Re: [PATCH v2 09/10] LSM: SafeSetID: verify transitive constrainedness
From: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>
Date: 2019-05-07 15:03:19
Ready for merge. On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 1:38 PM Kees Cook [off-list ref] wrote:
On Thu, Apr 11, 2019 at 1:12 PM Micah Morton [off-list ref] wrote:quoted
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Someone might write a ruleset like the following, expecting that it securely constrains UID 1 to UIDs 1, 2 and 3: 1:2 1:3 However, because no constraints are applied to UIDs 2 and 3, an attacker with UID 1 can simply first switch to UID 2, then switch to any UID from there. The secure way to write this ruleset would be: 1:2 1:3 2:2 3:3 , which uses "transition to self" as a way to inhibit the default-allow policy without allowing anything specific. This is somewhat unintuitive. To make sure that policy authors don't accidentally write insecure policies because of this, let the kernel verify that a new ruleset does not contain any entries that are constrained, but transitively unconstrained. Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> Signed-off-by: Micah Morton <mortonm@chromium.org>Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <redacted> -Keesquoted
--- Changes since the last patch: Instead of failing open when userspace configures an unconstrained (and vulnerable) policy, fix up the policy to make sure it is safe by restricting the un-constrained UIDs. Return EINVAL from the policy write in the case that userspace writes an unconstrained policy. Also move hash_add() into a small helper function. security/safesetid/securityfs.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++- .../selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c | 4 +- 2 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)diff --git a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c index 997b403c6255..d568e17dd773 100644 --- a/security/safesetid/securityfs.c +++ b/security/safesetid/securityfs.c@@ -76,6 +76,37 @@ static void release_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol) call_rcu(&pol->rcu, __release_ruleset); } +static void insert_rule(struct setuid_ruleset *pol, struct setuid_rule *rule) +{ + hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kuid_val(rule->src_uid)); +} + +static int verify_ruleset(struct setuid_ruleset *pol) +{ + int bucket; + struct setuid_rule *rule, *nrule; + int res = 0; + + hash_for_each(pol->rules, bucket, rule, next) { + if (_setuid_policy_lookup(pol, rule->dst_uid, INVALID_UID) == + SIDPOL_DEFAULT) { + pr_warn("insecure policy detected: uid %d is constrained but transitively unconstrained through uid %d\n", + __kuid_val(rule->src_uid), + __kuid_val(rule->dst_uid)); + res = -EINVAL; + + /* fix it up */ + nrule = kmalloc(sizeof(struct setuid_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!nrule) + return -ENOMEM; + nrule->src_uid = rule->dst_uid; + nrule->dst_uid = rule->dst_uid; + insert_rule(pol, nrule); + } + } + return res; +} + static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file, const char __user *ubuf, size_t len) {@@ -128,7 +159,7 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file, goto out_free_rule; } - hash_add(pol->rules, &rule->next, __kuid_val(rule->src_uid)); + insert_rule(pol, rule); p = end + 1; continue;@@ -137,6 +168,11 @@ static ssize_t handle_policy_update(struct file *file, goto out_free_buf; } + err = verify_ruleset(pol); + /* bogus policy falls through after fixing it up */ + if (err && err != -EINVAL) + goto out_free_buf; + /* * Everything looks good, apply the policy and release the old one. * What we really want here is an xchg() wrapper for RCU, but since thatdiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c index 4f03813d1911..8f40c6ecdad1 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/safesetid/safesetid-test.c@@ -144,7 +144,9 @@ static void write_policies(void) { static char *policy_str = "1:2\n" - "1:3\n"; + "1:3\n" + "2:2\n" + "3:3\n"; ssize_t written; int fd; --2.21.0.392.gf8f6787159e-goog-- Kees Cook