit,
The encrypted-keys module is already controlled by the
CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS option, which I think might give sufficient
granularity to control the behavior. Do you still think a feature
dedicated option is needed?

Yael

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Sumit Garg <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-18 06:47:17

On Fri, 14 Jan 2022 at 00:45, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
On Fri, Jan 7, 2022 at 8:32 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On Fri, 7 Jan 2022 at 18:23, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Fri, Jan 7, 2022 at 12:15 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Yael,

On Thu, 6 Jan 2022 at 01:48, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Mon, Jan 3, 2022 at 1:51 AM Sumit Garg [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Mimi,

Apologies for the delayed reply as I was on leave for a long new year weekend.

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 18:59, Mimi Zohar [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Hi Sumit,

On Thu, 2021-12-30 at 15:37 +0530, Sumit Garg wrote:
quoted
+ Jan, Ahmad

On Thu, 30 Dec 2021 at 03:24, Yael Tiomkin [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.
This type of user-space key import feature has already been discussed
at large in the context of trusted keys here [1]. So what makes it
special in case of encrypted keys such that it isn't a "UNSAFE_IMPORT"
or "DEBUGGING_IMPORT" or "DEVELOPMENT_IMPORT", ...?

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-integrity/74830d4f-5a76-8ba8-aad0-0d79f7c01af9@pengutronix.de/

-Sumit
quoted
Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
There is a difference between trusted and encrypted keys.
Yeah I understand the implementation differences.
quoted
 So in
addition to pointing to the rather long discussion thread, please
summarize the conclusion and, assuming you agree, include why in once
case it was acceptable and in the other it wasn't to provide userspace
key data.
My major concern with importing user-space key data in *plain* format
is that if import is *not* done in a safe (manufacturing or
production) environment then the plain key data is susceptible to
user-space compromises when the device is in the field.
I agree this can happen. Key distribution in any scenario needs to be
secure and this could also potentially be an issue if the key is first
encrypted and then imported.
Currently its not the case with encrypted keys. These are random keys
generated within the kernel and encrypted with master key within the
kernel and then exposed to user-space as encrypted blob only.

There are two different ways to create encrypted keys. One is to have
them generated within the kernel using random numbers, and the other
is by importing them in their encrypted form from user-space.
I was referring to the latter in my previous statement.
So, from a key distribution security point of view, encrypted key
user-space import is **not equal to** plain key user-space import.
That's why we need to have a separate compile time option as every
device may come with its own threat model and may choose to enable or
disable this user-space plain key import feature.

-Sumit
quoted
quoted
quoted
We can make sure the documentation
highlights the safety requirement.
IMO, you should enable this feature as a compile time option. The help
text for that config option should highlight the use-case along with a
safety warning.

-Sumit
quoted
quoted
And it sounds like we are diverting from basic definition [1] of encrypted keys:

"Trusted and Encrypted Keys are two new key types added to the
existing kernel key ring service. Both of these new types are variable
length symmetric keys, and in both cases all keys are created in the
kernel, and **user space sees, stores, and loads** only encrypted
blobs."

Also, as Jarrko mentioned earlier the use-case is still not clear to
me as well. Isn't user logon keys an alternative option for
non-readable user-space keys?
The goal in this change is to allow key encryption from userspace,
using user-provided decrypted data. This cannot be achieved in logon
keys, which as you mentioned, are simply non-readable user type keys.

quoted
[1] https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v4.13/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.html

-Sumit
quoted
thanks,

Mimi
Yael
Hi Sumit,
The encrypted-keys module is already controlled by the
CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS option, which I think might give sufficient
granularity to control the behavior. Do you still think a feature
dedicated option is needed?
Since this feature will change security properties for encrypted keys
which can be considered as a regression for existing users during
uprev. So it needs to be an optional key import feature with a clear
user visible warning. Thinking more about this, you can even have a
module param to turn it on with a runtime warning as well.

-Sumit
Yael

Re: [PATCH v4] KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data

From: Nayna <hidden>
Date: 2022-01-20 17:14:06

On 1/13/22 14:01, Yael Tiomkin wrote:
On Mon, Jan 10, 2022 at 11:04 AM Nayna [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
On 12/29/21 16:53, Yael Tiomkin wrote:
quoted
The encrypted.c class supports instantiation of encrypted keys with
either an already-encrypted key material, or by generating new key
material based on random numbers. This patch defines a new datablob
format: [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
<decrypted data> that allows to instantiate encrypted keys using
user-provided decrypted data, and therefore allows to perform key
encryption from userspace. The decrypted key material will be
inaccessible from userspace.

Reviewed-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Yael Tiomkin <redacted>
---

Notes:
      v -> v2: fixed compilation error.

      v2 -> v3: modified documentation.

      v3 -> v4: modified commit message.

   .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       | 25 ++++++--
   security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c      | 62 +++++++++++++------
   2 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 80d5a5af62a1..f614dad7de12 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
@@ -107,12 +107,13 @@ Encrypted Keys
   --------------

   Encrypted keys do not depend on a trust source, and are faster, as they use AES
-for encryption/decryption. New keys are created from kernel-generated random
-numbers, and are encrypted/decrypted using a specified ‘master’ key. The
-‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or user-key type. The main disadvantage
-of encrypted keys is that if they are not rooted in a trusted key, they are only
-as secure as the user key encrypting them. The master user key should therefore
-be loaded in as secure a way as possible, preferably early in boot.
+for encryption/decryption. New keys are created either from kernel-generated
+random numbers or user-provided decrypted data, and are encrypted/decrypted
+using a specified ‘master’ key. The ‘master’ key can either be a trusted-key or
+user-key type. The main disadvantage of encrypted keys is that if they are not
+rooted in a trusted key, they are only as secure as the user key encrypting
+them. The master user key should therefore be loaded in as secure a way as
+possible, preferably early in boot.


   Usage
@@ -199,6 +200,8 @@ Usage::

       keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen"
           ring
+    keyctl add encrypted name "new [format] key-type:master-key-name keylen
+        decrypted-data" ring
       keyctl add encrypted name "load hex_blob" ring
       keyctl update keyid "update key-type:master-key-name"
@@ -303,6 +306,16 @@ Load an encrypted key "evm" from saved blob::
       82dbbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0
       24717c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc

+Instantiate an encrypted key "evm" using user-provided decrypted data::
+
+    $ keyctl add encrypted evm "new default user:kmk 32 `cat evm_decrypted_data.blob`" @u
+    794890253
+
+    $ keyctl print 794890253
+    default user:kmk 32 2375725ad57798846a9bbd240de8906f006e66c03af53b1b382d
+    bbc55be2a44616e4959430436dc4f2a7a9659aa60bb4652aeb2120f149ed197c564e0247
+    17c64 5972dcb82ab2dde83376d82b2e3c09ffc
+
   Other uses for trusted and encrypted keys, such as for disk and file encryption
   are anticipated.  In particular the new format 'ecryptfs' has been defined
   in order to use encrypted keys to mount an eCryptfs filesystem.  More details
diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
index 87432b35d771..baf6fba5e05e 100644
--- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
+++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c
@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
    *
    * datablob format:
    * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
+ * new [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length> <decrypted data>
    * load [<format>] <master-key name> <decrypted data length>
    *     <encrypted iv + data>
    * update <new-master-key name>
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ static int valid_master_desc(const char *new_desc, const char *orig_desc)
    */
   static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
                         char **master_desc, char **decrypted_datalen,
-                       char **hex_encoded_iv)
+                       char **hex_encoded_iv, char **decrypted_data)
   {
       substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
       int ret = -EINVAL;
@@ -231,6 +232,8 @@ static int datablob_parse(char *datablob, const char **format,
                               "when called from .update method\n", keyword);
                       break;
               }
+             *decrypted_data = strsep(&datablob, " \t");
+
               ret = 0;
               break;
       case Opt_load:
@@ -595,7 +598,8 @@ static int derived_key_decrypt(struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload,
   static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
                                                        const char *format,
                                                        const char *master_desc,
-                                                      const char *datalen)
+                                                      const char *datalen,
+                                                      const char *decrypted_data)
   {
       struct encrypted_key_payload *epayload = NULL;
       unsigned short datablob_len;
@@ -604,6 +608,7 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
       unsigned int encrypted_datalen;
       unsigned int format_len;
       long dlen;
+     int i;
       int ret;

       ret = kstrtol(datalen, 10, &dlen);
@@ -613,6 +618,20 @@ static struct encrypted_key_payload *encrypted_key_alloc(struct key *key,
       format_len = (!format) ? strlen(key_format_default) : strlen(format);
       decrypted_datalen = dlen;
       payload_datalen = decrypted_datalen;
+
+     if (decrypted_data) {
+             if (strlen(decrypted_data) != decrypted_datalen) {
+                     pr_err("encrypted key: decrypted data provided does not match decrypted data length provided\n");
+                     return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+             }
+             for (i = 0; i < strlen(decrypted_data); i++) {
+                     if (!isalnum(decrypted_data[i])) {
User-provided decrypted data may have special characters, commonly used
in passwords or key phrases, apart from alphanumeric.  Replace isalnum
with !iscntrl() to validate against control characters but allow special
characters.

Thanks & Regards,

       - Nayna
Hi Nayna,
I wonder if we should use isprint() instead?
I have been thinking more about this. Encrypted keys documentation says, 
"All user level blobs, are displayed and loaded in hex ascii for 
convenience."

Should we use a similar hex ascii encoding for user-provided data?  
Verification would then be isxdigit().

Users should convert their input to hex ascii before passing it to keyctl.

Thanks & Regards,

      - Nayna
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