Hi Igor,
On 8/20/21 12:12 AM, Igor Zhbanov wrote:
[Overview]
Fileless malware attacks are becoming more and more popular, and even
ready-to-use frameworks are available [1], [2], [3]. They are based on
running of the malware code from anonymous executable memory pages (which
are not backed by an executable file or a library on a filesystem.) This
allows effectively hiding malware presence in a system, making filesystem
integrity checking tools unable to detect the intrusion.
[snip]
[TODO]
- Implement xattrs support for marking privileged binaries on a per-file
basis.
If/when you plan to add that, adding the new xattr to the list of EVM-protected xattrs
may be worth discussing.
- Store NAX attributes in the per-task LSM blob to implement special
launchers for the privileged processes, so all of the children processes
of such a launcher would be allowed to have anonymous executable pages
(but not to grandchildren).
[snip]
Overall I'm pleased to see this patch and I have no more remarks,
outside of the few points Randy Dunlap raised.
Reviewed-by: THOBY Simon <redacted>
Thanks,
Simon