On Thu, Aug 06, 2020 at 06:00:02PM +0100, Darren Kenny wrote:
On Thursday, 2020-07-16 at 16:52:54 +03, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
quoted
Provisioning Certification Enclave (PCE), the root of trust for other
enclaves, generates a signing key from a fused key called Provisioning
Certification Key. PCE can then use this key to certify an attestation key
of a Quoting Enclave (QE), e.g. we get the chain of trust down to the
hardware if the Intel signed PCE is used.
To use the needed keys, ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY is required but should be
only allowed for those who actually need it so that only the trusted
parties can certify QE's.
Obviously the attestation service should know the public key of the used
PCE and that way detect illegit attestation, but whitelisting the legit
users still adds an additional layer of defence.
Add new device file called /dev/sgx/provision. The sole purpose of this
file is to provide file descriptors that act as privilege tokens to allow
to build enclaves with ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY set. A new ioctl called
SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_SET_ATTRIBUTE is used to assign this token to an enclave.
Cc: <redacted>
Acked-by: Jethro Beekman <redacted>
Suggested-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <redacted>
Reviewed-by: Darren Kenny <redacted>
Thanks, I added your tags to the corresponding commits.
/Jarkko