From: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>

Update the documentation for trusted and encrypted KEYS with DCP as new
trust source:

- Describe security properties of DCP trust source
- Describe key usage
- Document blob format

Cc: Ahmad Fatoum <a.fatoum@pengutronix.de>
Cc: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: Fabio Estevam <festevam@gmail.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: James Bottomley <redacted>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: NXP Linux Team <redacted>
Cc: Pengutronix Kernel Team <kernel@pengutronix.de>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Cc: Sascha Hauer <s.hauer@pengutronix.de>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Co-developed-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: David Gstir <david@sigma-star.at>
---
 .../security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst       | 84 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 83 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
index 80d5a5af62a1..e8413122e4bc 100644
--- a/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst
+++ b/Documentation/security/keys/trusted-encrypted.rst

@@ -35,6 +35,11 @@ safe.
          Rooted to Hardware Unique Key (HUK) which is generally burnt in on-chip
          fuses and is accessible to TEE only.
 
+     (3) DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)
+
+         Rooted to a one-time programmable key (OTP) that is generally burnt in
+         the on-chip fuses and is accessbile to the DCP encryption engine only.

+
   *  Execution isolation
 
      (1) TPM

@@ -46,6 +51,12 @@ safe.
          Customizable set of operations running in isolated execution
          environment verified via Secure/Trusted boot process.
 
+     (3) DCP
+
+         Fixed set of cryptographic operations running in isolated execution
+         environment. Only basic blob key encryption is executed there.
+         The actual key sealing/unsealing is done on main processor/kernel space.
+
   * Optional binding to platform integrity state
 
      (1) TPM

@@ -63,6 +74,11 @@ safe.
          Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process for platform integrity. It can
          be extended with TEE based measured boot process.
 
+     (3) DCP
+
+         Relies on Secure/Trusted boot process (called HAB by vendor) for
+         platform integrity.
+
   *  Interfaces and APIs
 
      (1) TPM

@@ -74,10 +90,14 @@ safe.
          TEEs have well-documented, standardized client interface and APIs. For
          more details refer to ``Documentation/staging/tee.rst``.
 
+     (3) DCP
+
+         Vendor-specific API that is implemented as part of the DCP crypto driver in
+         ``drivers/crypto/mxs-dcp.c``.
 
   *  Threat model
 
-     The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM or TEE for a given
+     The strength and appropriateness of a particular TPM, TEE or DCP for a given
      purpose must be assessed when using them to protect security-relevant data.
 
 

@@ -103,6 +123,14 @@ access control policy within the trust source.
      from platform specific hardware RNG or a software based Fortuna CSPRNG
      which can be seeded via multiple entropy sources.
 
+  * DCP (Data Co-Processor: crypto accelerator of various i.MX SoCs)
+
+     The DCP hardware device itself does not provide a dedicated RNG interface,
+     so the kernel default RNG is used. SoCs with DCP like the i.MX6ULL do have
+     a dedicated hardware RNG that is independent from DCP which can be enabled
+     to back the kernel RNG.
+
+
 Encrypted Keys
 --------------
 

@@ -188,6 +216,19 @@ Usage::
 specific to TEE device implementation.  The key length for new keys is always
 in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
 
+Trusted Keys usage: DCP
+-----------------------
+
+Usage::
+
+    keyctl add trusted name "new keylen" ring
+    keyctl add trusted name "load hex_blob" ring
+    keyctl print keyid
+
+"keyctl print" returns an ASCII hex copy of the sealed key, which is in format
+specific to this DCP key-blob implementation.  The key length for new keys is
+always in bytes. Trusted Keys can be 32 - 128 bytes (256 - 1024 bits).
+
 Encrypted Keys usage
 --------------------
 

@@ -370,3 +411,44 @@ string length.
 privkey is the binary representation of TPM2B_PUBLIC excluding the
 initial TPM2B header which can be reconstructed from the ASN.1 octed
 string length.
+
+DCP Blob Format
+---------------
+
+The Data Co-Processor (DCP) provides hardware-bound AES keys using its
+AES encryption engine only. It does not provide direct key sealing/unsealing.
+To make DCP hardware encryption keys usable as trust source, we define
+our own custom format that uses a hardware-bound key to secure the sealing
+key stored in the key blob.
+
+Whenever a new tusted key using DCP is generated, we generate a random 128-bit