[PATCH RFC v2 5/5] SELinux: Support SELinux determination of side-channel vulnerability
From: Stephen Smalley <hidden>
Date: 2018-08-20 16:01:15
Also in:
lkml, selinux
On 08/17/2018 06:16 PM, Casey Schaufler wrote:
SELinux considers tasks to be side-channel safe if they have PROCESS_SHARE access.
Now the description and the code no longer match.
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <redacted> --- security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index a8bf324130f5..7fbd7d7ac1cb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c@@ -4219,6 +4219,14 @@ static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, spin_unlock(&isec->lock); } +static int selinux_task_safe_sidechannel(struct task_struct *p) +{ + struct av_decision avd; + + return avc_has_perm_noaudit(&selinux_state, current_sid(), task_sid(p), + SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, 0, &avd); +}
And my question from before still stands: why do we need a new hook and new security module instead of just using ptrace_may_access()?
quoted hunk ↗ jump to hunk
+ /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */ static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)@@ -7002,6 +7010,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, selinux_task_movememory), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, selinux_task_kill), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, selinux_task_to_inode), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_safe_sidechannel, selinux_task_safe_sidechannel), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, selinux_ipc_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, selinux_ipc_getsecid),