Re: [PATCH v6 12/13] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Date: 2021-09-16 22:19:41
Also in:
keyrings, linux-crypto, linux-integrity, lkml
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 05:14:15PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+/* + * Try to load the MokListTrustedRT UEFI variable to see if we should trust + * the mok keys within the kernel. It is not an error if this variable + * does not exist. If it does not exist, mok keys should not be trusted + * within the machine keyring. + */ +static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void) +{ + efi_status_t status; + unsigned int mtrust = 0; + unsigned long size = sizeof(mtrust); + efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID; + u32 attr; + + status = efi.get_variable(L"MokListTrustedRT", &guid, &attr, &size, &mtrust);
This should use efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListTrustedRT") instead,
similar to how load_moklist_certs() does. It's a *much* more reliable
mechanism. We don't even need to fall back to checking for the
variable, as any version of shim that populates this supports the config
table method.
--
Peter