Re: [PATCH bpf-next v4 3/7] bpf: Introduce BPF_MODIFY_RETURN

On 3/5/2020 7:54 AM, KP Singh wrote:

On 05-Mar 08:51, Stephen Smalley wrote:

quoted

On Wed, Mar 4, 2020 at 2:20 PM KP Singh [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

From: KP Singh <redacted>

When multiple programs are attached, each program receives the return
value from the previous program on the stack and the last program
provides the return value to the attached function.

The fmod_ret bpf programs are run after the fentry programs and before
the fexit programs. The original function is only called if all the
fmod_ret programs return 0 to avoid any unintended side-effects. The
success value, i.e. 0 is not currently configurable but can be made so
where user-space can specify it at load time.

For example:

int func_to_be_attached(int a, int b)
{  <--- do_fentry

do_fmod_ret:
   <update ret by calling fmod_ret>
   if (ret != 0)
        goto do_fexit;

original_function:

    <side_effects_happen_here>

}  <--- do_fexit

The fmod_ret program attached to this function can be defined as:

SEC("fmod_ret/func_to_be_attached")
int BPF_PROG(func_name, int a, int b, int ret)
{
        // This will skip the original function logic.
        return 1;
}

The first fmod_ret program is passed 0 in its return argument.

Signed-off-by: KP Singh <redacted>
Acked-by: Andrii Nakryiko <redacted>

IIUC you've switched from a model where the BPF program would be
invoked after the original function logic
and the BPF program is skipped if the original function logic returns
non-zero to a model where the BPF program is invoked first and
the original function logic is skipped if the BPF program returns
non-zero.  I'm not keen on that for userspace-loaded code attached

We do want to continue the KRSI series and the effort to implement a
proper BPF LSM. In the meantime, the tracing + error injection
solution helps us to:

  * Provide better debug capabilities.
  * And parallelize the effort to come up with the right helpers
    for our LSM work and work on sleepable BPF which is also essential
    for some of the helpers.

As you noted, in the KRSI v4 series, we mentioned that we would like
to have the user-space loaded BPF programs be unable to override the
decision made by the in-kernel logic/LSMs, but this got shot down:

   https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/00c216e1-bcfd-b7b1-5444-2a2dfa69190b@schaufler-ca.com (local)

I would like to continue this discussion when we post the v5 series
for KRSI as to what the correct precedence order should be for the
BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM and would appreciate if you also bring it up there.

I believe that I have stated that order isn't my issue.
Go first, last or as specified in the lsm list, I really
don't care. We'll talk about what does matter in the KRSI
thread.

quoted

to LSM hooks; it means that userspace BPF programs can run even if
SELinux would have denied access and SELinux hooks get
skipped entirely if the BPF program returns an error.

Then I'm fine with using the LSM ordering mechanisms that Kees
thought through to run the BPF last. Although I think it's somewhat
concerning that SELinux cares what other security models might be
in place. If BPF programs can violate SELinux (or traditional DAC)
policies there are bigger issues than ordering.

quoted

  I think Casey
may have wrongly pointed you in this direction on the grounds
it can already happen with the base DAC checking logic.  But that's

What we can do for this tracing/modify_ret series, is to remove
the special casing for "security_" functions in the BPF code and add
ALLOW_ERROR_INJECTION calls to the security hooks. This way, if
someone needs to disable the BPF programs being able to modify
security hooks, they can disable error injection. If that's okay, we
can send a patch.

- KP

quoted

kernel DAC checking logic, not userspace-loaded code.
And the existing checking on attachment is not sufficient for SELinux
since CAP_MAC_ADMIN is not all powerful to SELinux.
Be careful about designing your mechanisms around Smack because Smack
is not the only LSM.

:)