Re: [PATCH v2 4/4] virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets
From: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-07 16:18:04
Also in:
linux-coco, linux-efi, lkml
From: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <hidden>
Date: 2021-10-07 16:18:04
Also in:
linux-coco, linux-efi, lkml
* Dave Hansen (dave.hansen@intel.com) wrote:
On 10/6/21 11:18 PM, Dov Murik wrote:quoted
+static int sev_secret_map_area(void) +{ + struct sev_secret *s = sev_secret_get(); + struct linux_efi_coco_secret_area *secret_area; + u32 secret_area_size; + + if (efi.coco_secret == EFI_INVALID_TABLE_ADDR) { + pr_err("Secret area address is not available\n"); + return -EINVAL; + } + + secret_area = memremap(efi.coco_secret, sizeof(*secret_area), MEMREMAP_WB); + if (secret_area == NULL) { + pr_err("Could not map secret area header\n"); + return -ENOMEM; + }There doesn't seem to be anything truly SEV-specific in here at all. Isn't this more accurately called "efi_secret" or something? What's to prevent Intel or an ARM vendor from implementing this?
I don't think anything; although the last discussion I remember on list with Intel was that Intel preferred some interface with an ioctl to read the secrets and stuff. I'm not quite sure if the attestation/secret delivery order makes sense with TDX, but if it does, then if you could persuade someone to standardise on this it would be great. Dave -- Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK