Re: [PATCH v7 01/14] ima: Add IMA namespace support
From: Christian Brauner <hidden>
Date: 2021-12-16 14:08:21
Also in:
linux-integrity, lkml
Subsystem:
extended verification module (evm), integrity measurement architecture (ima), security subsystem, the rest · Maintainers:
Mimi Zohar, Roberto Sassu, Dmitry Kasatkin, Paul Moore, James Morris, "Serge E. Hallyn", Linus Torvalds
On Thu, Dec 16, 2021 at 12:43:10AM -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Implement an IMA namespace data structure that gets created alongside a user namespace with CLONE_NEWUSER. This lays down the foundation for namespacing the different aspects of IMA (eg. IMA-audit, IMA-measurement, IMA-appraisal). Signed-off-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com> Suggested-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> --- include/linux/ima.h | 33 ++++++++++++ include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ++ init/Kconfig | 10 ++++ kernel/user.c | 7 +++ kernel/user_namespace.c | 8 +++ security/integrity/ima/Makefile | 3 +- security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 8 +++ security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 4 ++ security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c | 28 ++++++++++ security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 10 files changed, 169 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_init_ima_ns.c create mode 100644 security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.cdiff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h index b6ab66a546ae..61461ee5b208 100644 --- a/include/linux/ima.h +++ b/include/linux/ima.h@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/kexec.h> +#include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <crypto/hash_info.h> struct linux_binprm;@@ -210,6 +211,38 @@ static inline int ima_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, } #endif /* CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE */ +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns; + +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_NS + +void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *ns); +int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns); + +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) +{ + return current_user_ns()->ima_ns; +} + +#else + +static inline void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) +{ +} + +static inline int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA + user_ns->ima_ns = &init_ima_ns; +#endif + return 0; +} + +static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) +{ + return &init_ima_ns; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_NS */ + #if defined(CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE) && defined(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING) extern bool ima_appraise_signature(enum kernel_read_file_id func); #elsediff --git a/include/linux/user_namespace.h b/include/linux/user_namespace.h index 33a4240e6a6f..5249db04d62b 100644 --- a/include/linux/user_namespace.h +++ b/include/linux/user_namespace.h@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct uid_gid_map { /* 64 bytes -- 1 cache line */ #define USERNS_INIT_FLAGS USERNS_SETGROUPS_ALLOWED struct ucounts; +struct ima_namespace; enum ucount_type { UCOUNT_USER_NAMESPACES,@@ -99,6 +100,9 @@ struct user_namespace { #endif struct ucounts *ucounts; long ucount_max[UCOUNT_COUNTS]; +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA + struct ima_namespace *ima_ns; +#endif } __randomize_layout; struct ucounts {diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig index 11f8a845f259..27890607e8cb 100644 --- a/init/Kconfig +++ b/init/Kconfig@@ -1242,6 +1242,16 @@ config NET_NS Allow user space to create what appear to be multiple instances of the network stack. +config IMA_NS + bool "IMA namespace" + depends on USER_NS + depends on IMA + default y + help + Allow the creation of IMA namespaces for each user namespace. + Namespaced IMA enables having IMA features work separately + in each IMA namespace. + endif # NAMESPACES config CHECKPOINT_RESTOREdiff --git a/kernel/user.c b/kernel/user.c index e2cf8c22b539..287751d89b44 100644 --- a/kernel/user.c +++ b/kernel/user.c@@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ #include <linux/user_namespace.h> #include <linux/proc_ns.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA +extern struct ima_namespace init_ima_ns; +#endif + /* * userns count is 1 for root user, 1 for init_uts_ns, * and 1 for... ?@@ -67,6 +71,9 @@ struct user_namespace init_user_ns = { .keyring_name_list = LIST_HEAD_INIT(init_user_ns.keyring_name_list), .keyring_sem = __RWSEM_INITIALIZER(init_user_ns.keyring_sem), #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_IMA + .ima_ns = &init_ima_ns, +#endif }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(init_user_ns);diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c index 6b2e3ca7ee99..6fa01323aac9 100644 --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include <linux/fs_struct.h> #include <linux/bsearch.h> #include <linux/sort.h> +#include <linux/ima.h> static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly; static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);@@ -141,8 +142,14 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns)) goto fail_keyring; + ret = create_ima_ns(ns);
Instead of greedily allocating a new ima namespace for each new user namespace creation and wasting memory that is likely wasted since most containers won't use ima (for a long time at least) have you considered lazily allocating it like I suggested in one of my first reviews? So under the assumption that the only way for a container to get its own ima policy it needs to have mounted a new securityfs instance you can move the ima namespace allocation into fill_super/ima_fs_ns_init(): From 46fd4f19e1360bee167fccb11e793a3a3331ccc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Christian Brauner <redacted> Date: Thu, 16 Dec 2021 14:57:30 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] !!!! HERE BE DRAGONS - COMPLETELY UNTESTED !!!! Lazily initialize ima_ns. This avoids pointlessly wasting memory that is never needed or used which I think will be the case for most containers. --- include/linux/ima.h | 2 +- kernel/user_namespace.c | 6 ------ security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++++-- security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 5 ++++- security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c | 7 ++++++- 5 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h
index a2705aa5242a..cb1b94df11a1 100644
--- a/include/linux/ima.h
+++ b/include/linux/ima.h@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns); static inline struct ima_namespace *get_current_ns(void) { - return current_user_ns()->ima_ns; + return smp_load_acquire(¤t_user_ns()->ima_ns); } static inline int ima_securityfs_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
index 6fa01323aac9..653f8fa83b69 100644
--- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
+++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c@@ -142,14 +142,8 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new) if (!setup_userns_sysctls(ns)) goto fail_keyring; - ret = create_ima_ns(ns); - if (ret) - goto fail_sysctls; - set_cred_user_ns(new, ns); return 0; -fail_sysctls: - retire_userns_sysctls(ns); fail_keyring: #ifdef CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS key_put(ns->persistent_keyring_register);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 3b8001ba62e3..971620a22dab 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static const struct seq_operations ima_policy_seqops = { static int ima_open_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp) { struct user_namespace *user_ns = ima_user_ns_from_file(filp); - struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns; + struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns; /* no need to use acquire semantics it's guaranteed to be initialized */ if (!(filp->f_flags & O_WRONLY)) { #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY
@@ -450,7 +450,8 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root) { - struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns; + int ret; + struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns; /* no need to use acquire semantics it's guaranteed to be initialized */ struct dentry *int_dir; struct dentry *ima_dir = NULL; struct dentry *ima_symlink = NULL;
@@ -459,6 +460,21 @@ int ima_fs_ns_init(struct user_namespace *user_ns, struct dentry *root) struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count = NULL; struct dentry *violations = NULL; + /* + * While multiple superblocks can exist they are keyed by userns in + * s_fs_info for securityfs. The first time a userns mounts a + * securityfs instance we lazily allocate the ima_namespace for the + * userns since that's the only way a userns can meaningfully use ima. + * The vfs ensure we're the only one to call fill_super() and hence + * ima_fs_ns_init() so we don't need any memory barriers here, i.e. + * user_ns->ima_ns can't change while we're in here. + */ + if (!ns) { + ret = create_ima_ns(user_ns); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + /* FIXME: update when evm and integrity are namespaced */ if (user_ns != &init_user_ns) { int_dir =
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
index 4c85a8df3c86..a0e71416561d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c@@ -414,7 +414,10 @@ static int process_measurement(struct ima_namespace *ns, int ret = 0; while (user_ns) { - ns = user_ns->ima_ns; + /* the container has not loaded a separate policy (yet) */ + ns = smp_load_acquire(&user_ns->ima_ns); + if (!ns) + continue; ret = __process_measurement(ns, file, cred, secid, buf, size, mask, func);
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
index d192a80c927f..5c7177b07344 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_ns.c@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ int create_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) if (err) goto fail_free; - user_ns->ima_ns = ns; + /* Pairs with smp_load_acquire() in get_current_ns() and process_measurement(). */ + smp_store_release(&user_ns->ima_ns, ns); return 0;
@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ static void destroy_ima_ns(struct ima_namespace *ns) void free_ima_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns) { + /* No need to use acquire semantics as the userns can't be reached + * anymore from userspace so either ima_ns has been initialized or it + * never has. + */ struct ima_namespace *ns = user_ns->ima_ns; if (WARN_ON(ns == &init_ima_ns))
--
2.30.2