Re: [PATCH v17 0/4] overlayfs override_creds=off & nested get xattr fix
From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Date: 2020-10-20 23:11:08
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linux-doc, lkml, selinux
On Tue, Oct 20, 2020 at 3:17 PM Mark Salyzyn [off-list ref] wrote:
Mark Salyzyn (3): Add flags option to get xattr method paired to __vfs_getxattr overlayfs: handle XATTR_NOSECURITY flag for get xattr method overlayfs: override_creds=off option bypass creator_cred Mark Salyzyn + John Stultz (1): overlayfs: inode_owner_or_capable called during execv The first three patches address fundamental security issues that should be solved regardless of the override_creds=off feature. The fourth adds the feature depends on these other fixes. By default, all access to the upper, lower and work directories is the recorded mounter's MAC and DAC credentials. The incoming accesses are checked against the caller's credentials. If the principles of least privilege are applied for sepolicy, the mounter's credentials might not overlap the credentials of the caller's when accessing the overlayfs filesystem. For example, a file that a lower DAC privileged caller can execute, is MAC denied to the generally higher DAC privileged mounter, to prevent an attack vector. We add the option to turn off override_creds in the mount options; all subsequent operations after mount on the filesystem will be only the caller's credentials. The module boolean parameter and mount option override_creds is also added as a presence check for this "feature", existence of /sys/module/overlay/parameters/overlay_creds Signed-off-by: Mark Salyzyn <redacted> Cc: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu> Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net> Cc: Vivek Goyal <vgoyal@redhat.com> Cc: Eric W. Biederman <redacted> Cc: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com> Cc: Randy Dunlap <redacted> Cc: Stephen Smalley <redacted> Cc: John Stultz <redacted> Cc: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org To: linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-team@android.com
The SELinux list should also be CC'd on these patches. For those who may just be seeing this, the lore link is below: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20201020191732.4049987-1-salyzyn@android.com/T/#t (local) -- paul moore www.paul-moore.com