Re: [PATCH 16/18] LSM: Allow arbitrary LSM ordering

Started by Casey Schaufler on Sep 18, 2018

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On 9/17/2018 4:47 PM, Micka?l Sala?n wrote:
On 9/18/18 01:30, Casey Schaufler wrote:
quoted
On 9/17/2018 4:20 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
quoted
On Mon, Sep 17, 2018 at 4:10 PM, Micka?l Sala?n [off-list ref] wrote:
quoted
Landlock, because it target unprivileged users, should only be called
after all other major (access-control) LSMs. The admin or distro must
not be able to change that order in any way. This constraint doesn't
apply to current LSMs, though.
What harm would it cause for Landlock to get called before SELinux?
I certainly see why it seems like it ought to get called after, but
would it really make a difference?
If an unprivileged process is able to infer some properties of a file
being requested (thanks to one of its eBPF program doing checks on this
process accesses), whereas this file access would be denied by a
privileged LSM, then there is a side channel attack allowing this
process to indirectly get information otherwise inaccessible.

In other words, an unprivileged process should not be allowed to sneak
itself (via an eBPF program) before SELinux for instance. SELinux should
be able to block such information gathering the same way it can block a
fstat(2) requested by a process.
The argument would feel a bit stronger if LSM checks happened before
the DAC checks. The opportunity to sneak a check in already exists, but
not with the tools you get with eBPF. For now at least I'll grant that
there's good reason for Landlock to go last.
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