Re: [RFC PATCH v1 2/3] LSM/x86/sgx: Implement SGX specific hooks in SELinux

From
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Date
2019-06-16 22:16:52
Also in
lkml, selinux
Reply to
Xing, Cedric, 2019-06-14
On Fri, Jun 14, 2019 at 10:16 AM Xing, Cedric [off-list ref] wrote:
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From: Christopherson, Sean J
Sent: Thursday, June 13, 2019 5:46 PM

On Thu, Jun 13, 2019 at 01:02:17PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
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On 6/11/19 6:02 PM, Sean Christopherson wrote:
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On Tue, Jun 11, 2019 at 09:40:25AM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
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I haven't looked at this code closely, but it feels like a lot of
SGX-specific logic embedded into SELinux that will have to be
repeated or reused for every security module.  Does SGX not track
this state itself?
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SGX does track equivalent state.

There are three proposals on the table (I think):

  1. Require userspace to explicitly specificy (maximal) enclave
page
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     permissions at build time.  The enclave page permissions are
provided
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     to, and checked by, LSMs at enclave build time.

     Pros: Low-complexity kernel implementation, straightforward
auditing
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     Cons: Sullies the SGX UAPI to some extent, may increase
complexity of
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           SGX2 enclave loaders.

  2. Pre-check LSM permissions and dynamically track mappings to
enclave
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     pages, e.g. add an SGX mprotect() hook to restrict W->X and WX
     based on the pre-checked permissions.

     Pros: Does not impact SGX UAPI, medium kernel complexity
     Cons: Auditing is complex/weird, requires taking enclave-
specific
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           lock during mprotect() to query/update tracking.

  3. Implement LSM hooks in SGX to allow LSMs to track enclave
regions
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     from cradle to grave, but otherwise defer everything to LSMs.

     Pros: Does not impact SGX UAPI, maximum flexibility, precise
auditing
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     Cons: Most complex and "heaviest" kernel implementation of the
three,
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           pushes more SGX details into LSMs.

My RFC series[1] implements #1.  My understanding is that Andy
(Lutomirski) prefers #2.  Cedric's RFC series implements #3.

Perhaps the easiest way to make forward progress is to rule out the
options we absolutely *don't* want by focusing on the potentially
blocking issue with each option:

  #1 - SGX UAPI funkiness

  #2 - Auditing complexity, potential enclave lock contention

  #3 - Pushing SGX details into LSMs and complexity of kernel
implementation


[1]
https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20190606021145.12604-1-sean.j.christopherso
n@intel.com
Given the complexity tradeoff, what is the clear motivating example
for why
#1 isn't the obvious choice? That the enclave loader has no way of
knowing a priori whether the enclave will require W->X or WX?  But
aren't we better off requiring enclaves to be explicitly marked as
needing such so that we can make a more informed decision about
whether to load them in the first place?
Andy and/or Cedric, can you please weigh in with a concrete (and
practical) use case that will break if we go with #1?  The auditing
issues for #2/#3 are complex to say the least...
How does enclave loader provide per-page ALLOW_* flags? And a related question is why they are necessary for enclaves but unnecessary for regular executables or shared objects.

What's the story for SGX2 if mmap()'ing non-existing pages is not allowed?
I think it just works.  Either you can't mmap() the page until you
have explicitly EAUG-ed it, or you add a new ioctl() that is
effectively "EAUG lazily".  The latter would declare that address and
request that it get allocated and EAUGed when faulted, but it wouldn't
actually do the EAUG.

--Andy
Thread (67 messages) 67 messages, 7 authors, last reply 2019-06-18
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