Thread (17 messages) 17 messages, 8 authors, 2020-06-12

Re: [PATCH] capabilities: Introduce CAP_RESTORE

From: Andrei Vagin <hidden>
Date: 2020-05-23 04:27:55
Also in: lkml, selinux

On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 09:40:37AM -0700, Casey Schaufler wrote:
On 5/21/2020 10:53 PM, Adrian Reber wrote:
quoted
There are probably a few more things guarded by CAP_SYS_ADMIN required
to run checkpoint/restore as non-root,
If you need CAP_SYS_ADMIN anyway you're not gaining anything by
separating out CAP_RESTORE.
quoted
 but by applying this patch I can
already checkpoint and restore processes as non-root. As there are
already multiple workarounds I would prefer to do it correctly in the
kernel to avoid that CRIU users are starting to invent more workarounds.
You've presented a couple of really inappropriate implementations
that would qualify as workarounds. But the other two are completely
appropriate within the system security policy. They don't "get around"
the problem, they use existing mechanisms as they are intended.
With CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, we will need to use the same mechanisms.

The problem is that CAP_SYS_ADMIN is too wide. If a process has
CAP_SYS_ADMIN, it can do a lot of things and  the operation of forking a
process with a specified pid isn't the most dangerous one in this case.
Offten security policies don't allow to grant CAP_SYS_ADMIN to any
third-party tools even in non-root user namespaces.
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