Re: [PATCH v8 1/2] mm: security: introduce init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 boot options
From: Qian Cai <hidden>
Date: 2019-06-26 18:15:54
Also in:
linux-mm
On Wed, 2019-06-26 at 14:19 +0200, Alexander Potapenko wrote:
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
The new options are needed to prevent possible information leaks and make control-flow bugs that depend on uninitialized values more deterministic. This is expected to be on-by-default on Android and Chrome OS. And it gives the opportunity for anyone else to use it under distros too via the boot args. (The init_on_free feature is regularly requested by folks where memory forensics is included in their threat models.) init_on_alloc=1 makes the kernel initialize newly allocated pages and heap objects with zeroes. Initialization is done at allocation time at the places where checks for __GFP_ZERO are performed. init_on_free=1 makes the kernel initialize freed pages and heap objects with zeroes upon their deletion. This helps to ensure sensitive data doesn't leak via use-after-free accesses. Both init_on_alloc=1 and init_on_free=1 guarantee that the allocator returns zeroed memory. The two exceptions are slab caches with constructors and SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU flag. Those are never zero-initialized to preserve their semantics. Both init_on_alloc and init_on_free default to zero, but those defaults can be overridden with CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON and CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON. If either SLUB poisoning or page poisoning is enabled, we disable init_on_alloc and init_on_free so that initialization doesn't interfere with debugging. Slowdown for the new features compared to init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0: hackbench, init_on_free=1: +7.62% sys time (st.err 0.74%) hackbench, init_on_alloc=1: +7.75% sys time (st.err 2.14%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +8.38% wall time (st.err 0.39%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_free=1: +24.42% sys time (st.err 0.52%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: -0.13% wall time (st.err 0.42%) Linux build with -j12, init_on_alloc=1: +0.57% sys time (st.err 0.40%) The slowdown for init_on_free=0, init_on_alloc=0 compared to the baseline is within the standard error. The new features are also going to pave the way for hardware memory tagging (e.g. arm64's MTE), which will require both on_alloc and on_free hooks to set the tags for heap objects. With MTE, tagging will have the same cost as memory initialization. Although init_on_free is rather costly, there are paranoid use-cases where in-memory data lifetime is desired to be minimized. There are various arguments for/against the realism of the associated threat models, but given that we'll need the infrastructure for MTE anyway, and there are people who want wipe-on-free behavior no matter what the performance cost, it seems reasonable to include it in this series. Signed-off-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com> Acked-by: Kees Cook <redacted> To: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> To: Christoph Lameter <redacted> To: Kees Cook <redacted> Cc: Masahiro Yamada <redacted> Cc: Michal Hocko <mhocko@kernel.org> Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> Cc: Nick Desaulniers <redacted> Cc: Kostya Serebryany <redacted> Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com> Cc: Sandeep Patil <redacted> Cc: Laura Abbott <redacted> Cc: Randy Dunlap <redacted> Cc: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> Cc: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Cc: Qian Cai <redacted> Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> --- v2: - unconditionally initialize pages in kernel_init_free_pages() - comment from Randy Dunlap: drop 'default false' lines from Kconfig.hardening v3: - don't call kernel_init_free_pages() from memblock_free_pages() - adopted some Kees' comments for the patch description v4: - use NULL instead of 0 in slab_alloc_node() (found by kbuild test robot) - don't write to NULL object in slab_alloc_node() (found by Android testing) v5: - adjusted documentation wording as suggested by Kees - disable SLAB_POISON if auto-initialization is on - don't wipe RCU cache allocations made without __GFP_ZERO - dropped SLOB support v7: - rebase the patch, added the Acked-by: tag v8: - addressed comments by Michal Hocko: revert kernel/kexec_core.c and apply initialization in dma_pool_free() - disable init_on_alloc/init_on_free if slab poisoning or page poisoning are enabled, as requested by Qian Cai - skip the redzone when initializing a freed heap object, as requested by Qian Cai and Kees Cook - use s->offset to address the freeptr (suggested by Kees Cook) - updated the patch description, added Signed-off-by: tag --- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 9 +++ drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c | 2 +- include/linux/mm.h | 22 ++++++ mm/dmapool.c | 4 +- mm/page_alloc.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++-- mm/slab.c | 16 ++++- mm/slab.h | 19 +++++ mm/slub.c | 43 +++++++++-- net/core/sock.c | 2 +- security/Kconfig.hardening | 29 ++++++++ 10 files changed, 199 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txtb/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 138f6664b2e2..84ee1121a2b9 100644--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt@@ -1673,6 +1673,15 @@initrd= [BOOT] Specify the location of the initial ramdisk + init_on_alloc= [MM] Fill newly allocated pages and heap objects with + zeroes. + Format: 0 | 1 + Default set by CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON. + + init_on_free= [MM] Fill freed pages and heap objects with zeroes. + Format: 0 | 1 + Default set by CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON. + init_pkru= [x86] Specify the default memory protection keys rights register contents for all processes. 0x55555554 by default (disallow access to all but pkey 0). Candiff --git a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.cb/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c index 829b0c6944d8..61758201d9b2 100644--- a/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c +++ b/drivers/infiniband/core/uverbs_ioctl.c@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ __malloc void *_uverbs_alloc(struct uverbs_attr_bundle*bundle, size_t size, res = (void *)pbundle->internal_buffer + pbundle->internal_used; pbundle->internal_used = ALIGN(new_used, sizeof(*pbundle->internal_buffer)); - if (flags & __GFP_ZERO) + if (want_init_on_alloc(flags)) memset(res, 0, size); return res; }diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index dd0b5f4e1e45..96be2604f313 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h@@ -2696,6 +2696,28 @@ static inline void kernel_poison_pages(struct page*page, int numpages, int enable) { } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_ALLOC_DEFAULT_ON +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_alloc); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_alloc); +#endif +static inline bool want_init_on_alloc(gfp_t flags) +{ + if (static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_alloc)) + return true; + return flags & __GFP_ZERO; +} + +#ifdef CONFIG_INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(init_on_free); +#else +DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(init_on_free); +#endif +static inline bool want_init_on_free(void) +{ + return static_branch_unlikely(&init_on_free); +} + extern bool _debug_pagealloc_enabled; static inline bool debug_pagealloc_enabled(void)
Do those really necessary need to be static keys? Adding either init_on_free=0 or init_on_alloc=0 to the kernel cmdline will generate a warning with kernels built with clang. [ 0.000000] static_key_disable(): static key 'init_on_free+0x0/0x4' used before call to jump_label_init() [ 0.000000] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at ./include/linux/jump_label.h:317 early_init_on_free+0x1c0/0x200 [ 0.000000] Modules linked in: [ 0.000000] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.2.0-rc6-next-20190626+ #9 [ 0.000000] pstate: 60000089 (nZCv daIf -PAN -UAO) [ 0.000000] pc : early_init_on_free+0x1c0/0x200 [ 0.000000] lr : early_init_on_free+0x1c0/0x200 [ 0.000000] sp : ffff100012c07df0 [ 0.000000] x29: ffff100012c07e20 x28: ffff1000110a01ec [ 0.000000] x27: 000000000000005f x26: ffff100011716cd0 [ 0.000000] x25: ffff100010d36166 x24: ffff100010d3615d [ 0.000000] x23: ffff100010d364b5 x22: ffff1000117164a0 [ 0.000000] x21: 0000000000000000 x20: 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] x19: 0000000000000000 x18: 000000000000002e [ 0.000000] x17: 000000000000000f x16: 0000000000000040 [ 0.000000] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 6c61632065726f66 [ 0.000000] x13: 6562206465737520 x12: 273478302f307830 [ 0.000000] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] x9 : 0000000000000000 x8 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.000000] x7 : 6d756a206f74206c x6 : ffff100014426625 [ 0.000000] x5 : ffff100012c07b28 x4 : 0000000000000007 [ 0.000000] x3 : ffff1000101aadf4 x2 : 0000000000000001 [ 0.000000] x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : 000000000000005d [ 0.000000] Call trace: [ 0.000000] early_init_on_free+0x1c0/0x200 [ 0.000000] do_early_param+0xd0/0x104 [ 0.000000] parse_args+0x1f0/0x524 [ 0.000000] parse_early_param+0x70/0x8c [ 0.000000] setup_arch+0xa8/0x268 [ 0.000000] start_kernel+0x80/0x560