On Mon, 2021-09-27 at 22:08 +0200, Andreas Rammhold wrote:

On 07:27 27.09.21, Mimi Zohar wrote:

quoted

On Mon, 2021-09-27 at 10:51 +0200, Andreas Rammhold wrote:

quoted

On 09:47 13.09.21, Ahmad Fatoum wrote:

quoted

Dear trusted key maintainers,

On 30.07.21 03:28, Andreas Rammhold wrote:

quoted

Before this commit the kernel could end up with no trusted key sources
even though both of the currently supported backends (TPM and TEE) were
compiled as modules. This manifested in the trusted key type not being
registered at all.

When checking if a CONFIG_… preprocessor variable is defined we only
test for the builtin (=y) case and not the module (=m) case. By using
the IS_REACHABLE() macro we do test for both cases.

Fixes: 5d0682be3189 ("KEYS: trusted: Add generic trusted keys framework")
Signed-off-by: Andreas Rammhold <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>

Does anyone intend to pick this up?

Did this end up in any tree by now? I am wondering if I should resend
the patch instead. Perhaps it was just overlooked?

For EVM environments only using trusted and encrypted keys, not file
signatures, the trusted key is needed to decrypt the "master" key in
order to verify kernel modules.

So what you are saying is that right now (before this patch & after this
patch) you could compile a kernel that wouldn't be able to load any
modules when the trusted keychain part is built as module?

Before this patch, trusted and encrypted keys are builtin, so verifying
kernel modules with security.evm containing an EVM hmac would succeed. 
Afterwards it would fail, as there's a dependency on the trusted key to
verify the integrity of the trusted key module.

Mimi