Re: [PATCH 03/27] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down
From: Matthew Garrett <hidden>
Date: 2019-03-08 23:31:03
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From: Matthew Garrett <hidden>
Date: 2019-03-08 23:31:03
Also in:
lkml
On Fri, Mar 8, 2019 at 3:00 PM James Morris [off-list ref] wrote:
On Wed, 6 Mar 2019, Matthew Garrett wrote:quoted
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> If the kernel is locked down, require that all modules have valid signatures that we can verify.Perhaps note that this won't cover the case where folk are using DM-Verity with a signed root hash for verifying kernel modules.
Mm. I can't see a terribly good way of doing this generically - loadpin gives no indication to the module loading code that it comes from a trusted source. Would making the lockdown/module signature enforcement a separate config option be reasonable?