On Thu, Oct 03, 2019 at 03:12:04PM +0900, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:

On Mon, 30 Sep 2019 11:31:29 -0700
Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On Sat, Sep 28, 2019 at 07:37:27PM -0400, Steven Rostedt wrote:

quoted

On Wed, 28 Aug 2019 21:07:24 -0700
Alexei Starovoitov [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

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This won’t make me much more comfortable, since CAP_BPF lets it do an ever-growing set of nasty things. I’d much rather one or both of two things happen:

1. Give it CAP_TRACING only. It can leak my data, but it’s rather hard for it to crash my laptop, lose data, or cause other shenanigans.

2. Improve it a bit do all the privileged ops are wrapped by capset().

Does this make sense?  I’m a security person on occasion. I find
vulnerabilities and exploit them deliberately and I break things by
accident on a regular basis. In my considered opinion, CAP_TRACING
alone, even extended to cover part of BPF as I’ve described, is
decently safe. Getting root with just CAP_TRACING will be decently
challenging, especially if I don’t get to read things like sshd’s
memory, and improvements to mitigate even that could be added.  I
am quite confident that attacks starting with CAP_TRACING will have
clear audit signatures if auditing is on.  I am also confident that
CAP_BPF *will* allow DoS and likely privilege escalation, and this
will only get more likely as BPF gets more widely used. And, if
BPF-based auditing ever becomes a thing, writing to the audit
daemon’s maps will be a great way to cover one’s tracks.  

CAP_TRACING, as I'm proposing it, will allow full tracefs access.
I think Steven and Massami prefer that as well.
That includes kprobe with probe_kernel_read.
That also means mini-DoS by installing kprobes everywhere or running
too much ftrace.

I was talking with Kees at Plumbers about this, and we were talking
about just using simple file permissions. I started playing with some
patches to allow the tracefs be visible but by default it would only be
visible by root.

 rwx------

Then a start up script (or perhaps mount options) could change the
group owner, and change this to:

 rwxrwx---

Where anyone in the group assigned (say "tracing") gets full access to
the file system.

Does it for "all" files under tracefs?

quoted

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The more I was playing with this, the less I see the need for
CAP_TRACING for ftrace and reading the format files.

Nice! Thanks for playing with this. I like it because it gives us a way
to push policy into userspace (group membership, etc), and provides a
clean way (hopefully) do separate "read" (kernel memory confidentiality)
from "write" (kernel memory integrity), which wouldn't have been possible
with a single new CAP_...

 From the confidentiality point of view, if tracefs exposes traced data,
it might include in-kernel pointer and symbols, but the user still can't
see /proc/kallsyms. This means we still have several different confidentiality
for each interface.

Anyway, adding a tracefs mount option for allowing a user group to access
event format data will be a good idea. But even though, I  think we still
need the CAP_TRACING for allowing control of intrusive tracing, like kprobes
and bpf etc. (Or, do we keep those for CAP_SYS_ADMIN??)

No doubt. This thread is only about tracefs wanting to do its own fs based controls.