Thread (15 messages) 15 messages, 5 authors, 2021-06-08

Re: [RFC PATCH 0/3] Allow access to confidential computing secret area

From: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <hidden>
Date: 2021-05-20 11:16:50
Also in: linux-efi, lkml

* Brijesh Singh (brijesh.singh@amd.com) wrote:
Hi Dov,


On 5/13/21 1:26 AM, Dov Murik wrote:
quoted
Confidential computing hardware such as AMD SEV (Secure Encrypted
Virtualization) allows guest owners to inject secrets into the VMs
memory without the host/hypervisor being able to read them.  In SEV,
secret injection is performed early in the VM launch process, before the
guest starts running.

Support for secret injection is already available in OVMF (in its AmdSev
package; see edk2 commit 01726b6d23d4 "OvmfPkg/AmdSev: Expose the Sev
Secret area using a configuration table" [1]), but the secrets were not
available in the guest kernel.

The patch series copies the secrets from the EFI-provided memory to
kernel reserved memory, and optionally exposes them to userspace via
securityfs using a new sev_secret kernel module.

The first patch in efi/libstub copies the secret area from the EFI
memory to specially allocated memory; the second patch reserves that
memory block; and the third patch introduces the new sev_secret module
that exposes the content of the secret entries as securityfs files.

This has been tested with AMD SEV guests, but the kernel side of
handling the secret area has no SEV-specific dependencies, and therefore
should be usable for any confidential computing hardware that can
publish the secret area via the standard EFI config table entry.

Here is a simple example for usage of the sev_secret module in a guest to which
secrets were injected during launch:

# modprobe sev_secret
# ls -la /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret
total 0
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 0 May 12 18:03 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 0 May 12 18:02 ..
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 12 18:03 736870e5-84f0-4973-92ec-06879ce3da0b
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 12 18:03 83c83f7f-1356-4975-8b7e-d3a0b54312c6
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 12 18:03 9553f55d-3da2-43ee-ab5d-ff17f78864d2
-r--r----- 1 root root 0 May 12 18:03 e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910

# xxd /sys/kernel/security/sev_secret/e6f5a162-d67f-4750-a67c-5d065f2a9910
00000000: 7468 6573 652d 6172 652d 7468 652d 6b61  these-are-the-ka
00000010: 7461 2d73 6563 7265 7473 0001 0203 0405  ta-secrets......
00000020: 0607                                     ..
I am adding a new virt driver to help get the attestation report for the
SEV-SNP guest. I understand they both are different, in case of the SEV
the attestation is already completed and we are simply exposing the
secret provided after the attestation to the userspace, whereas in SNP,
the userspace is querying the attestation and will probably derive keys
etc based on the attestation report. I am wondering if we should merge
both the SEV secret and SNP attestation query in a single driver ?
Should we cover usecases where SEV guest is not booted under the EFI ?
Also, it appears that this driver need to be manually loaded, should we
create a platform device so that the driver binds to platform device and
use the resource structure to find the location of the secret data?
The nice thing about Dov's device/file is that it's a simple text file
that userspace can then read the secret out of;  I'm not sure if there's
anything similar in SNP (or for that matter TDX, cc'ing in Andi)

Dave
I was trying to answer some of these questions SNP series. See these patches

https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=161978514019741&w=2

https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=161978514119744&w=2

https://marc.info/?l=kvm&m=161978514219751&w=2

quoted
[1] https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/01726b6d23d4


Cc: Laszlo Ersek <redacted>
Cc: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <redacted>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: James Bottomley <redacted>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

Dov Murik (3):
  efi/libstub: Copy confidential computing secret area
  efi: Reserve confidential computing secret area
  virt: Add sev_secret module to expose confidential computing secrets

 drivers/firmware/efi/Makefile                 |   2 +-
 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c |  41 +++
 drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c                    |   5 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile         |   3 +-
 .../efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c      |  68 +++++
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efi-stub.c       |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h        |   2 +
 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c       |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Kconfig                          |   2 +
 drivers/virt/Makefile                         |   1 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig               |  11 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile              |   2 +
 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c          | 260 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/efi.h                           |  11 +
 14 files changed, 410 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/confidential-computing.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/confidential-computing.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Kconfig
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/Makefile
 create mode 100644 drivers/virt/sev_secret/sev_secret.c


base-commit: c06a2ba62fc401b7aaefd23f5d0bc06d2457ccc1
-- 
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / dgilbert@redhat.com / Manchester, UK
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