Re: [PATCH v20 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking
From: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Date: 2020-09-05 19:05:44
Also in:
selinux
On 9/5/20 11:13 AM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
On 9/5/2020 6:25 AM, Paul Moore wrote:quoted
On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 7:58 PM Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 9/4/2020 2:53 PM, Paul Moore wrote:quoted
On Fri, Sep 4, 2020 at 5:35 PM Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
On 9/4/2020 1:08 PM, Paul Moore wrote:...quoted
quoted
I understand the concerns you mention, they are all valid as far as I'm concerned, but I think we are going to get burned by this code as it currently stands.Yes, I can see that. We're getting burned by the non-extensibility of secids. It will take someone smarter than me to figure out how to fit N secids into 32bits without danger of either failure or memory allocation.Sooo what are the next steps here? It sounds like there is some agreement that the currently proposed unix_skb_params approach is a problem, but it also sounds like you just want to merge it anyway?There are real problems with all the approaches. This is by far the least invasive of the lot. If this is acceptable for now I will commit to including the dynamic allocation version in the full stacking (e.g. Smack + SELinux) stage. If it isn't, well, this stage is going to take even longer than it already has. Sigh.quoted
I was sorta hoping for something a bit better.I will be looking at alternatives. I am very much open to suggestions. I'm not even 100% convinced that Stephen's objections to my separate allocation strategy outweigh its advantages. If you have an opinion on that, I'd love to hear it.
fwiw I prefer the separate allocation strategy, but as you have already said it trading off one set of problems for another. I would rather see this move forward and one set of trade offs isn't significantly worse than the other to me so, either wfm.