On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 12:27 PM Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:

On 04/17, Paul Moore wrote:

quoted

On Wed, Apr 17, 2019 at 10:57 AM Oleg Nesterov [off-list ref] wrote:

quoted

On 04/17, Paul Moore wrote:

quoted

I'm tempted to simply return an error in selinux_setprocattr() if
the task's credentials are not the same as its real_cred;

What about other modules? I have no idea what smack_setprocattr() is,
but it too does prepare_creds/commit creds.

it seems that the simplest workaround should simply add the additional
cred == real_cred into proc_pid_attr_write().

Yes, that is simple, but I worry about what other LSMs might want to
do.  While I believe failing if the effective creds are not the same
as the real_creds is okay for SELinux (possibly Smack too), I worry
about what other LSMs may want to do.  After all,
proc_pid_attr_write() doesn't change the the creds itself, that is
something the specific LSMs do.

Yes, but if proc_pid_attr_write() is called with cred != real_cred then
something is already wrong?

True, or at least I would think so.

Looking at the current tree there are three LSMs which implement
setprocattr hooks: SELinux, Smack, and AppArmor.  I know Casey has
already mentioned that he wasn't able to trigger the problem in Smack,
but looking at smack_setprocattr() I see the similar commit_creds()
usage so I would expect the same problem in Smack; what say you Casey?
 Looking at apparmor_setprocattr(), it appears that it too could end
up calling commit_creds() via aa_set_current_hat().

Since it looks like all three LSMs which implement the setprocattr
hook are vulnerable I'm open to the idea that proc_pid_attr_write() is
a better choice for the cred != read_cred check, but I would want to
make sure John and Casey are okay with that.

John?

Casey?

-- 
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com