[PATCH v4 00/19] LSM: Module stacking for SARA and Landlock

On Fri, Sep 21, 2018 at 4:59 PM, Casey Schaufler [off-list ref] wrote:

v4: Finer granularity in the patches and other
    cleanups suggested by Kees Cook.
    Removed dead code created by the removal of SELinux
    credential blob poisoning.

Thanks for the splitting, this really does make it easier to review
(at least for me). I think this looks really good, though obviously
I'd like to refactor it slightly on top of my series. :)

One additional thought I had was about the blobs allocations: some are
separate kmem caches, and some are kmalloc. I'm thinking it might make
sense to use separate kmem caches for two reasons:

- they're going to always be the same size and are regularly
allocated/freed, so it may offer a performance benefit.

- they're explicitly not supposed to be exposed to userspace, so
hardened usercopy would protect them if they were not kmalloc()ed.

I'm excited about getting this landed!

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security