On Sat, May 30, 2020 at 01:59:53AM -0400, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi wrote:
Modern Windows applications are executing system call instructions
directly from the application's code without going through the WinAPI.
This breaks Wine emulation, because it doesn't have a chance to
intercept and emulate these syscalls before they are submitted to Linux.
In addition, we cannot simply trap every system call of the application
to userspace using PTRACE_SYSEMU, because performance would suffer,
since our main use case is to run Windows games over Linux. Therefore,
we need some in-kernel filtering to decide whether the syscall was
issued by the wine code or by the windows application.
Interesting use-case! It seems like you're in the position of needing to
invert the assumption about syscalls: before you knew everything going
through WinAPI needed emulation, and now you need to assume everything
not going through a native library needs emulation. Oof.
Is it possible to disassemble and instrument the Windows code to insert
breakpoints (or emulation calls) at all the Windows syscall points?
[...]
* Why not SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER?
We experimented with dynamically generating BPF filters for whitelisted
memory regions and using SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, but there are a few
reasons why it isn't enough nor a good idea for our use case:
1. We cannot set the filters at program initialization time and forget
about it, since there is no way of knowing which modules will be loaded,
whether native and windows. Filter would need a way to be updated
frequently during game execution.
2. We cannot predict which Linux libraries will issue syscalls directly.
Most of the time, whitelisting libc and a few other libraries is enough,
but there are no guarantees other Linux libraries won't issue syscalls
directly and break the execution. Adding every linux library that is
loaded also has a large performance cost due to the large resulting
filter.
Just so I can understand the expected use: given the dynamic nature of
the library loading, how would Wine be marking the VMAs?
3. As I mentioned before, performance is critical. In our testing with
just a single memory segment blacklisted/whitelisted, the minimum size
of a bpf filter would be 4 instructions. In that scenario,
SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER added an average overhead of 10% to the execution
time of sysinfo(2) in comparison to seccomp disabled, while the impact
of SECCOMP_MODE_MEMMAP was averaged around 1.5%.
Was the BPF JIT enabled? I was recently examining filter performance too:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/202005291043.A63D910A8@keescook/ (local)
Indeed, points 1 and 2 could be worked around with some userspace work
and improved SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER support, but at a high performance and
some stability cost, to obtain the semantics we want. Still, the
performance would suffer, and SECCOMP_MODE_MEMMAP is non intrusive
enough that I believe it should be considered as an upstream solution.
It looks like you're using SECCOMP_RET_TRAP for this? Signal handling
can be pretty slow. Did you try SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF?
Sending as an RFC for now to get the discussion started. In particular:
1) Would this design be acceptable?
Maybe? I want to spend a little time exploring alternatives first. :)
2) I'm not comfortable with using the high part of vm_flags, though I'm
not sure where else it would fit. Suggestions?
I don't know this area very well. Hopefully some of the mm folks can
comment on it. It seems like there needs to be a more dynamic way mark
VMAs for arbitrary purposes (since this isn't _actually_ a PROT* flag,
it's just a marking for seccomp to check).
Regardless, here's a review of the specifics of patch, without regard to
the design question above. :)
quoted hunk
CC: Thomas Gleixner <redacted>
CC: Kees Cook <redacted>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
CC: Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>
CC: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
CC: Paul Gofman <redacted>
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <redacted>
---
arch/Kconfig | 21 +++++++++
arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 +
include/linux/mm.h | 8 ++++
include/linux/mman.h | 4 +-
include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h | 2 +
kernel/seccomp.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
mm/mprotect.c | 2 +-
8 files changed, 97 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig
index 786a85d4ad40..e5c10231c9c2 100644
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -471,6 +471,27 @@ config SECCOMP_FILTER
See Documentation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst for details.
+config HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_MEMMAP
+ bool
+ help
+ An arch should select this symbol if it provides all of these things:
+ - syscall_get_arch()
+ - syscall_get_arguments()
+ - syscall_rollback()
+ - syscall_set_return_value()
+ - SIGSYS siginfo_t support
+ - secure_computing is called from a ptrace_event()-safe context
+ - secure_computing return value is checked and a return value of -1
+ results in the system call being skipped immediately.
+ - seccomp syscall wired up
+
+config SECCOMP_MEMMAP
+ def_bool y
+ depends on HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_MEMMAP && SECCOMP
+ help
+ Enable tasks to trap syscalls based on the page that triggered
+ the syscall.
+
Since I don't see anything distinct in the requirements for
SECCOMP_MEMMAP, so I don't think it needs a separate CONFIG: it is almost
entirely built on the SECCOMP_FILTER infrastructure. I'd just drop the
CONFIGs.
quoted hunk
config HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
bool
help
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 2d3f963fd6f1..70998b01c533 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ config X86
select HAVE_ARCH_COMPAT_MMAP_BASES if MMU && COMPAT
select HAVE_ARCH_PREL32_RELOCATIONS
select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER
+ select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_MEMMAP
(and it's not arch-specific)
quoted hunk
select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST
select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK
select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 5a323422d783..6271fb7fd5bc 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -294,11 +294,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2 34 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3 35 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4 36 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5 37 /* bit only usable on 64-bit architectures */
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_0 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_0)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_1 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_1)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_2 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_2)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_3 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_3)
#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_4 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_4)
+#define VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 BIT(VM_HIGH_ARCH_BIT_5)
#endif /* CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS */
#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS
@@ -340,6 +342,12 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
# define VM_GROWSUP VM_NONE
#endif
+#if defined(CONFIG_X86)
+# define VM_NOSYSCALL VM_HIGH_ARCH_5
+#else
+# define VM_NOSYSCALL VM_NONE
+#endif
+
/* Bits set in the VMA until the stack is in its final location */
#define VM_STACK_INCOMPLETE_SETUP (VM_RAND_READ | VM_SEQ_READ)
I have no idea what the correct way to mark VMAs would be. As you
mentioned, this seems ... wrong. :)
quoted hunk
diff --git a/include/linux/mman.h b/include/linux/mman.h
index 4b08e9c9c538..a5ca42eb685a 100644
--- a/include/linux/mman.h
+++ b/include/linux/mman.h
@@ -94,7 +94,8 @@ static inline void vm_unacct_memory(long pages)
*/
static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
{
- return (prot & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM)) == 0;
+ return (prot & ~(PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM
+ | PROT_NOSYSCALL)) == 0;
}
#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot
#endif@@ -119,6 +120,7 @@ calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, unsigned long pkey)
return _calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_READ, VM_READ ) |
_calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_WRITE, VM_WRITE) |
_calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_EXEC, VM_EXEC) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_NOSYSCALL, VM_NOSYSCALL) |
arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
}
diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
index f94f65d429be..4eafbaa3f4bc 100644
--- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
+++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/mman-common.h
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@
#define PROT_SEM 0x8 /* page may be used for atomic ops */
/* 0x10 reserved for arch-specific use */
/* 0x20 reserved for arch-specific use */
+#define PROT_NOSYSCALL 0x40 /* page cannot trigger syscalls */
+
#define PROT_NONE 0x0 /* page can not be accessed */
#define PROT_GROWSDOWN 0x01000000 /* mprotect flag: extend change to start of growsdown vma */
#define PROT_GROWSUP 0x02000000 /* mprotect flag: extend change to end of growsup vma */
AIUI, all of the above is to plumb the VMA marking through an mprotect()
call. I wonder if perhaps madvise() would be better? I'm not sure how
tight we are on new flags there, but I think it would be cleaner to use
that interface. Take a look at MADV_WIPEONFORK / VM_WIPEONFORK.
quoted hunk
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
index c1735455bc53..c7d042a409e7 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/seccomp.h
@@ -10,12 +10,14 @@
#define SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED 0 /* seccomp is not in use. */
#define SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT 1 /* uses hard-coded filter. */
#define SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER 2 /* uses user-supplied filter. */
+#define SECCOMP_MODE_MEMMAP 3 /* Lock syscalls per memory region. */
Making this incompatible with FILTER might cause problems for the future
(more and more process launchers are starting to set filters).
So this would, perhaps, be a new flag for struct seccomp, rather than a
new operating mode.
quoted hunk
/* Valid operations for seccomp syscall. */
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT 0
#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER 1
#define SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL 2
#define SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES 3
+#define SECCOMP_SET_MODE_MEMMAP 4
/* Valid flags for SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER */
#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC (1UL << 0)
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index 55a6184f5990..ebf09b02db8d 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -930,6 +930,55 @@ static int __seccomp_filter(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd,
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECCOMP_MEMMAP
+static int __seccomp_memmap(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma = find_vma(current->mm,
+ sd->instruction_pointer);
+ if (!vma)
+ BUG();
No new kernel code should use BUG:
https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/process/deprecated.html#bug-and-bug-on
I would maybe pr_warn_once(), but then treat it as if it was marked with
VM_NOSYSCALL.
quoted hunk
+
+ if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_NOSYSCALL))
+ return 0;
+
+ syscall_rollback(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ seccomp_send_sigsys(this_syscall, 0);
+
+ seccomp_log(this_syscall, SIGSYS, SECCOMP_RET_TRAP, true);
+
+ return -1;
+}
This really just looks like an ip_address filter, but I get what you
mean about stacking filters, etc. This may finally be the day we turn to
eBPF in seccomp, since that would give you access to using a map lookup
on ip_address, and the map could be updated externally (removing the
need for the madvise() changes).
quoted hunk
+
+static long seccomp_set_mode_memmap(unsigned int flags)
+{
+ const unsigned long seccomp_mode = SECCOMP_MODE_MEMMAP;
+ long ret = 0;
+
+ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC)
+ return -EINVAL;
This should just test for any bits in flags. TSYNC + memmap should be
avoided, IMO.
quoted hunk
+
+ spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (seccomp_may_assign_mode(seccomp_mode))
+ seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, flags);
+ else
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+
+ spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+#else
+static int __seccomp_memmap(int this_syscall, const struct seccomp_data *sd)
+{
+ BUG();
+}
+static long seccomp_set_mode_memmap(unsigned int flags)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECCOMP_MEMMAP */
+
int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
{
int mode = current->seccomp.mode;@@ -948,6 +997,8 @@ int __secure_computing(const struct seccomp_data *sd)
return 0;
case SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER:
return __seccomp_filter(this_syscall, sd, false);
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_MEMMAP:
+ return __seccomp_memmap(this_syscall, sd);
default:
BUG();
}
@@ -1425,6 +1476,10 @@ static long do_seccomp(unsigned int op, unsigned int flags,
return -EINVAL;
return seccomp_get_notif_sizes(uargs);
+ case SECCOMP_SET_MODE_MEMMAP:
+ if (uargs != NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return seccomp_set_mode_memmap(flags);
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1462,6 +1517,10 @@ long prctl_set_seccomp(unsigned long seccomp_mode, void __user *filter)
op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER;
uargs = filter;
break;
+ case SECCOMP_MODE_MEMMAP:
+ op = SECCOMP_SET_MODE_MEMMAP;
+ uargs = NULL;
+ break;
The prctl() interface is deprecated, so no new features should be added
there.
quoted hunk
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
diff --git a/mm/mprotect.c b/mm/mprotect.c
index 494192ca954b..6b5c00e8bbdc 100644
--- a/mm/mprotect.c
+++ b/mm/mprotect.c
@@ -591,7 +591,7 @@ static int do_mprotect_pkey(unsigned long start, size_t len,
* cleared from the VMA.
*/
mask_off_old_flags = VM_READ | VM_WRITE | VM_EXEC |
- VM_FLAGS_CLEAR;
+ VM_NOSYSCALL | VM_FLAGS_CLEAR;
new_vma_pkey = arch_override_mprotect_pkey(vma, prot, pkey);
newflags = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, new_vma_pkey);
--
2.27.0.rc2
So, yes, interesting. I'll continue to think about how this could work
best. Can you share what your filters looked like when you were
originally trying those?
Thanks!
-Kees
--
Kees Cook