[PATCH v7 5/7] fs,doc: Enable to enforce noexec mounts or file exec through O_MAYEXEC

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ Currently, these files are in /proc/sys/fs:
 - inode-nr
 - inode-state
 - nr_open
+- open_mayexec_enforce
 - overflowuid
 - overflowgid
 - pipe-user-pages-hard

@@ -165,6 +166,54 @@ system needs to prune the inode list instead of allocating
 more.
 
 
+open_mayexec_enforce
+--------------------
+
+While being ignored by :manpage:`open(2)` and :manpage:`openat(2)`, the
+``O_MAYEXEC`` flag can be passed to :manpage:`openat2(2)` to only open regular
+files that are expected to be executable.  If the file is not identified as
+executable, then the syscall returns -EACCES.  This may allow a script
+interpreter to check executable permission before reading commands from a file,
+or a dynamic linker to only load executable shared objects.  One interesting
+use case is to enforce a "write xor execute" policy through interpreters.
+
+The ability to restrict code execution must be thought as a system-wide policy,
+which first starts by restricting mount points with the ``noexec`` option.
+This option is also automatically applied to special filesystems such as /proc .
+This prevents files on such mount points to be directly executed by the kernel
+or mapped as executable memory (e.g. libraries).  With script interpreters
+using the ``O_MAYEXEC`` flag, the executable permission can then be checked
+before reading commands from files. This makes it possible to enforce the
+``noexec`` at the interpreter level, and thus propagates this security policy
+to scripts.  To be fully effective, these interpreters also need to handle the
+other ways to execute code: command line parameters (e.g., option ``-e`` for
+Perl), module loading (e.g., option ``-m`` for Python), stdin, file sourcing,
+environment variables, configuration files, etc.  According to the threat
+model, it may be acceptable to allow some script interpreters (e.g. Bash) to
+interpret commands from stdin, may it be a TTY or a pipe, because it may not be
+enough to (directly) perform syscalls.
+
+There are two complementary security policies: enforce the ``noexec`` mount
+option, and enforce executable file permission.  These policies are handled by
+the ``fs.open_mayexec_enforce`` sysctl (writable only with ``CAP_SYS_ADMIN``)
+as a bitmask:
+
+1 - Mount restriction: checks that the mount options for the underlying VFS
+    mount do not prevent execution.
+
+2 - File permission restriction: checks that the to-be-opened file is marked as
+    executable for the current process (e.g., POSIX permissions).
+
+Note that as long as a policy is enforced, opening any non-regular file with
+``O_MAYEXEC`` is denied (e.g. TTYs, pipe), even when such a file is marked as
+executable or is on an executable mount point.
+
+Code samples can be found in tools/testing/selftests/openat2/omayexec_test.c
+and interpreter patches (for the original O_MAYEXEC version) may be found at
+https://github.com/clipos-archive/clipos4_portage-overlay/search?q=O_MAYEXEC .
+See also an overview article: https://lwn.net/Articles/820000/ .
+
+
 overflowgid & overflowuid
 -------------------------
 

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <linux/bitops.h>
 #include <linux/init_task.h>
 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
 
 #include "internal.h"
 #include "mount.h"

@@ -425,6 +426,11 @@ static int sb_permission(struct super_block *sb, struct inode *inode, int mask)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+#define OPEN_MAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT	BIT(0)
+#define OPEN_MAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE	BIT(1)
+
+int sysctl_open_mayexec_enforce __read_mostly;
+
 /**
  * inode_permission - Check for access rights to a given inode
  * @inode: Inode to check permission on

@@ -2861,11 +2867,29 @@ static int may_open(const struct path *path, int acc_mode, int flag)
 	case S_IFSOCK:
 		if (acc_mode & MAY_EXEC)
 			return -EACCES;
+		/*
+		 * Opening devices (e.g. TTYs) or pipes with O_MAYEXEC may be
+		 * legitimate when there is no enforced policy.
+		 */
+		if ((acc_mode & MAY_OPENEXEC) && sysctl_open_mayexec_enforce)
+			return -EACCES;
 		flag &= ~O_TRUNC;
 		break;
 	case S_IFREG:
 		if ((acc_mode & MAY_EXEC) && path_noexec(path))
 			return -EACCES;
+		if (acc_mode & MAY_OPENEXEC) {
+			if ((sysctl_open_mayexec_enforce & OPEN_MAYEXEC_ENFORCE_MOUNT)
+					&& path_noexec(path))
+				return -EACCES;
+			if (sysctl_open_mayexec_enforce & OPEN_MAYEXEC_ENFORCE_FILE)
+				/*
+				 * Because acc_mode may change here, the next and only
+				 * use of acc_mode should then be by the following call
+				 * to inode_permission().
+				 */
+				acc_mode |= MAY_EXEC;
+		}
 		break;
 	}
 

@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ extern int sysctl_protected_symlinks;
 extern int sysctl_protected_hardlinks;
 extern int sysctl_protected_fifos;
 extern int sysctl_protected_regular;
+extern int sysctl_open_mayexec_enforce;
 
 typedef __kernel_rwf_t rwf_t;
 

@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ static int sixty = 60;
 
 static int __maybe_unused neg_one = -1;
 static int __maybe_unused two = 2;
+static int __maybe_unused three = 3;
 static int __maybe_unused four = 4;
 static unsigned long zero_ul;
 static unsigned long one_ul = 1;

@@ -888,7 +889,6 @@ static int proc_taint(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 	return err;
 }
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_PRINTK
 static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 				void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
 {

@@ -897,7 +897,6 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
 
 	return proc_dointvec_minmax(table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
 }
-#endif
 
 /**
  * struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure

@@ -3264,6 +3263,15 @@ static struct ctl_table fs_table[] = {
 		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
 		.extra2		= &two,
 	},
+	{
+		.procname       = "open_mayexec_enforce",
+		.data           = &sysctl_open_mayexec_enforce,
+		.maxlen         = sizeof(int),
+		.mode           = 0600,
+		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin,
+		.extra1		= SYSCTL_ZERO,
+		.extra2		= &three,
+	},
 #if defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC) || defined(CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC_MODULE)
 	{
 		.procname	= "binfmt_misc",